MULTICULTURALISM AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN MODERN NATION STATES

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Milena Manojlović

National Security Academy, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia

**Abstract.** This article is an analysis of the complex relations between concept of multiculturalism and modern liberal nation states, which are based on a principle of common citizenship. Consequently, in this article we question the impact of multiculturalism on the process of integration in these societies, which inevitably brings us to a contemplation of the complex relations of modern liberal democracy and nationalism. The author presents the most influential ideas of the political philosopher Brian Barry who, as a liberal egalitarian, criticized multiculturalism from the theoretical position of liberalism that seeks to provide social justice. The structure of this paper reflects his prominent ideas on this matter. In three separate chapters, the author discusses the impact of public policies with a multicultural agenda on the equal treatment of citizens, the relationship between liberalism and assimilation and liberalism, and national identity perceived as a necessary precondition for achieving integration. The last chapter of article considers the positions of other theorists on the subject of relations between a liberal state and national identity, which leads to concluding reflections of the conception of politics as a space for self-expression.

**Key words:** liberalism, multiculturalism, integration, assimilation, citizenship, national identity.

1. INTRODUCTION

First of all, it is very important to clarify any misunderstandings regarding terminology used in this paper. *Multiculturalism* is defined as a set of the stances that support the politicization of group identities, and the base for common identity is culture. “Those who advocate the politicization of (cultural) group identities start from a variety of premises and finish up with a variety of policy prescriptions. Nevertheless, there is enough overlap between them to make it feasible to discuss them within a single book. The views in

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**Corresponding author:** Milena Manojlović, National Security Academy, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia

E-mail: milenamanojlovic@ymail.com
question are known as the politics of difference, the politics of recognition or, most popularly, *multiculturalism*” (Barry, 2001:5).

Barry warns of inconsistent use of the term ‘multiculturalism’. The word is being simultaneously used in its descriptive and prescriptive meaning, both as a term for the socio-cultural diversity that one may find in contemporary society and as a political programme that promotes group rights. “Recognition of the fact of multiculturalism can easily be taken to entail a commitment to the multiculturalist programme; conversely, anybody who dissents from normative multiculturalism automatically stands accused of blindness to cultural plurality” (Barry, 2001:22). Barry clears his position, stressing that he does not deny reality of plural societies but, at the same time, does not agree with normative or ideological aspect of multiculturalism. “The argument of this book is not that the fact of multiple cultures is unimportant (or in most instances regrettable) but that the multiculturalist programme for responding to it is in most instances ill-advised. Indeed, it is just because the fact of multiple cultures is important that the politicization of group identities and the development of group-specific policies should be resisted” (Barry, 2001:24).

2. MULTICULTURALISM AND EQUAL TREATMENT

Firstly, Barry addresses the argument of a Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka, who claimed that common citizenship right was originally developed in the context of much more homogeneous political communities and that it should be updated to deal with issues of ethno-cultural diversity of contemporary society. Barry does not accept this argument. In fact, “this model of citizenship was developed in response to the wars of religion that made much of Europe a living hell in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (Barry, 2001:21). Concept of common citizenship rights did not emerge from harmonious society; the society created them. Precisely, because liberals recognized the important role that religion plays in many people’s lives, they emphasized the importance of neutralizing it as a political force. Because religion is so important to people, solution lies in making it a private issue and pushing it out of the public sphere. That is the key argument of the liberal formula for the depoliticization of differences. Insisting on it does not come from some misunderstanding or from neglecting the importance that religion has for people; on the contrary, it is motivated by deep understanding of value that religion has for citizens. Mere existence of different religions is not a cause for conflicts in society. Conflicts occur when one group tries to impose their religious beliefs to others. The liberal argument is that all sides must make compromises. The key is in denouncing public aspiration; all religions must be retained in the private sphere.

But then, some claim that not all religions are equally capable to attain this liberal standard of privatization of religion. “According to this, the liberal solution to religious conflict, in relegating religion to the private sphere, fails to accommodate all those whose beliefs include the notion that religion ought to have public expression” (Barry, 2001:26). Barry is aware of this argument, and considers it to be, to some extent, valid. Some religions, particularly Islam, lay a stronger claim to public sphere, with numerous of rules that regulate everyday life of followers. But the next argument, proposed by Charles Taylor, is that therefore Liberalism must not insist on full cultural neutrality. Barry strongly opposes this line of argumentation. He even questions how societies would even look like and function since, if we follow Taylor’s demands, if there is any belief that is contrary to liberalism, then liberalism is not
neutral. That is rather absurd and this illogical argumentations lead to conclusion that liberal societies are never neutral. But, according to Barry, Liberalism is neutral not because it is equally compatible with all religions but because it treats all religions the same. With this equal treatment, it provides a neutral arena for all citizens. “The answer is that the way in which liberalism is neutral is that it is fair” (Barry, 2001:28).

Furthermore, Barry asks why we should give up on a model that proved to be a successful one. But, the authors that follow the multicultural agenda are also for equal treatment. “If public policy treats people differently in response to their different culturally derived beliefs and practices, the argument runs, it is really treating them equally. To appreciate this, it is said, we need a more subtle understanding of what is involved in equal treatment than that which underlies 'difference-blind' liberalism, according to which people are treated equally when they are treated in the same way” (Barry, 2001:17). This assertion is used for justification of the rule-and-exemption approach, which insists on exemptions of minorities from certain laws if they are, concerning their culture or religion, especially hard on them. But the rules continue to apply to all others citizens. According to Barry, these kinds of practices led to a complete collapse of common citizenship rules, which are grounded on equality under law. “These rights should be assigned to individual citizens, with no special rights (or disabilities) accorded to some and not others on the basis of group membership” (Barry, 2001:7). All our differences, our particular identities, facts about our sex, race, religious beliefs, ethnicity and culture must remain out of the public range in the sense that under the law we are treated equally. Furthermore, Barry underlines that if a main cause for this rule-and-exemption approach is to preserve different cultures, than it is logical to assume that exemptions will be permanent. These exemptions from law would not have some transitional role during a period of adjustment of minorities in new society. On the contrary, exemptions will lead to creation of groups that are permanently treated differently, and thus society would stop providing equal treatment under law for all of its citizens.

Barry states that the rule-and-exemption approach may sometimes be defensible on the basis of political prudence or an estimate of the balance of advantages. “But I shall reject the characteristic case made by the supporters of multiculturalism, that a correct analysis would show exemptions for cultural minorities to be required in a great many cases by egalitarian liberal justice” (Barry, 2001:33). Similarly as in case of relation that liberalism has with religions, Barry is asking why is equality of rule measured by different impact that it has on citizens. For example, speed limits inhibit only those who like to drive fast, but that makes this rule an unfair one. “The point is a completely general one. If we consider virtually any law, we shall find that it is much more burdensome to some people than to others” (Barry, 2001:34).

Equally applied laws provide for an equal set of choices and, therefore, they provide equal chances for all citizens. Justice is achieved if we all have the same set of rules and opportunities in front of us. If we decide not to use them because of our beliefs or culture, it is the result of beliefs we have, not of an unfair treatment. “We can say if we like that people are responsible for their own beliefs, but that should be understood simply as a way of saying that they own them: their beliefs are not to be conceived of as some sort of alien affliction” (Barry, 2001:36). Additionally, Barry stresses that claims, like ones made by Bhikhu Parekh, that represent religious beliefs like burdens are offensive; so are those who compare them with disabilities, for both sides of that comparison. People with disabilities, unlike people who freely choose to live their lives in accordance with their
religion and culture, do not choose not to use some opportunities. For them, the range of opportunities is limited by their disability. “Parekh deliberately blurs this distinction by writing that that 'opportunity is a subject-dependent concept, so that a facility, a resource or a course of action' does not constitute an opportunity, or you, even if it is actually open to you, unless you have 'the cultural disposition' to take advantage of it” (Barry, 2001:37). This line of argumentation harms the true meaning of the word opportunity, which is an objective state of affairs and it does not depend on our preferences. Barry is especially against the practice in which, when one is advocating for usage of the rule-and-exemption approach, one calls for rights given by some general principle mandating respect for religious differences, which does not exist. “The suggestion is then made that following through this principle consistently would entail more exemptions for more groups. However, if (as I have maintained) there is no such principle, these cases are not the thin end of the wedge - they are the wedge itself. In other words, they are anomalies to be tolerated because the cure would be worse than the disease. But they provide no support for any extension to new cases” (Barry, 2001:51).

3. LIBERALISM AND ASSIMILATION

The next subject that is discussed in the book concerns of accusations that liberalism has inherent tendency to assimilate minorities and that it is, in the words of Charles Taylor, difference-blind. Barry’s first remark is that, traditionally, sculptures that represent Goddess of Justice have blindfold over their eyes. He rejects all accusations that liberalism cannot provide a set of measures that are necessary for survival of any particular culture. But, he does not understand why would that even be liability of a liberal state? Individuals, citizens and their choices, those are the important things in liberal framework, and the survival of some culture is not end in itself. Liberalism does not see any value in the preservation of culture and cultural existence separate from the interests of the individual carriers of culture. “Liberals must stand up for the rights of those who wish to pursue individual goals of self-development. Contrary, however, to a frequently heard claim, liberals are not committed to the attempt to eradicate all traditional ways of life in order to further some ideal of free-floating personal autonomy” (Barry, 2001:66). Barry does not perceive that cultures could have special rights as entities. “Communities defined by some shared cultural characteristic (for example, a language) may under some circumstances have valid claims, but the claims then arise from the legitimate interests of the members of the group” (Barry, 2001:67).

The usual line of argumentation against liberalism is, as Barry suggests, that liberalism is prone to assimilation and hostile to minorities, and the main proof is that it assumes that there are no differences among people. He returns to the previously stated arguments and strongly underlines that liberalism recognizes the importance of cultural and religious differences, and that is why it depoliticized them. “The liberal notion of equality before the law, so far from resting on the assumption that differences do not exist, is proposed as the fairest way of accommodating them” (Barry, 2001:68).

John Rawls and the ideas presented in his capital work “A theory of Justice” are often criticized along the same vein of argument, i.e. that egalitarian liberalism is difference-blind. The idea of veil of ignorance, the original position that essentially blinds people to all facts about themselves so they cannot tailor principles to their own advantage, is being
criticized: “First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong” (Rawls, 1971:118). Hence, there are frequent claims that this theory does not include and is not relevant for actual people, their differences, values and belief. But then again, Barry suggests that these interpretations of Rawls's work are wrong. “What is the right way to deal with difference? Rawls's basic idea is that a sign of our having achieved a just answer is that it is one that can be endorsed as fair by each person, whatever his or her personal characteristics, endowments and commitments may be” (Barry, 2001:69). Barry insists that Rawls's whole theory is based on the assumption that the key point of justice is to address differences in a way that could lead us to equality.

Iris Marion Young also connects liberal principles of equal treatment with tendencies of assimilation. “According to this line of analysis, liberalism does not actually assume away the existence of difference, but it is committed to hoping that all the differences constituting peoples distinctive social identities will someday disappear” (Barry, 2001:69). Young contrasts this ideal of assimilation, that she contributes to liberalism, with an ideal of diversity. She defines this ideal of diversity, not in terms of a state of affairs, but in terms of a public policy, one in which group identities are given an explicit role to both the inputs and outputs of political decision making. But, Barry denies that assimilation is in fact the motive for equal treatment. “For egalitarian liberals, equal treatment is required by justice. It is an expression of the equal rights to which citizens of a liberal state are entitled” (Barry, 2001:71). But, at the same time, Barry rejects promotion of Young's ideal of diversity through public policies. “For liberals, the right amount of diversity - and the right amount of assimilation - is that which comes about as a result of free choices within a framework of just institutions”(Barry, 2001:71).

Firstly, Barry makes terminological difference between acculturation and assimilation. “One way of making the distinction would be to define the process of becoming more similar culturally as 'acculturation', while reserving the term 'assimilation' for the complete disappearance of the groups identity so that it ceases to function as a reference point either for the members of the group or for others outside the group”(Barry, 2001:72). It is important to emphasize that assimilation requires mutual recognition, meaning that an individual must feel as part of a group he is assimilating in, and the group must accept that individual as a member as well. Assimilation, which is very important, can be absorptive or additive. Absorptive assimilation is achieved when the process of acculturation is so strongly present that all members of a group have the same cultural identity. On the other hand, additive assimilation does not include loosing the previous cultural identity, but only the addition of a new one. “The crucial point is that, just as the acquisition of a new identity may not require complete acculturation, so it may not require the giving up of an old identity” (Barry, 2001:81). Assimilation is not the same as acculturation, so it is not necessary to lose distinctive cultural attributes. On the contrary, human beings are capable of having multiple identities at the same time. Also, by including new members, identity of a group itself is evolving.
Assimilation may occur voluntary, may be brutally enforced, or it may happen spontaneously. In the case of voluntary assimilation, when achieving it is a goal of one group, one must examine the possibility that motives of that group are based on avoiding any sort of discrimination, which is prohibited by standards and rules that are required by liberalism. On the other hand, it is possible to have conditions that encourage assimilation, without them being discriminatory. “Even if institutional background satisfies the demands of justice, it may well still be that the culture (for example, the language) of a group puts it at a disadvantage in pursuing end valued by its members” (Barry, 2001:75). Unfortunately, brutally enforced assimilation was not rare through human history. Barry stresses that brutally enforced assimilation is prohibited in liberal societies. “But if it is assimilation of this kind that is objectionable - and it surely is - we should not conflate it with assimilation that occurs in the absence of coercion within a context of just institutions. The thesis of 'difference-blind' liberalism is that it would been improper to interference with individual liberty to design public policies aimed at frustrating the wishes of those who would like to assimilate under those conditions” (Barry, 2001:76).

4. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Barry opens the debate about the contemporary liberal state and its relation to national identity with an interesting observation: “I believe that it is an appropriate objective of public policy in a liberal democratic state to facilitate the achievement of a state of affairs in which all immigrants - or at least their descendants - become assimilated to the national identity of the country in which they have settled” (Barry, 2001:72). It should be noted that Barry says immigrants need to become assimilated and not to assimilate; so, it is clear that they are not the ones who should do all the work; it is possible that the community they are assimilated to would have to adapt and change some of its customs. It is clear, therefore, that Barry is suggesting additive rather than absorbing assimilation. Also, it is important for Barry that the concept of national identity must be understood in a specific way. There are different conceptions of national identity. According to the purely legalistic conception of national identity, members of a one nation are all those who have citizenship of that nation. This view, according to Barry, is liked by authors, officials and others that support multiculturalism, and it is very important to liberals as well. But, liberals deny that citizenship alone is enough. According to the ethnic conception of national identity, in order to be part of a nation, an individual has to be a member of a dominant ethnic group which "owns" the country. “Even if citizenship is granted to those who do not belong to the ethnic group that conceives itself as owning the state, there is nothing to prevent the numerically and politically dominant ethnic group from discriminating against citizens who do not belong to it by, for example, disqualifying them from eligibility for positions that are regarded as to important to entrust to them” (Barry, 2001:77).

Barry begins the explanation of his concept of national identity by stressing the fact that Liberal democracy is a relatively rare form of Government in the world. Large numbers of decolonized States that have tested liberal democratic constitutions have slipped to dictatorships or anarchies. Consequently, one could conclude that the conditions for the maintenance of the liberal order are strict and demanding. Therefore, the creation and facilitation of these conditions must be a priority of liberal societies. “What might be the conditions we are looking for? To begin with, we cannot expect the outcomes of democratic
polities to be just in a society that contains large numbers of people who feel no sense of empathy with their fellow citizens and do not have any identification with their lot” (Barry, 2001:79). That sense of solidarity, according to Barry, is preserved by the common institutions and the distribution of income. The distribution of income is aimed at preventing the rich members of community from thinking that they can avoid the common destiny, particularly the common system of education, health care and other public services that would only service needs of poorer fellow citizens. The only difference that egalitarian liberals do not tolerate is the material one, particularly when it is significant. “More broadly, liberal democracies are very unlikely to produce just outcomes unless their citizens have certain attitudes towards one another. It must be accepted on all hands that the interests of everyone must count equally, and that there are no groups whose members’ views are to be automatically discounted. Equally important is a willingness on the part of citizens to make sacrifices for the common good which, of course presupposes that they are capable of recognizing a common good. Moreover, citizens do not just as a matter of fact have to be willing to make sacrifices; it is also necessary that citizens should have firm expectations of one another to the effect that they will be prepared to give up money, leisure and perhaps even life itself if the occasion arises. What shall we call this cluster of attitudes towards fellow citizens? I propose to define it as a sense of common nationality, distinguishing the appropriate concept of nationality from both the formal one embodied in a passport and also the ethnic interpretation of nationality. In contrast with either of these, I shall describe the relevant sense of nationality as civic nationality” (Barry, 2001:80).

Barry is aware of risks of using word nationality which is often defined in ethnic terms. But alternative terms, like feeling of belonging to political community, are too vague and more importantly they are subjective. “Talking about a shared identity emphasizes that there must be mutuality of recognition and not merely a lot of people who harbor in their breasts similar feelings about their personal relation to the polity” (Barry, 2001:80).

It is clear that assimilation to this national identity does not imply acculturation. Acceptance of certain cultural quality, most of all the dominant language, may be essential in order to achieve the requirements of this civic nationality but, what is really important, it does not necessarily imply abandoning the previous cultural attributes and identity. The author points out that the key is the conventional aspect of identity, what he calls ratification. Thus, acculturation is not necessary, and the scope of "culturally dense" conditions for obtaining the national identity depends on the results of constant negotiation between involved ethnic groups. Barry notes that these conditions are not fixed once and for all; they are constantly subject to renegotiation in the process of inclusion. This conclusion is of extreme importance because it points out that culture is not the fundamental issue in the debate about national identity. Moreover, according to Barry, national identity does not have the distinctive cultural content. “Provided that assimilation to a common identity is not ruled out by descent based criteria, the core of a common national identity is a common commitment to the welfare of the larger society made up of the majority (or minorities) and mutual trust in others to abide by that commitment even when it entails sacrifices” (Barry, 2001:88). As the author concludes, that is why multiculturalism is a trap, especially when it takes the form of assignment of public services to minority groups. Such situation, in which the groups live in parallel worlds, does not encourage mutual understanding, collaboration, and trust. It is necessary to have common institutions that connect us all, to patiently collaborate through them, and the product of this meticulous work can be a strong sense of commitment to the common good that is shared by all citizens. In the end, Barry...
emphasizes the importance of giving the highest priority to combating violence and assaults that are related to group membership.

5. LIMITATIONS OF LIBERALISM

A significant insight into the same problems that Barry examines was given in the essay *Politics of Recognition and Democratic Citizenship*, written by professor Milan Podunavac. In it, the author analyzes the relationship of liberal political theory and the challenges that are sets before it by the politics of recognition, as well as the relationship of liberalism and nationalism, and the concept of political nation that is created out of this relationship. Podunavac writes that supporters of multiculturalism claim that standard solutions offered by liberal political theory as a form of "managing" the contradictory imperatives of unity and diversity require solutions are not efficient. Basically, it is necessary to go beyond traditional liberal and democratic principles. "The principle of tolerance of diversity, which places the uniqueness of individual in the field of privacy and civil society and which is in the heart of the liberalism, is just insufficient. The principle of democratic justice requires the acceptance and recognition of particular identity in the public field. Equality of moral and political status, on which the democratic order is grounded, cannot be met without additional sensitivity and reflections regarding cultural differences" (Podunavac, 2010:38).

In the subsequent analysis, Podunavac rejects all radical standpoints and argues that the most productive solutions emerged from the encounter of liberalism and the politics of recognition. Certainly, one of the most important standpoints is T.H. Marshall's concept of Social Citizenship. "Marshall indicates citizenship as a form of "shared identity" that has the task to, within certain political community, integrates those groups on its periphery, which are potentially a factor of dissolution of its national unity" (Podunavac, 2010:41). Those conclusions apply to the process of integration of working class citizens who, due to their material deprivation and poor education, remained out of "common culture" which is "common property and heritage." Therefore, the idea of social justice develops only with full development of the principle of common citizenship (when it includes the whole of the civil, political and social rights), and it allows every member of society to enjoy certain rights and benefits, regardless of the results of market distribution. "Participation in the distribution of public goods is based on the principle of social justice, which is derived from the common life and common heritage. And that's the point at which Marshall's concept of social justice crashes. The emergence of radical pluralism and group aspirations destroys this idea" (Podunavac, 2010:41). If there is no longer a common heritage, then how will the principle of social justice be established and preserved?

The response of liberalism, which is represented by Barry in one of its variant, is the concept of the political nation, perceived as a field of interaction and mutual support of liberal and national principles. Podunavac argues that liberal nationalists think that a mixture of political liberalism and nationalism has a key role in a formation of "national community", which is necessary for preservation of modern liberal societies. "This type of osmosis provides the base of the modern national state, which is a particular form of pre-political right of nations to form a state. At the same time, this osmosis is the key factor in the narratives of political integration of modern societies and essentially another name for modern political community" (Podunavac, 2010:46). The argument that liberal institutions cannot prevail outside of the nation-state is widely accepted, and creation of
collective (national) identity is normatively justified in many ways. Barry, for instance, justifies it by insisting on the importance of social and political trust. "Since the right to a (national) state is a special form of pre-political right to self-preservation, maintenance of the state is a first imperative of every political society. When the variety of particular demands and cultural diversity endangers a sense of collective identity, it is desirable and necessary to encourage political assimilation. And those are the limits of liberal nationalism contrary to the "politics of recognition" (Podunavac, 2010:48). This is how Podunavac explains the phenomenon that "politics of recognition" is being more discouraged than encouraged in modern political societies and constitutional democracies.

In his concept of Republican citizenship, the German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas strived to cut all ties of modern liberal states and nationalism. Habermas even argued that the term "nation" in modern Europe has changed its meaning. From the term that marked a pre-political identity, it evolved into a term that has a constitutional role in determining the political identity of the citizen in a democratic community. Habermas’s argument is that the identity of the nation of citizens does not emanate from common ethnic and cultural properties. It rather derives from the practical action (praxis) of citizens who use their civil rights in an active way. Modern nations have cut their umbilical cord to the womb of a national consciousness which gave birth to them and, today, they are based on identically applied procedures for all of its inhabitants. Hence, modern states have an obligation to protect these procedures and constitutional principles (based on universal human rights), and not some particular culture. "Democratic right to self-determination includes the right to protect political culture, which includes the specific context of universal principles and civil liberties, but it does not imply protection of privileged cultural life forms" (Habermas, 2002:41).

6. CONCLUSION

Barry's main argument is that the multicultural politics could infringe trust among citizens, additionally making it harder for unprivileged minorities to climb the social ladder and reach better living conditions. On the other hand, a Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka insists that the notion of multiculturalism, as a factor that hinders solidarity and the welfare state, has not been confirmed. Kymlicka stresses that one could argue quite the opposite; in fact, it is precisely the absence of multiculturalism that corrodes the bonds of civil solidarity. The key questions facing modern plural societies in Europe are as follows: was it the lack of sensitivity of their liberal system to the specific needs of migrant populations that contributed to their insufficient integration in these societies; on the other hand, have the policies that protect group identities contributed to a situation in which parts of the migrant population reject the dominant values of the society in which they live? Even more interesting are Kymlicka’s claims that, as members of the minority group become wealthier, their demands for group rights get stronger. This leads us to the conclusion that the desires of Barry’s unprivileged minorities would be even louder if their material position was more favorable.

The arguments stated by Jürgen Habermas open a number of questions as well. Firstly, it is difficult to determine what makes for political culture whose preservation is considered legitimate and where a privileged culture of one community begins (as well as its specific way of life), which are not (in his opinion) included in the right to self-determination. It
seems that each community has a different answer to this question, depending on how they perceive themselves and what kind of future they seek for their members. The answers in Switzerland or in the USA would be different from those in Israel or in Serbia. While all of them are democratic countries, loyalty of their citizens is based on various grounds, which go beyond the guaranteed constitutional or universal human rights. It seems that liberalism reaches its limit when challenged by the integration of those groups that lay claim to the expression of their anti-liberal beliefs in the public sphere.

Also, loosening of the bond between national citizenship and national identity is not a uniform process, which is proved by the increasing number of minority groups that are trying to come to independence and to their own national states, even though they currently live in liberal societies that respect and protect the rights of all of its citizens as individuals, and additionally as members of minority groups. In response to the question why the Basques, Catalans or Scots (for example) seek to establish their own political entities, an Israeli academic Yael Tamir appropriately noted: "Because there is something unique about us and the best, if not the only way to preserve it, is to secure the public sphere which is marked by our own cultural and political institutions" (Tamir, 2002:205).

A member of a certain community defines its identity through ideas, morals and communication with others in the public arena. Politics is a field of self-expression and the place for public recognition of identity and values; it is not merely a neutral instrument for the maintenance of order and for the distribution of public goods.

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