THE ENLIGHTENMENT SIDE OF RATIONALISM BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF REASON AS COMMON SENSE

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Abstract. Rationalism of the 17th century has its seamy side in the philosophy of Enlightenment, whose relationship to the essential social questions is completely different. It is no longer gnoseological, or ontological, but it is mainly based on the ethic and aesthetic hypotheses, where reason was considered something that is to become. The enlighteners viewed the existing reason as insufficiently rational or completely irrational. In this way, the problems of rationalism were transferred from theory to practice, i.e. to the educational system and its reforms. This enthusiasm was caused by the belief that the culture of intellect can eliminate ignorance, as well as all social deficits that are a result of it. There is a difference that can be seen in considering the intellect, which cannot be accounted for by the "common sense" as general and a sense as such. Hegel later proved this with his conception of the speculative (dialectically established) intellect. Thus, the deficiency of knowledge was regarded more like a misunderstanding, while the shift towards the willing motivation for studying and investigating things was regarded the norm of approach.

Key words: Rationalism of the 17th century, Enlightenment, natural reason, existing reason, speculative-dialectic reason.

The concept of logos indicated the main characteristics of philosophy in the world-historic movements. No matter whether it is considered as the basis and the reason of the rational attitude, or as thing that can be understood and which is worthy of the intellectual hypothesism as an intellectual subject, logos as speech originally makes sense to things themselves. The double movement of the conceptualized matter from the visible to the invisible essence, regardless of the level to which the latter can be improved, points out that the work of philosophers can never be a matter of routine, nor a basis for reaching the highest positions in the privileged strata of society. In regard to what this sense hides, and where it is hardly understood, the speech of reason is the one that strives for

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intelligibility, considering demonstratively everything that belongs to things themselves and deserves to be considered. It functions as such even with extremely delicate forms of expressing intellectual points of view that we note while judging taste, during the characterizations of the barely understood aesthetic categories, as well as the very phenomenon of art, are concerned. Free inspiration, or the so-called “spontaneity”, does not necessarily imply irresponsibility or permission to do anything, since it can by no means justify the artistic arbitrariness and ignorance, aesthetic dismissal and disorder. Even though the very taste will always be subjective, it can still be deep, refined and loyal, while it can also be soft, blind and rude, overcome and inconsistent. In terms of this, “general sense”, as a public sense or good intentions, is viewed in regard to the characterization of the concept of taste as competent in an almost schematic way, when only the study of the direction of its actions and of the universal good are demanded, not considering the concepts that, according to subjective judgment, are the most adequate ones. Such observations are hardly concerned with the problem of the obligatory moment, so that what is regarded as an obligation becomes the schema of the deontic structure, where the so-called “moral beauty of virtue”, is viewed rather than the obligatory character of certain actions that were later justly objected to by Kant. Concerning this question, Hegel thought that familiarity with the subject is precedes the judging of critics with a certain taste, since these matters are discussed only by considering their external sides, while their introduction and obvious familiarity is a more important requirement because of the gathered facts and reasons. What is otherwise known should be introduced, so that the knowledge would keep the character of viability. Considering is the aforementioned, it cannot be concluded that artistic perfection can be identified with the so-called “expressive forming”, “striking liveliness”, or as it can also be said “picturesqueness”, since the work can be seen as completely inartistic, simply because the aesthetic ideas it consisted of, did not provide for the matters” internal ability of being passable. However, various epochs imply different tastes, so that the opinions

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1 Dealing with the philosophy of language in the classic antique discursive practice, then within the initiative of the methodical elaborations of the classic conceptualization of the logos, Irina Deretić (2009, 392, 402, 407) reached a more precise clarification of the understanding of the logos in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, presenting it in a perfect way: “... logos as a speech remains diElektos, logos as a reason diEneia, logos as an explanation remains aEtia, and logos as a definition DrismOcc. This act of specialization of the philosophic language and the terminology does not displace the concept of logos at all, but it is synonymously used with the aforementioned concepts. The fact that mostly contributes to this is that in the Zeta book of Metaphysics, logos is a word that cannot be substituted, and the most important questions of the central discussion on ousia are mentioned through this concept, and that is the relationship of form and definition, as well as of the single and universal in the knowledge and existence... We tried to confirm the view on the basis of which form is universal in the great discussion concerning the characters of Aristotle’s substantial forms that has been held since the first antique critics of his first philosophy until today. One of the reasons for this type of reading is that only universal forms can guarantee knowledge... Rational thinking and understanding is possible because reality is intelligible, no matter whether that intelligibility is understood as eidetic entities themselves, or as forms that are realized in the material, sensory perceived objects.”

2 “Since experts, whose weak point this is, may stick to knowing simply external aspects, techniques, histories, etc., and perhaps have little notion of the true nature of the work of art, or even know nothing of it at all; indeed they can even judge the real value of deeper observations with humiliation in comparison with simply positive, technical, and historical information; but even then their expertise, regarding it, is of a genuine kind, it is concerned at least with certain reasons and matters, and with the variety of judgments with which more precise differentiating of the different are related, although they are partly external points of one work of art and its evaluation” (Hegel 1988, 35; transl. T. M. Knox; transl. by N. Popovic, 1975, 36).
regarding them are always conditioned, even though the conditional quality may deeply remind us of something unconditional.

Enlightenment is an international west European intellectual movement that intended to change man’s attitude of the world, wherever he was – in Holland, England, France or Germany. The key role concerning its creation was played by the Huguenot emigrants from France, led by Pierre Bayle in Amsterdam and London. They emigrated from France after the breaking of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, and they expressed enormous aversion to religious persecution and intolerance, sharing their views among European cultural, political and economic channels of communication. During an extremely significant period 1687–1701, Holland played the leading role in the English “glorious revolution” and in establishing the bases for the stable functioning of the constitutional monarchy in England. Freedom was cherished in it, and Lord Shaftesbury himself named the Dutch “the people of a motherhood freedom”, because they resisted the Spanish conqueror and overcame their troubles. Hugo Grotius, a great Dutch theoretician wrote The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic (1610) that predicted the successful ending of the Dutch fight for independence on the basis of the myth of a German tribe, the Batavians, that was the center of the fight for independence in the 16th century, and it also predicted its successful conclusion. The Dutch managed to build firm and stable institutions in the fields of state and social organization, as well as in education and science, so that the Enlightenment was a prominent sanctuary for them in the 17th century. Then during the 40s, Cartesian philosophy (of René Descartes) provoked a severe philosophical discussions at all Dutch universities, except in Groningen, and showed an unusual actuality that could not be compared with intellectual trends among the more conservative European universities of that period.

The “new age” is known for its “new ways” that are no longer limited by time, experiencing the very heritage of philosophy as some kind of ballast. Moving aside which fortunately means that this kind of effort may seem manageable, has more of a virtually intellectual character, more like a simulacrum of some simulation of specialty, since the existence or intellectual substantiality is common even to the ones that dispute it. The struggle of the nominalists and realists in western Europe, that is most advanced in transcendental matters, is the antithesis that dominates the transfer of basic knowledge to “positive certainty”, which conditions the development of sciences guaranteed by the doubtlessness of the individual knowing. The instruments of positive or individualistic unsuspicious knowledge are the generalization of the fragmentary that was snatched away from transcendental matters, and later reduced, then the section of the possibilities of knowledge controlled by the facts or the so-called “positive certainties”, so that in this way they inaugurated one civilization with inverted old philosophic conceptions. No matter how this made an impact and stumbled into psychological suspicious objectivism and naturalism that relativizes phenomena on the grounds of sensationalistic motivations.

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1 It is the opinion of Jonathan Israel, which derived from his study of the history of Holland, where it was a *magnum opus*, an example that was followed in the English revolution. In the important period 1687–1901, Holland played a main role in establishing the constitutional bases for stable functioning of the monarchy in England (Israel 1991, 103–162.) The secretary of the Royal Society of England, Heinrich Oldenburg, pointed out in a letter that was sent to the Baruch de Spinoza in 1662 that Holland was completely free as a republic, so that one can freely study philosophy, encouraging him to publish papers on this topic.

2 Jonathan Israel (2006) used to say that in this way “the great consensus that ‘new philosophy’ transformed the Dutch intellectual life and high education’ was reached, but after which the discussions concerning the boundaries of the so called ‘free thinking’ were not stopped”.

3 For the English revolution, see (Israel 1991, 103–162.)
the intention to find good enough answers to the ancient questions of divergence was still realized according to the acceptable frame of understanding, giving coherent definitions of philosophy created during the last few centuries (as it was also seen from the earlier works on the origins of geometry by Edmund Husserl).  

Considerations of the religious teachings from the points of view of reason formed the opinions, in the time of Kant, on how it is impossible to prove Christian dogmas concerning the immortality of God, the soul and resurrection, so he decided to determine a scientific method in order to save the Christian faith, as well as the moral that is considered. He placed those religious and moral truths outside the scope of experience and reason, i.e. the domain of the causal laws that would absorb them, and into the realm of the heart, pure willingness and spirituality. In that way, man is not only a phenomenal being living with his affective nature, but he is also a rational being of spirituality who expresses a noumenal ethical character. The mind should rule the world and life, and freedom is the goal one should strive for. On the grounds of his ethic doctrine concerning the freedom of pure willingness, he also presented teachings on the state and international relationships, pleading for the union of nations and federalism of free countries, with the goal of keeping eternal peace on Earth. His universal thought is that politics should accommodate ethics through the harmonization of rights and freedoms, i.e. that it should find its origin in moral philosophy. Since freedom is not possible in its crude state, i.e. as wild and predatory, it is significant for the state in which it is realized according to the laws of intellectual principles, i.e. being able to realize legitimate freedom. Freedom, equality and independence of individuals are possible only under the pressure of law that is in his opinion most successfully realized in the republican government. Monarchies and aristocracies are easily encouraged to take part in wars in order to protect the property of those who rule, while people are the ones who bear the worst consequences that only point out barbaric freedom and the need for overcoming the state of lawlessness. In the ideas of enlightenment (primarily in the ideas of Rousseau from Le contract social), he found a possibility for the union of freedom and the social system, and also a way to secure the unity of humanity during the state of peace. If peace would

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5 “Firstly, what sort of strange obstinacy is this, seeking to ask the question concerning the origin of geometry while going back to some that is not even known in the legend, to Thales of geometry…? Geometry is available to us in its hypotheses, its theories. Of course we must and we can answer this logical edifice in detail in terms of self-evidence. Here, to be sure, we start from the first axioms, and then proceed to the original self-evidence which the fundamental concepts make possible. What is this, if not the ‘theory of knowledge’, in this case particularly the theory of geometrical knowledge? No one would think of tracing the epistemological problem back to the one that was suggested by Thales. This is quite unnecessary. Available concepts and propositions themselves are consisted of their own meaning, first as inevident opinion, but real attitude with considered but hidden truth, making it seem evident, we certainly can reveal… This, however, is not an empty claim; for quite generally it is true for every fact concerning ‘culture’, whether it is a matter of the lowest culture of necessities or the highest culture (science, state, church, economic organization, etc.), that every straightforward understanding of it as an experiential fact involves the concept that it is something constructed through human activity. No matter how hidden, no matter how merely ‘implicitly’ complied this meaning is, it belongs to the self-evident possibility of explication, of ‘making it explicit’ and clarifying it. Every explication and every transition from making it explicit to making it self-evident (even perhaps in cases where one stops too early) is nothing else but a historical disclosure; mainly, there is something historical in it, and as such it bears, with basic necessity, the horizon of its history within itself. It can certainly be said that the whole of the cultural present, understood as totality, ‘implies’ the whole of the cultural past in an undetermined but structurally determined generality. To say it more precisely, it implies a continuity of pasts which imply one another, each in themselves being a past cultural present. And this whole continuity has been a unity of traditionalization up to the present, and that is our present as [a process of] traditionalizing itself in the flowing-static vitality” (Husserl 1989, 23–24).
be considered universal by including all countries, the goal of nature would be achieved by implementing the universal world civic order and there would also be the possibility of developing all the talents of the human species. In this way, politics would be able to subordinate itself to the morality and rights which remind us of an ideal possibility of return of the antique archetype of unity, ethics and politics. Kant considered this according to the scheme of the history of nature as God’s work (Predictions about the beginning of the history of humanity), while he regarded man’s stepping out from nature as a condition of human history where a man is exposed through his own free activities (“The idea of universal history directed to the realization of the world social system”). Considering the concept of freedom provided by the ideas of Enlightenment, Kant still realized the basic need to limit them by the intelligible nature of the human character itself. Certainly unique relations should not be ignored; likewise the disputable moments concerning the opinion that the progress of humanity in history is not provided by good human nature governed by altruism, but selfish human inclinations. Kant’s malice, as an initiative moment, is simultaneously forced by the hypothesis toward which human kind or humanity functions purposefully, getting rights in history on the basis of the causality (a mechanism in the Enlightenment) of nature, striving for the final goal of nature itself as a possible perfection of the social system. In Kant’s view, history realizes the hidden plan of the purpose of nature in this way (that is God’s thought), forcing man to work and make an effort to find the means of wisdom by which he will overcome difficulties.

Hegel formulated this in his Philosophy of history as an assignment of philosophy to investigate what is usually considered something that is known (Hegel 1970, 24), and also to be aware of the demanding restrictions that can arise during discovery and identification. What is really found out here is defined by the very time we live in: “every individual is a child of his/her time which is why philosophy is its time embraced within thoughts. Therefore, it would be insane to think that philosophy can be outside of its (contemporary) world; likewise the individual cannot cross its time” (Hegel 1989, 18).

Some eternal universal philosophy that would be important out of time, and at all times, would then be a universal must, and could be implemented only under coercion, and also superficially forced (for instance ideological diomatic matters and the viewpoint of the world such as dialectic materialism that are broken along with political projects of communist bolshevism and a realistic socialism in the world), which certainly would not be a part of love for wisdom, but would be distorted and utmost forced. However, this sort of distortion and rejection still keeps track of the concept of philosophy; therefore, it is still some kind of philosophic interpretation no matter how horribly distorted it was. Misuses always initiate mistrust, and the scientific character of philosophy that was created by Hegel in these communitarian projections of the world revolution is extremely misused, but not fully and only by his own merits. He considered his own philosophy

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6 In his early work Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel was faced with the naivey of the so-called hypercritical remarks in the theory of knowledge, and that was followed by a decrease in the severity of pain, patience and work regarding the work of philosophers, so he wrote: “However, if the fear of being misunderstood brings distrust concerning science generally, which is transferred to the work itself without any doubts, and really tries to find out something, then it is not clear at all why isn’t it done oppositely, not to cause distrust regarding the previously mentioned distrust, and why doesn’t someone take care of the fact that the fear of not being mistaken is actually a mistake” (Hegel 1979, 46). The fear of being mistaken within the hyperskepticism of knowledge regards itself as reality born out of truth and by naming itself a fear of being mistaken hides the deception that it is a fear of truth that can disappear by presenting the knowledge of a concept.
not only the peak of the history of philosophy but also as its end or final realization. Certainly, that is a raised level of realization of philosophy in its scientific aspect of presenting concepts, it is the result of productive scientific work on advancing the idea as the construction of realizing and reality. Hegel structured the main category of the concept of time by the eternal idea of the world so that from the eternity of the moment it now constitutes “the negative unity of being” as the internal temporally contained eternity. That is possible since on the grounds of the language of emotions there is eternal love or, when one consists of the other, while without any difference it is in itself a unity of life toward identity of the pure will in that kind of love.\(^7\)

Provided that the divine idea is presented in its final form, then its only worthy form is the one on the basis of Logos that resurrects in death and is able to arouse human humanities from being hidebound and from being oriented in finiteness. Therefore, the divine idea is the most adequate to itself concerning the idea of Christianity.\(^8\) The Christian idea enables a complete concretization of the abstract concepts of singularity and duality, the same and different, as thoughtful things inspired by the rational spirit. God revealed himself to the universe as love so that: “It is that review of the other idea as an idea concerning manifestation, where the eternal idea directly became trustworthy for a man, and it is transferred into spiritual knowledge and also into the direct sensuality but in the way that changes can be found in it, the history of God, life that presents God himself\(^9\).” Perfection is a representation with its own indefiniteness concerning the unity of thoughts and the concept with reality, while the concept is constituted in itself it is being objectively realized, which is regarded as the enriched consideration that derives from its own nature where there is no longer one-sidedness. The concept is something so imperfect (Kant) if the opinion has only one side and the action within a man simultaneously with other actions in the available empirical dimensions, which is the

\(^7\)“Gott ist die Liebe, d. i. dieß Unterscheiden und die Nichtigkeit dieses Unterscheidens, ein Spiel dieses Unterscheidens, mit dem es kein Ernst ist, das eben so als aufgehoben gesetzt ist d.h. die ewige, einfache Idee. Diese ewige Idee ist denn in der christlichen Religion ausgesprochen als das, was die heilige Dreieinigkeit heißt, daß ist Gott selbst, der ewige dreinige” (Hegel 1965, 227).

\(^8\) That’s the spirit that arises only within a thoughtful man during the enthusiasm of the purely thoughtful consideration, since hearing that truth in the form of the usual presentation missed the opportunity of its general extension on the basis of its concept. The man who can generally accept that truth for the spirit itself is the one who performs the function of pure knowledge according to the dialectical striving for truth. The form of an idea is transformed into a concept as a result of existence within itself and its authenticity is expressed by a person as subjective self through the relations with things, when it overcame the nature of knowledge and its high aspects of absolutism and doing everything for yourself and according to yourself, destroying it by deeper reflection within itself after which there is a power of differentiating good and evil, overcoming the abstractions of contradiction in itself.

\(^9\) “Das ist diese Darstellung der zweiten Idee als Idee in der Erscheinung, wie die ewige Idee für die unmittelbare Gewißheit des Menschen geworden, d. h. Erscheinen ist. Daß sie Gewißheit für den Menschen werde, ist nothwendig sinnliche Gewißheit, aber die zugleich übergeht in das geistige Bewußtsein und ebenso in unmittelbare Sinnlichkeit verkehrt ist, aber so, daß man darin sieht die Bewegung, Geschichte Gottes, das Leben, das Gott selbst ist” (Hegel 1965, 308). The statements that a thing is like this or that are a matter of having an attitude, but every statement considers another one that is being made opposite to it, without end. Contradiction consists of naming the contradictions without any difference, while separations are performed only by the existing spirit, since: “the spirit is only of the fact that infinity can be reached in contradictions.” And that is in the way that “the need is satisfied in a way that the concept itself decides to become the existence or that the existence can be realized after conceptualizing (p. 218). Therefore, existence is a reality that depends on considering God being in that way a reality that depends on conceptualization, because being is a content of conception, and it contradicts the needs for demonstration, which is according to Hegel manifested as a contribution to the arguments of the logic of objectivization.
subjective side of consideration, the so called “final man”, and there are not only people who consider an activity only empirical, while rejecting the spiritual that constitutes a concrete subjectivity of a man generally speaking, while a contemporary world includes the spiritual into the basis with which it regards the concrete or the will in the unity of concept and reality, the idea, which is actually an old divided representation of perfection. Perfection is in fact related to the original pure will or God’s will, and the Nature of God really is something that cannot be achieved in the estimated judgment, without the concept that itself consists of differentiating and a difference from the different, without its revival in spirit. In that way, there is a relation between the immediate particular condition, historical and logical contradiction as the condition of the true opinion, when there is an “absolute aim of will”, which points out the very “nature of idea” that is the most Orthodox one according to his own statement, in the secrets of Communion by the secrets of the logic of logos, where it finds the revived support. 10 The Christian idea is concretized by solving the contradictions of the created and uncreated, by the energies of the spirit realizing the spiritual unity, always constructing that basis of the concept that is called the world. Dissonances within that universal concept that arise after the ignorance of such a presentation of the origin of the world to the human society are important for contemporary considerations, manifesting a huge desire for misunderstanding, hesitating in the directions of the willing directing toward their own base; but they surely are followed by that already mentioned objection of their own consciousness that is always made when real questions of philosophy are asked, namely the questions that derive from pure will, and by their nature strive toward the origin of the relation between God and a man, and that is the nature of the absolute spirit and the close of day in the Heavenly Kingdom. The life of customs has its own contradictions, but they are a matter of will and effort that finalize the ideas in their historical profiles, considering suffering and pain (Ильнин 1994, 489–490).11

When a man remains speechless in his own troubles, God enables him to say what troubles him, transferring pain into the medium of concept, so that Adorno’s well-known saying “whoever doesn’t want to be engaged with the work of mind, should abandon philosophy” (Adorno 1986, 116), reminds us of Hegel and his verdict from the Phenomenology of spirit, who according to the hypothesis was long ago faced with positivistic scientific authoritarianism: “Now, following one’s own conviction is, of course, more than giving oneself over to authority; but changing an opinion accepted on authority into an opinion held out of personal conviction, does not necessarily alter the content of the opinion, or replace error with truth. The only difference between being caught up in a system of opinions and prejudices based on personal conviction, and being caught up in one based

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10 “Eternal sacrifice consists of it, that absolute content, the unity of subject and absolute object prescribed to the individual as direct enjoyment, and if the individual is right, that peacefulness is a resurrection of Christ” (Г. В. Ф. Херен: Фил. рел., Т. 2., с. 319) Werner Beierwaltes also thinks that Hegel’s reflection in itself is the revelation of the secret of substance in the exemplary way /Selbstdurchlichtung/, mentioning also his citation of the New Testament: “God is the Spirit, not a darkness, and no one colour, or a mixture, touching that pure light” (Beierwaltes 2001, 67). The finite world is Enlightenment as the energy of the idea of resurrection (Beierwaltes 1972, 163–195).

11 The difference between the epistemic and practical side of his philosophy, what Ilyn considers some kind of a tragic component of our times, in Hegel’s opinion has a more optimistic colorful grounding on the soul that can think and have self-consciousness, and by applying it, he joins the request for real freedom: “Those are the moments of real freedom that is not based on feelings, since feelings allows both servitude and slavery, but on the thoughts and self-reliance of a man concerning his psychic being... it is not sufficient that a man can use his own powers, he has to find the opportunity to use them” (Hegel 1951, 400).
on the authority of others, lies in the added conceit that is innate in the former position (Hegel 1977, 50; transl. N. Popovic, 1979, 49).  

Multiple dimensions of utterance appear regarding the judgments of existence that in the direct support on perception also demands a standard of putting together those perceptions included in the representations with the subject, worked out in detail within comprehensive aspects. Plenty of purely positive judges concerning individual matters and abstract orders that were externally related are a matter of spatial empirical thinking, and not of the philosophical attitudes that Hegel names the truths of mind. In this way, reflection in philosophy can neither be a mathematical demonstration that is based on the firm distinctions of spatial perception demanding overcoming the predictive areas toward a more distinctive concept till the establishment of the unity of idea and reality. Subjective immediateness is a part of the substantiability or the main aspect of being so that the opinion differently establishes the presence of the subjective in a predicate as a result of which the matter is included in comprehensibility and stops becoming a part of the bad infinity with this predicative burden of subjectivity. That is the existence that leaves a bared external abstraction even through its own work of conceptualization of itself. Through the existence in which we ourselves are included, it concretizes itself through being universal, as a generating power of the ontological necessity in a conceptual definition. Dialectical methodology of position, antithesis and synthesis (tollere, elevare, conservare), realizes what governs the spirit to the stable conceptions through changes and movements to the goal, in the sense of the realization of the objective or the essential more objective universe. Pointing out these places that draw one’s attention to the possible exchange of truth and authenticity with utilitarian goals that are at first sight able to make it up, is related to that kind of indulgence that actually brought the rooted exchanges of the theses. When commonly used language is intensified to its conceptual hypotheses, for the liberation of the internal dialectics as the dialectics of itself, language is overcome in a speculative predication by which the subject is being identified through the concept of its own difference (moving the reflection as the reality of the very subject of thinking, and what is being thought is considered ontologically). There is no possibility of denying conceptual speech and any aspect of strictness in thinking.

12 Because of the regret for some confusion and misunderstandings in the philosophical written works, G. W. F. Hegel answers that the leadership by the Enlightenment ideology of “common sense”, as a “healthy reason”, is just one catastrophic prejudice, which is included in discourse by the opinion that all things are just a visible and verbal imitation of them (“die nachhammad der sensibilia realit”, as a literal “meaning” in the language, like in the real theatre of life. Theatristica datur, but life is not just a symbolic agreement. It is a statement of pure negativism inspired by a final cause, and philosophy suggests the reversed opinion, to turn around all psychic potentials by the assignments of thinking, that are able to take enriched concepts into a thinking being. Hegel accepts the recommendation in the Phenomenology of spirit, to read those “incomprehensible philosophical works” so many times with better attention and more productively, until the time of thinking becomes reasonable (1952, 57–58; trans. pg. 41–42).

13 Not until we consider the objective necessity under the illusion of contingent events, are substantial statements consistent. But, it is just objective by the character of the consciousness that lost the subjective side of understanding, or its part in that understanding. What really exists allows existence, even in the domain of a formal logic copula that connected subject and a predicate, and a speculative deepening means the return to life from the abstraction on the level of transforming things into thoughts. The rational statement of the linguistic copula is that it presents every terminated speech as an asserted one /yes-talking/, concerning the identity and difference and also differing from its difference (until the subject considers the substance of the nature of individual essence). Expressions created by speculative language mean that conceptions take over leadership in realizing a connection with the whole world, and enlightening the horizon where it appears. One-dimensional
Even besides mentioning different ages and contexts of social actions of philosophy (and cross-interactions), there is always a possibility of separating the living power that is going to be transferred to the theoretical sphere of the perception of reality, in which it will be oriented on considering its original competence of existence. The existence of philosophy because of us, namely by human mediation, by studying it, allows philosophy to make a union with the estranged and lost to the extent in which it is possible for every single man to do so, and therefore it is realized as a life of yearning for wisdom regarding the whole entirety of truth. That kind of realization or the content of philosophy is its essential existence or an authentic bundle combination of eidetic morphology, or the ideas of the wholeness of existence. Intelligence is intelligence when it is being thought or realized in the ideological and not un-ideological and external way. Hellenistic philosophy is created on the grounds of this, emphasizing the word “nature” to the level of being fascinating, while Hegel’s insight into its being right is connected to the concepts that can relate an idea and a phenomenon. The world spirit is included in it, since it is absurd to believe that some imperfect parts and bodies of the universe (the real greatness of a man in such a cosmic extent can be compared to a micron) are worth living, and that itself life was not allowed to the cosmos nor the universe of conceptions.

Premeditation or telling the truth about every singular philosopher is preceded by the place he comes from, and it therefore points out a certain historical extent. The extent in the history of events has its unity in the infinity by which it is determined, out of the arbitrary baroque additions. Even though that premeditation of the idea is originally found during the working out of the philosophical ground plan or the main principle, it is possible to reach it beforehand and to reveal the place from which it derives. Therefore, there is a necessity to prepare through the perfection of the hypotheses from the game of truth and method, belonging to the object and to the maneuver of consciousness within a finiteness of knowing, namely understanding of what it exists and what it is, of what one is in his/her existence (in his/her own nature).

Contemporary philosophy opened the ways for overcoming standpoints of purely rational philosophy that lost its ability for concepts of identity in differences and differentiating from those differences. Similarly, there is Kant’s instruction for evading predicative attitudes from the horizon of reality /having in mind that existence is not a predicate/, and in this way opening the area of subjectivity in order to consider it according to the more appropriate analytic complexes concerning unity (historically self-established concept of egoism /“ichkeit”/, formed to the level of the pathological shape of auto-blocking within oneself, namely to the auto-isolation by intensifying the aesthetical complexities of considering the subject, and all that in order to reach what overcomes statements as pictures of many-fold pluralistic aspects of being are in the overcoming negativism synthetized by the reflection of a self-relationship in the adequate concepts.

14 “It is a reflection that makes the True a result, but it is equally a reflection that overcomes the antithesis between the process of its becoming and the result, for this becoming is also simple, and therefore not different from the form of the True which shows itself as simple in its result; the process of becoming is rather merely this return into simplicity…. The exaltation of a supposed Nature over misconceived thinking, and especially the rejection of external teleology, has brought the form of purpose in general, into discredit. Still, in the sense in which Aristotle, too, defines Nature as a purposeful activity, the purpose is what is immediate and at rest, the unmoved which is also self-moving, and as such is Subject. Its power to move, taken abstractly, is being-for-self or pure negativity. The result is the same as in the beginning, only because the beginning is the purpose; in other words, the actual is the same as its Notion only because the immediate, as purpose, contains the self or pure actuality within itself” (Hegel 1977, 12; transl. N. Popović, 11–12).
regional and simultaneously partial essence). The anathema of a copula as a logical normative is a simple failure, when it is allowed for the thing that was, to be or what actually is, to disappear from the horizon of thought, because thereby the essence of every single transformation into something meaningful is in this way cancelled. The copula “opens” the areas and insights of the world, it simply “constitutes the world” in its own functioning. The real subject (predicate) of the existence is given only as a proposal, while for the historically consecrated and self-conscious philosopher, it is actually given as an absolute level of searching and finding the spiritual characters within universal logic. It is that form of logic that will not be able to move apart the frames of approach and the purpose infinitely taken from the absolute. And precisely this will be able to include the necessary heuristic sense in the contemporary philosophical considerations.

Arbitrary reformulating of the copulative statement at the center of problems called the “syllogisms of the great volume” or the “trap for the words”, that a long time ago brought peace to the participants in polemics by confusing the interlocutor, is only a mind game. Putting a ‘muzzle on the mouth’ of the enemy in order to select and follow unique or absurd words so that they would be prepared for a harmonious life with nature and society through living in spiritual peace is known as a controversial recipe from antiquity. Even though one has good intentions, things are not doing well, while the processing of “human material” through arguing for general and common needs in order to express personal ones, is an evident technique of manipulation that is completely revealed in contemporary social discourses. Confusion and the loss of feelings, a distorted sense and a tendency for talking nonsense, as a price for paying the “general benefit” at the end, would also mean frivolity worth sacrifice. Today it does not seem like the Enlightenment program with faults, but more like an advertisement for attracting customers to the recipe for happiness and tranquility. There is no serious educational program included in the hypotheses of communication with reasonable attitudes that universally provides a methodically elaborated sense of the use of means for teaching and the characterization of its results and goals. Unlike the cyclic circles that characterize graduality in mastering the educational aspect of working on realizing things, that kind of wisdom that would be achieved through the irrational fear of suppressing self-punishment would be the wisdom of a distorted man. Distortion can hardly be critically related to the riddle of existence and the characteristics of living in the world where we found ourselves.15

The professional jargon of the Enlightenment, the creation of which is not motivated by promoting wisdom, longing for a closer approaches to the truth, but for other reasons of some mutual benefits which it stands for so that it would be available for the individual, is more than obscure. A common vanity and personal interests govern violent conflicts far more, where the winner is the one who shouts the most, and they are usually the ones who are the most inconsiderate, the last ones who stay after everyone else has

15 Studying early byzantine philosophy, Sergei Averincev (Averincev and Medvedev 2005, 11) wrote: “A privilege to think on the grounds of the school laws of philosophy belonged to the educated and wealthy people of the old culture. It does not mean that there weren’t thinkers among the inferior people, but those were not philosophers. The time made them popular ascetics, who were remembered by their descendants as glorious saints or as damned heretics. A freak – a reasonable man who was once allowed to become a cynic and stoic, now becomes a monk, a blessed fool, a stylist. He taught people the ascetic moral and he revealed the powerful ones all over the world, as a street philosopher in the time of Epictet, and his ascetic way of life was traditionally called ‘philosophy’, but his ‘philosophy’ was not directly related to the philosophy as a science. Plato’s dialectic, Aristotle’s logic, Poseidon’s study about nature, Plotinus’ and Proclus’ ontology were accessible only for the elite. A scientific paper concerning philosophy was conducted by the powers of elite”.
left. That is the point of transparent motivation that is completely realized only after increasing the personal influence and power for sickly sweet comfort, arising as an ultimately unacceptable phenomenon that is justified by the so-called normal state, needs and manners, so indecent in regard to the idea of justification that it is sometimes bizarre. Dominating the binding limitations and rudeness that are frequent characteristics of the conceptions of the Enlightenment, is of an immense importance for the freedom of the philosopher’s work that should be achieved with wider spiritual aspects. Heuristic principles of searching for more approximate self-determinations, which are justified in self-perceptions as existentially evidenced, as essential deeper levels of the aspects of consciousness, are at the same time the essential externalization of that consciousness.

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16 A peaceful man has no guarantees for his own safety in the society of people who live in it. It is not safe to talk with that kind of ‘wise people’, because they tend to make philosophical work and language profane. Attracting the attention by scandals is a possible way to shame someone, but with a suspicious merit in sending a message. Blessed and happy with subjectivity is the condition for accepting the sneer or a critique irony, as a condition: “to sustain the annihilations of one’s own goals and their realizations. A rigid reason is the least able for it, precisely in the occasions by which his behavior is silly to the others to the highest extent…” (Hegel 1975, 606). Hegel’s statement is that a natural error in this connection is to suppose that it is very easy to make jests and to be funny about oneself and everything available, and that this is why the humorous form is commonly snatched at: “but it happens commonly that the humor becomes flat if the author lets himself go in the field of the contingency of his notions and pleasures which, strung loosely together, deviate into indefiniteness, and, often with deliberate bizzareness, conjoin the most heterogeneous things” (Aesthetics, Lectures on Fine Art by G. W. F. Hegel (1988), translated by T. M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 601).
Racionalizam 17. veka ima svoje naličje u filozofiji prosvetiteljstva, čiji je odnos prema temeljnim društvenim pitanjima sasvim drugačiji. On više nije ni gnoseološki ni ontološki, nego je postavljen na pretežno etičke i estetske pretpostavke, gde se razum poimao kao nešto što bi tek trebalo da bude. Postojeći razum prosvetitelji su smatrali ili nedovoljno razumnim, ili sasvim nerazumnim. S time se problematika racionalizma premeštala sa tle teorije na tle prakse, tj. na prosvetni sistem i reforme u njemu. To je bila ponesenost uverenjem da kultura intelekta može da otkloni neznanje kao i sve socijalne deficite koji nastaju zahvaljujući njemu. Tu se ponajviše očituje razlika u pojmanju intelekta, koji ne može da bude sveden na zdrav razum kao opšte i zajedničko čulo. To je kasnije pokazao Hegel sa svojom koncepcijom spekulativnog (dijalektički ustrojenog) razuma. U tom je smislu nedostatak znanja okvalifikovan više kao nesporazum, a okretanje ka voljnoj motivaciji za čuvačavanja i proučavanja stvari kao normom pristupa.

Ključne reči: racionalizam 17. veka, prosvetiteljstvo, prirodni razum, postojeći razum, spekulativno-dijalektički razum.