UNIVERSALISM REVIVED:
NEEDS-BASED COSMOPOLITANISM AS A FOUNDATION
OF GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

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Abstract. In the paper it is argued that cosmopolitanism based on human needs would be
the most legitimate way to organize the emerging global community. Such cosmopolitanism
should be rooted in the notion of basic human needs, for instance: security, autonomy,
identity and well-being. Although the notion of human need is universalistic (thereby
providing space for meta-consensus), the “human nature” derived from this notion is not
necessarily fixed. Deliberation on the needs and political practice of their satisfaction will
enable the real progress of cosmopolitanism, more quickly and without numerous problems
that the human right-based approach is facing nowadays. Global democracy requests
certain universalism in ethics, but it has to be different from those previously attempted,
while also the everyday position of individuals in different parts of the world has to be
improved considerably.

Key words: human needs, cosmopolitanism, universalism, deliberation, global justice,
democracy.

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to offer one possible way of cosmopolitan thought development,
namely, the one which is based on human needs theory and on the practice of need
definition, satisfaction and operationalization. A short insight on potential advantages of
needs is provided compared to the theory and ideology of human rights. It shall be argued
that universalism (if truly universal) is still useful and even in a sense necessary for keeping
the cosmopolitan blade of critique sharp. Cosmopolitan values may be justified only by
relying on the concept of human nature, and it is exactly there that the tradition of thinking
about human needs enters the picture. Of course, the work of deconstructivists, postmodern

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thinkers and our post-metaphysical epoch in general immensely complicates the defense of any foundations and grand narratives, but universalizing thinking, in our view, represents a vital element of cosmopolitanism, as a stance that emphasizes equal human dignity of all individuals. That is why this particular debate is left aside for the moment and it is stated (for our purposes) that we at least need pragmatic, if not philosophical (epistemological) universalism; the conditions in which we live and diversities of the world make the cosmopolitan enterprise impossible without universalizing impetus. Attempts to strengthen and institutionalize cosmopolitan ideas have, up to now, mostly been carried out through the doctrine and practice of human rights, which was not the best way to make them accessible to large number of people from different countries and cultures. So, instead of rejecting every universalism (which would be per se devastating for the cosmopolitan theory), what is needed is a universalism of a different kind. A situation in which all individuals would have a real chance and capability to satisfy their human needs (which are themselves open to discussion and non-fixed) will prove to be a more appropriate precondition for establishing a cosmopolitan order and multiplying identities than pursuing a legal, westernized and pure deliberative approach.

2. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN NEED. UNIVERSALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM AND THEORY OF NEEDS

There are many definitions of human needs, and here they will not (because of lack of space and limited scope of the paper) be listed or explained, nor will time be devoted to depicting the debate on human needs and all its complex elements and issues. Our attempt is to just remind cosmopolitan thinkers of this almost forgotten body of knowledge that could be helpful in their endeavor. Human needs theory unfortunately holds quite a weak position in social sciences, and its most important strongholds today are the fields of peace studies and conflict resolution. Initially developed in psychology (Abraham Maslow being the one of the pioneers), it made an impact on sociology and other sciences, but was later put aside, perhaps due to its leftist background and the triumph of liberal thought in mainstream academia. Also, many critics of the human needs theories were forewarning that their paternalistic potential may be dangerous to freedom and that needs cannot be successfully distinguished from wants (which was one of the key basis of these theories), but the arguments of the critics were not as strong as they seemed (Watt 1982, 541–542).

Needs are requirements that a person has to have in order to live a life with enough dignity. It presupposes certain material goods, as well as more sociological and psychological conditions creating the possibilities for living an autonomous life. When explaining the complex relations between needs and rights, one has to take into account that human needs theory is essential when thinking about foundations of human rights-based approaches. According to Gasper: “Basic needs normative theory is one systematic way to look at normative foundations, for rights or for any other normative theory” (Gasper 2007, 16). Also, essential prerequisites for strongly–felt needs (like water, food, shelter) are candidate human rights (Gasper 2007, 17). Human rights are always a kind of human social practice (Donnelly 2013, 17), while needs are also more closely related to the natural and animal world. Rights are implemented and secured by legal mechanisms. Although human rights and human needs theories share a common history and are principally directed at the
same goal of ensuring that people can maintain their life, freedom and chances for personal development, human rights discourse has through time become too concentrated on political and civil rights and weakened its economic, social and cultural dimension.

The essential idea of the concept of need is that failure to satisfy these drives (instincts, preconditions of normal development of human nature) will lead to physical or psychological damage to a person or group of persons. “Humans need a number of essentials to survive” (Marker 2003). Needs are universal motivations (Burton 1990, 36), and any lack of obtaining what is required will produce destructive results (Rubenstein 2001). So, needs are supposed to transcend differences in class, nation, gender, religion and culture, and to represent (at least relatively) an objective basis of grasping genuine characteristics of human beings. However, the universalism of human needs is not unambiguous. Johan Galtung is very careful (but also inexplicit) when he says that “there is something universal” in the notion of human need (Galtung 1978, 6). Rubenstein argues, following Marxist tradition, that needs are historical, and that some of them are becoming universal (Rubenstein 2001).

In order for human needs to be truly “human” they have to include a minimum of universalistic content, but it does not mean that all needs are always and completely equal and/or identical in different persons, times and places. It is difficult to talk about unalterable human nature, or about ultimate sociobiological foundations of politics, when there are such harsh critics of all grand narratives. But that “human nature” derived from human needs theory is not necessarily fixed. Actually, it is precisely the concept of human need (understood in sense of historical, changeable features of men) that provides the opportunity for global deliberation, because the one and single universal list of human needs should not be posed, but a large number of them created and discussed.

Cosmopolitanism can hardly ever be separated from universalism, or more precisely the claim to universalism. The premise of unity of all human beings and ultimate equality of their dignities is fundamental to cosmopolitans (Chernilo 2009, 533–534). Cosmopolitanism by default implies universalism in ethics (Lachapelle 2007, 366–368). On the other hand, theoreticians are more and more aware of the importance of the particularistic dimension of the cosmopolitan worldview (Levy and Sznaider 2007, 159–160); this dimension is mostly visible and valuable in respecting the differences of individuals and nations, or the cultural background different people carry with them. Beck is speaking of “contextual universalisms” (Beck and Sznaider 2010, 393), which leads us to pose a legitimate question: should academicians talk about a single universalism or many of them? Besides unsolved theoretical and epistemological issues (or in a sense because of them), this author argues for keeping the universalistic momentum as an irreplaceable component of creating conditions for coexistence in the interdependent world. Without basic universalism and recognizing universal norms (procedural, but also substantive, at least in the very crude form that is rooted in common sense), it would not be possible to continue with cosmopolitan promotion, and that is why it seems that universalism is not a nemesis to be afraid of. Thus, “universalism is an aspiration, a moral goal to strive for; it is not a fact, a description of the way the world is” (Benhabib 2008, 18). One has to be careful, though, that this universalizing process remains a regulative ideal of a rather pragmatic character – not dogmatic or with untouchable foundations, and that its aim should be an open dialogue on an equal basis with what is good and evil for all human beings, and not some previously designed telos or desired state-of-affairs.
Let’s now look what is so problematic about universalism. It is being criticized from two main positions – firstly, by the deconstructivist or postfoundationalists circles, and secondly, from the relativist, communitarian, more anthropological angle. It is true that the former has influenced political philosophy and made the cosmopolitan approach to an extent limit its theoretical self-assurance. However, the postmetaphysical and post-foundational critique is actually more directed towards practice of the existing cosmopolitanism (or absence of it) and, as such, it loses strength if the concrete steps and decisions really contribute to freedom or development; pure abstract critique cannot have a major impact because it is not related to actual matters of concern. The postmodern, poststructuralist or post-foundational wish is to debunk all “grand narratives” mainly because of their consequences, i.e. because they finish by reproducing the relations of power and hegemony. But once the practice is closer to the politics of freedom or improvisation and autonomy they praise, the issue of settling epistemological problems will not be so important. On the other hand, relativist, culturalist, feminist and particularist critique could often be reduced to resistance to hegemony of the First world, to an anti-Western attitude making efforts to preclude “the white man’s burden” or “forces of domination.” According to Chernilo: “The critics’ position ultimately becomes untenable because they fail to grasp that their recognition and protection of particular ways of life requires a wider conception of humanity’s ultimate unity” (Chernilo 2009, 546). Also, in view of that critique, it should be said that the cosmopolitan project would be significantly weakened if there is no universal horizon all humans would be a part of. That is to say, the lack of any claim of universality will be harmful to cosmopolitan identities and obligations, and will leave the movement disorganized and dependent on local actions. Of course, cosmopolitans may (and some of them indeed do) use universalism as an ideological weapon, but how this could be better confronted will be shown later.

The discourse of human needs is deeply cosmopolitan itself (bearing in mind that human needs are always needs of individuals), not national or international. Furthermore, the cosmopolitan ethics coheres very well with the empowerment of individuals worldwide to enable them to follow their preferred way of life. Classical social theory is inseparable from universalistic intent, and precisely this feature ties it with the cosmopolitan tradition (Chernilo 2007, 32). The universalism of cosmopolitanism unpacks in different realms as time passes, so different dimensions of it represent solutions to emerging problems of certain historical periods (Chernilo 2007, 19–20). As natural law was surpassed when it became indefensible, so it might happen with different elements and types of universalism, but not with its normative core. Without normative universalism, it seems that success or even the existence of cosmopolitanism is difficult to imagine, but there are still several methods through which one can manifest its universalism. Responsible people must not throw out the baby with the bathwater.

3. NEEDS AND RIGHTS: WHICH INSTRUMENTS CAN BE (MIS)USED BETTER?

Instead of a further debate about the universalism of cosmopolitanism, we tried to be shown that the concrete dominant mode of following universalism in practice may be amended. In other words, since the centrality of human rights and legislation is one of the

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1 We are borrowing from authors that differentiate matters of fact from matters of concern (see, for instance, Latour 2004, 231–232).
main features of today’s cosmopolitanism, what is proposed is a more “universal universalism”, based on human needs. It would transcend the universalism’ pitfalls created in the situation of drastic inequalities. Namely, the discourse of universal human rights (which started with Kant) is one of the strongest discourses in contemporary political philosophy, but it is flawed in a number of ways to make a real impact on the development of a more democratic and prosperous global community. Governments co-opted it, thereby reducing its democratic potential (Douzinas 2007, 24). Human rights (whose substance and domain is meant to be derived from human needs in order to be protected) lost their activistic, radical element, and are just a weapon in political struggles, often used to reproduce power relations (Douzinas 2007, 192–193). How does the doctrine of human rights help us prevent hunger or epidemics? It practically does not. At the same time, human rights are invoked when Western powers want to change regimes they do not like in Africa, Latin America or parts of Asia.

When we consider the role of the state in needs-based cosmopolitanism, one must also bear in mind that (in the major part of the world) both human needs and human rights are presented in the environment that is characterized by poorly regulated market forces, and that present-day consumer culture tends to incorporate ideas of genuine human values into very trivial and materialistic processes, so that the universality of human needs and/or rights appears only as an impetus of increasing profit for companies that provide goods and services qualified as desirable for possession. International financial institutions, as well as multinational corporations, significantly reduce the possibility of an individual state to refocus the agenda on the basic needs from comparative advantage sectors, and the state cannot guarantee the economic well–being of its citizens (Miller 2007, 45). Television, the Internet, advertising and marketing all function as an universalizing force; however, they uphold the system which creates drastic inequalities and reproduces situations where millions of people are not able to acquire the basic necessities.

Law is per definitionem conservative and tends to preserve the status quo. Deeply ingrained in liberal discourse, rights prioritise subjective preferences despite the fact that these preferences are determined by sources beyond the control of the individual (Hamilton 2003, 7). Needs–based politics can transcend the problems of liberal, so–called right–preference couple, through stressing the difference between (at least partially) objective conditions for normal human functioning and particular wants of individuals in a given context. Following human wants (not needs) has become the organizing principle of contemporary societies (Douzinas 2007, 36). But, felt needs are at the core of practical politics (Hamilton 2003, 14), while rights are abstract and vaguely related to everyday life. What benefit do the poor people really have from the fact that they are entitled to property rights? Legalizing human wants does not eventually fulfill them, but simply change their desired object, since the logic of right is always sketchy, while at the same time identities and recognition are not acquired once the group gets the law to protect it (for example, from discrimination). Recognizing human needs (not in closed, top–to–bottom prescription, but in actual and open political struggles) would lead to major changes in many countries. The language of needs is more widely used in different cultures and civilizations than the one of rights (Brock 2009, 72)

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2 The phrase is taken from: Wallerstein, 2006: 79-80. Also, it could be said that approach we take towards more universal universalism is to a certain extent similar to the one proposed by Wallerstein.
Jeffrey Noonan is the next author who is well aware of the social implications of the human rights doctrine, when he argues that the right for private property in practice often overrides all other positive rights (Noonan, 2007: 2). Thus, he believes that the defense of human rights argument would be much more efficient if directed towards universalizing life–interests (Noonan 2006, 242), which are founded on the concept of human needs (Noonan 2006, 218). Noonan is criticizing liberal democracy for understanding human rights and especially property rights as the bedrock of the political order, while failing to ensure that people can acquire what they really need. Needs–based thinking is a core mechanism of determining social morality (Noonan 2006, 54). Moral cosmopolitanism, therefore, must not bypass it.

Another important notion that should be introduced is violence. Here it is understood in a very broad sense, and includes, besides its direct manifestation, also its structural and cultural form (Galtung 1969, 173). Not only someone who was murdered, but the one who died from hunger or curable diseases, or committed suicide because of total disrespect, discrimination or harsh verbal violence is undoubtedly a victim of violence. All these cases where society (through all its institutions, i.e. economic or political system, education) directly or indirectly precludes individuals or groups from surviving or living a decent life have to fall under the category of violence. And human needs theory may serve as a best filter to recognize a whole spectrum of violent forms, from subtle stereotyping and disguised racism, labour exploitation to environmental degradation, genocide or war crimes. Human rights, even in their more inclusive package – with socio-economic rights included – cannot see or expose all the mechanisms which lead to differences in human dignities among persons. But, if human needs are not satisfied (not to a minimal extent, and for a long period of time) it can definitely be said that states and individuals still support violent structures.

The other problematic aspect of rights is that they reflect a win–lose, black and white logic, and that they allude to an elitist, third party approach to define whether the law is breached or not (you are guilty or not guilty, allowed to do something or not, and the court will decide on that). That is why, for example, conflict resolution theories are concentrated more on needs than on rights. A needs–based approach is better equipped to transform conflicts and evade violence than adversarial rights–based and power–based approaches (Mills 2003, 10–13). A similar thing could be said for the cosmopolitan project, which is itself primarily intended for ensuring the well–being of all human beings and reducing unjustified damage to anyone. Universal human rights are being criticized as a typically Western product, and both Asian theorists (see, for instance, Donnelly 1999, 66–69 and 83–87, although these critiques are mentioned mostly to be immediately rejected) and Islamic thought (see, i.e. Halliday 1995, 152–155) are trying to demystify what they regard as particularism that is in a quasi–universal cover. So, the voices from Asian or African civilizations proclaim that they face obstacles in accepting human rights as the main justification of foreign policy moves (and policy in general), not less because these civilizations are not in the same way legalistic or right–based as their Western partners and human rights protagonists are. Problems of this kind would probably be surpassed if human needs were to get the position human rights now occupy, since their universalism seems more visible and acceptable to everyone, and the consequences of forming political claims starting from need–satisfaction would be beneficial to a wider circle of individuals and nations.

Again leaving the theoretical debates aside, it would be wise to take a look at what we have in practice regarded as human rights and their “universalism”. Human rights
discourse was transformed into an ideology of the rich and powerful states of Europe and America, not rarely serving their realpolitik interests in countries that have different traditions and/or fiercely defend their sovereignty from foreign meddling. It is pretty clear that it would be perceived differently (in the large part of the so-called Third World) if the emphasis of science and politics would be on the notion of human needs; that would provide its inhabitants with chances to survive, receive education or healthcare. Now, when the focus is on human rights, what people in these countries see underscored is a critique of their way of life or the imposing of some extraneous and alien norms that are not at all their primary concern. So, most human rights ideologies of powerful countries deal with rights that are not at all perceived as universal in the large part of the world, while the rights to basic education, healthcare, water, nutrition, sanitation that would be better candidates for universal status are promoted mostly by financially and politically weak UN agencies. Even a casual survey on the debates on human rights in different countries (where issues of property, free press or sexual orientation are often dominant) could show us that “..... the specific philosophy on which the current “universal” and “official” human rights corpus is based is essentially European” (Mutua 1996, 593). Thereby, the practice of social conflicts on human rights clearly indicates that needs are closer to universality than rights, since the standards of universality are to be set by people, and not by (Western) governments and international bureaucracy.

In no way is this author against human rights. They are an important element of the heritage of mankind, and are here to stay (as, of course, they should). What is argued is that they are not inclusive enough and that the political and economic order they are an instrument of is not capable of making a cosmopolitan ideal of equal moral worth of all men true. In that regard, human needs discourse, if promoted, would not be as easily misused by the forces that want to keep an unjust distance between countries and people. Human rights discourse is loved by the Empire because it is useful in justifying military interventions, War on Terror, or enabling super-sovereignty (Chandler 2009, 55 and 68). Liberal Empire is constituted through law (Hardt and Negri 2000, 9–10). All these opinions are witnesses of the potential and actual aberrations from the ideal of human rights. It is possible that some of these problems would remain with us if needs-based cosmopolitanism is promoted and applied to contemporary problems, but the situation in many parts of the world gives us credence that the change of paradigm is worth giving a try, especially if the new paradigm is, in fact, more cosmopolitan than the existing one.

Global justice and (material) needs-satisfaction

There are not many authors who contributed to defining and explaining cosmopolitanism based on human needs. From the thinkers that consider themselves cosmopolitans, or cosmopolitan democrats, very few (at least in the English speaking community, and at least explicitly) stated they are supporters of cosmopolitanism of this sort. The work interested scholars and practitioners can rely on, thus, comes from the “outside”: in this case from the academic field of Global justice, where several authors have identified the relation between moral unity of all human beings and the satisfaction of their needs (in the first place basic ones like survival, security and freedom). The possibility of a cosmopolitan project depends to a large extent on the redistribution of resources, so the material needs of millions of people can be taken care of. This is articulated in Gillian Brock’s call for the “needs–based minimum floor principle” (Brock 2009, 57–58, Mandle
She thinks that the crucial task is to meet basic needs (Brock 2009, 63–69), and huge progress can be made even without some universal agreement on issues like measuring the well-being in different cultures and situations, comparing incentives, (in)equalities, etc. Therefore, why not set the focus on priorities, meaning the drastic incapability of people to achieve a yet-to-be-determined ideal of good life and equality? That is to be done, firstly, by proclaiming the threshold of material resources which has to be available to everyone; it is also something most people would choose to have (Mandle 2011, 301).

Developmental economist Branko Milanović talks about “creeping cosmopolitanism” (Milanović 2007, 18–19), when he analyses the proposals for the redistribution of income on a global scale. He shows that needs-based transfers across national borders are extraordinarily small when compared to within-national transfers (not to mention objective needs), and this is the argument for cosmopolitans to make a case for redistribution (Milanović 2007, 3). So, since there is no moral privilege of domestic society (or any society): “Grounds for global redistribution, according to the cosmopolitan view, are the same ones as grounds for national redistribution” (Milanović 2007, 13). So, if our compatriots (or other human beings in general) are in need for basic resources to survive and live a decent life, we have to make a transfer to them if we really see them as persons worthy of moral concern.

That is why Milanović proposes certain global taxes for income-elastic goods or services that would be transferred to poor people. Apart from aid and relief assistance, there has to be a significant transfer to the Global South, if one wants his cosmopolitanism to be sincere and taken seriously. Of course, in order for a cosmopolitan project to actually change the world, states must not alone make the regulations and norms of the international arena. But, states have the political power and will often counteract the global democratic impulse because they will lose this power once the cosmopolitan law substitutes international law; that raises the issue of the role of individuals, groups and a civil society in bottom-up pressures on respective governments to act.

The human needs approach to cosmopolitanism is in many ways similar to the human capabilities approach, suggested by Martha Nussbaum (Salam 2011, 115) or embraces ideas proposed by Amartya Senn. They share concern for providing a decent (if not equal) set of opportunities for all human beings, by satisfying the basic needs and making human dignity possible. However, philosophy of needs provides even more space for empowerment and improving people’s lives, since it can draw from much older and more numerous philosophical traditions (from Plato, Aristotle, Marx, Maslow, Marcuse etc.), but also because the concept of the need itself is more suitable to stress the active role of a political struggle, and because the human functioning in Nussbaum’s work starts from the list of already defined set of prerequisites and thereby retains the “dictatorship of theory” over dynamic process of feeling and prioritising needs and their satisfaction (Hamilton 2003, 12).

John Rawls’s conception of justice also could be said to have something in common with the path Brock has taken, but she insists that people (under the “veil of ignorance”) would be more concerned with guaranteeing the minimum floor than with maximizing the benefits to those worst-off (Brock 2009, 54–57, Salam 2011, 115). Having applied the principles of justice on the global scale, she argues that the results would be quite different than Rawlsians expect. What is important is decent conditions for everyone, not necessarily equal opportunities (Brock 2009 62) or accepting the famous “difference principle”; this conclusion would in practice probably lead to establishing a minimal
basic income for all. In other words, what Rawls proposes only for domestic principles of justice, she endorses globally (in a slightly modified, needs–based form, Mandle, 2011: 302). Gillian Brock also convinces us that all human rights from the Universal Declaration can be explained in terms of her needs–based approach (Brock 2009, 72). This approach, though, is not identical nor grounded on human needs theories developed in other scientific disciplines, but it is focused only on primary needs and offers no further elaboration of the concept itself and its emancipatory potential.

Lea Ypi, another author who approaches issues of global justice from the cosmopolitan perspective, defends cosmopolitan rights as rights which originate from the duty to fulfil basic human needs (Ypi 2006, 4). “Moreover, basic needs can be instrumented as universal means or instrument for the pursuit of any purpose” (Ypi 2006, 4) and it is a cosmopolitan positive duty to reform political institutions in a way that would make the establishment of a global community possible, firstly by meeting the subsistence needs of everyone (Ypi 2006, 10). Ypi believes that “subsistence rights” should be incorporated into and acquire the status of social rights, and that it would also be valuable because it will recognize some of the communitarian strong arguments regarding political culture of particular communities (Ypi 2006, 11). She also reminds us that cosmopolitan theory of justice based on human rights could not be completely suitable to address all emerging issues, and that one must go beyond the basic needs for survival if he wants to develop principles of distributive justice on a global scale. Cosmopolitanism needs an explanation of the causes of inequality, too (Ypi 2006, 13).

Non–material needs and rudimentary contours of future cosmopolitan theory

The content of the previous chapter had mostly been focused on material needs, especially the need for survival, i.e. by providing basic material resources which are necessary for human beings to stay alive (to acquire key satisfiers – food, water, healthcare, shelter, clothing, sanitation). But, the actual idea of the paper is to include human needs theories in their wholeness (not just the part that deals with the satisfaction of material needs) into cosmopolitan reflection. Apart from the Marxist tradition, it is exactly the currently dominant liberal and consumerist culture that direct us towards contemplating the needs in a mostly materialistic way. That is how the values of freedom, honesty, safety, empathy and solidarity, deeply–etched in human nature, are being extracted from the main stage of politics and social conflicts and bargainings, giving the way to debates on the media, sport, vacations, credits and debts. Subsistence needs are of primary importance, but are not all that should be spoken about, since it is precisely the significance of other human needs that has to be stressed and these needs should be articulated in a non–violent political struggle. What is offered here is just a call, an appeal, for launching a normative project of establishing a global democratic community of individuals that is to be derived from the notion of universal (but changeable) human needs. A needs-based approach enables us to critically reflect on the existing international political system, thus leading to the reorienting of political theory and practice towards a new normative paradigm. This paper aspires to nothing but to contribute to this approach in a minimal way, and to represent a beginning, purely an ounce of “food for thought” and ideas to be developed.

Cosmopolitan thinkers predominantly write about institutional arrangements of a future political and legal order; few of them deal with issues of basic needs (sometimes even in an instrumental way), but very few deem human needs the backbone of their
theory. The claim of this author is that institutional reforms are not the only primary method of empowerment and emancipation of millions of people throughout the world. This call for deliberation, for academic and general public dialogue on using the philosophy of needs and different theories of needs for developing new cosmopolitanism aims towards a situation where all human beings would be the real ultimate units of moral concerns and where needs will be satisfied in at least the acceptable degree. All interested individuals are entitled and invited to join discussions on the needs and their satisfiers that are to be legally protected, once they have enough resources to survive and maintain their essential dignity. So, moral cosmopolitanism would have to be partly transformed to a legal one and somewhat result in it; however, this legal order would not be self-justifying, but it will draw its strength from the universalizing discourse of human needs. Both satisfaction and deliberation on needs seeks collective efforts that transcend private morality, and thereby recuperate the solidarity and common identity of all members of political community. Thus, if the community is meant to be global, this would likely have very positive consequences for creating the common identity of all human beings.

A lot more needs must be taken into account, not just survival, but all the others, or as many as possible. That is how conditions might possibly be created for cosmopolitanism to succeed better, to show its advantages, and not to be discredited in large parts of the world’s population due to its subsequent elements, biases and dilemmas. But which needs exactly are being talked about? Burton, for instance, proposes four needs: survival, security, identity, autonomy (Burton 1990, 33). Galtung talks about classes of needs: security needs, welfare needs, identity needs, freedom needs (Galtung 1978, 14). Maslow defined 5 of them: physiological, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, self–actualization (Maslow 1943, 374–382). Here, a further elaboration of human needs typologies will not follow, nor will the relation between needs (or classes, categories of needs) and their satisfiers be examined, since it is extremely complicated and there are neither ambitions nor the space to do this. What is important is that these lists of needs have to be open for discussion, and that there is not one, single and final prescription of what a human being has to have as its felt need. There should be no pretension for universal validity of any particular list of needs. So, this author is more willing to get closer to a union approach, when humanity produces a vast number of needs (or candidates to the status of a human need) as there is a strive towards a universal maximum, rather than a universal minimum (Galtung 1978, 26). Every group will have the opportunity to challenge others, which would be a fine tool for fighting cultural relativism. Therefore, in no way do we (as scientists or Westerners) want to postulate or prescribe what the needs are or should be; this would be open for contestation and represent an arena of dialogue for individuals, civilizations and cultures.

Previous understandings of needs and human nature that used to look at them as fixed have to be altered. Needs must not be perceived as static; democratic participation and the practice of deliberation precisely embraces contestation and dissent in evaluating needs, which testifies that this needs–based universalism may not be paternalistic. This universalism would be universalizing universalism, that would be aware of its potential particularities and biases, but always with the same goal in mind: opening the possibility for maintaining and developing the richness of human species, on a mutual and equal basis. It would set the stage for identifying priorities, but also for the exploration of more or less universal needs or satisfiers, true vs. false needs, as well as for research about actual and historical injustices and/or desires or particular interests that were represented as universal needs and rights. As Nancy Fraser assures us, political contestation and disagreement is always deep when the proceeding from basic needs to those non-material
and controversial takes place, but that is an opportunity for the development of the politics of needs (see, for example, Liebenberg 2007, 184).

It cannot (perhaps it should not) be said in advance what would be the exact results of the aforementioned endeavour. What can be remarked (with quite high probability) is that needs-based cosmopolitanism (if practiced) would probably lead to the redistribution of some of the world’s resources; it will reduce the inequality gap between the North and the South, take more care about the identities and autonomies of different groups (although individuals remain referent objects and subjects of the highest priority), enhance security in the wider sense of the word, enrich cultural, artistic and academic diversity, provide space for discussions which are not necessarily Westernized etc. Hence, this paper calls for the rehabilitation of the concept of need and open dialogue (with universalizing motives) about alterations of national and international rules and customs, for reason of the sincere application of cosmopolitan justice.

Having said all this, we will now expose three proposals for the future of cosmopolitan theory, which will hopefully make a certain impact on research agenda (and, because of that, maybe also later on world politics), and that will contribute towards a better understanding and acceptance of cosmopolitanism. Thus, cosmopolitan thinkers, protagonists and movements should, among else:

1. Adopt the normative and practical priority of the satisfaction of the basic needs of all people – this goal has to be promoted everywhere possible in order to enable all human beings not to worry about their subsistence, no matter what changes and reforms (political, economic etc.) this achievement would presuppose;
2. Connect with and borrow from human needs theories and philosophy of needs in general, encourage the worldwide dialogue on needs, their satisfiers, the operationalization and measurement of their satisfaction – this would lead to the amelioration of the anthropological knowledge base and to the implementation of concrete proposals and suggestions;
3. Refrain from accepting or proclaiming any final goal, ultimate desired state-of-affairs, nor single definition and list of human needs – this also means that the dialogue on needs may not and should not reach its ultimate legal completion, or in any way be exempt from a legitimate non-violent political struggle.

These proposals represent just useful hints for further thinking and activities. Other potential recommendations for future cosmopolitan theory are welcome and expected.

4. UNIVERSALISM, DELIBERATION AND PREDOMINANCE OF POLITICS OVER LAW IN GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

In our view, cosmopolitanism has to pledge for the global democracy of individuals (but also of states or nations, at least in the initial phases of the reforming process), where all people should be authorized to participate in making decisions that would oblige them. Differences in power (though necessary and advisable to a certain point) must be put aside when deciding on decent capabilities of every man to follow his chosen life path. Maybe “bringing politics back in” should become the new cosmopolitan motto,3 in the

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3 One interesting idea that agrees with this proposal is “political cosmopolitanism”, developed by Vivienne Jabri (Jabri 2007, 178–180). In this form of cosmopolitanism, contestation and struggle are of vital importance to consensus that is to be reached on global arena of politics. Universality of Jabri’s political cosmopolitanism is always on-trial, in question, and represents solidarity in the world of cultural differences (Jabri 2007, 185).
situation where politics is commonly perceived just as a sphere of the technical set of moves to minimize dysfunctions of the economic system, and where emphasis on economy threatens to undermine centuries of struggle for the empowerment and challenging status quo (Evrenosoglu 2007, 3–4). How needs are interpreted and which claims are postulated as important and legitimate for their satisfaction is and must be a political issue. Human needs as a form of universality (in Hegel and Marx) requests practical recognition of other persons as social beings (Evrenosoglu 2007, 9–10). This radical universality is also present in the existing potential for identifying general damage that is being done to people indirectly, namely for marking inherent injustices of the political and social order. Universalism of rights is less capable of capturing them.

Political participation is often seen as almost identical with deliberation. However, the two must not be confused (Hamilton 2003, 158). Rawlsian and Habermasian “reasoning from the point of view of others” is useful, but its emphasis on consensus and agreement could hardly represent a solid ground for the justifications of the universality of cosmopolitanism if the concept of human need and its satisfaction are not equal. Only after the needs of survival, security and access are satisfied, will humanity have a sufficient level of equality to assure the cosmopolitan deliberation runs smoothly. Shared and recognized human nature based on needs (not fixed, but one that is to be imagined and defined over again) serves as a precondition for global deliberation, since the cosmopolitan authority may be maintained only if all individuals and groups see themselves as relatively equal (in the sense that their dignity or moral worth is the same as those of others, and that they have enough resources and minimal adequate social position they could defend them). Deliberative democracy cannot serve as a legitimising ground without the core nucleus of universality that is acquired through human needs theory.

Deliberative practices and cosmopolitanism are complementary, and the deliberation in the form of Habermas’ communication action (or in some other form) is productive and beneficial. Again, the dialogues and debates could have been put through up to now, and they have been. It is not the case that there was no deliberation on the universality of human rights or on cosmopolitanism in general. But the deliberation in the future should be conducted starting from and in relation to more universal universalism of human needs. It is more universal because it takes into account the social position of individuals and groups which impedes the possibility of veritable conversation, and because the effects of this deliberation have to be quite different from those of previous use of public reason, and will lead to significant social changes. On the other hand, it is not the deliberation itself that is to justify cosmopolitan norms; norms are justified by postulating human nature and human needs as universal (yet possible to influence, non-fixed and changeable) notions, while deliberation is an additive, but very important, due to its feature of protecting diversity and intersubjectivity and the genuine cosmopolitan-democratic direction of the whole process.

Some critics might argue the central importance of human needs would re-affirm the importance of the nation–state, thereby complicating the establishment of cosmopolitan institutions. As for that remark, it is worth noting that it might be true that a needs–based approach would lead to strengthening the importance of nation–states (in a practical sense, but not necessarily in the sense of a national identity), but that would not have a

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4 This is as such because generally a state is seen as the guarantor of their satisfaction; see, for example, Hamilton 2003, 145–146.
negative impact on the cosmopolitan project; actually, what will happen is exactly the opposite. It would make human beings from all parts of the world more capable of participating in decision making and see themselves as members of the community of mankind (via their states, though dominantly as individuals), while deliberating and evaluating progress in needs identification and satisfaction. And, what is more important, the likelihood of success of the cosmopolitan theory to be accepted would be considerably higher if (at least) vital needs of all are met, since the consequences of this approach would be such that huge numbers of people would be empowered and can be counted in for reforming global order and institutions in the right direction. There is an imperative for the existence of coercive authority, but its justification is easier if the human needs are satisfied and the people have provided themselves requirements for political participation (Hamilton 2003, 132–133), than when only human rights are made protected.

So, human needs cosmopolitanism accepts the role the state has in providing elementary prerequisites for a large number of people to receive basic healthcare, education and security (including food, water and subsistence security in general). There is, at the moment, no other way of taking millions of people out of poverty and misery except that their national–state supports them in this process. In the future, cosmopolitanism may think of alternatives to the world of nation–states, i.e. a world state or just global governance, but in the meantime it cannot consider the state as its adversary, as long as the state accepts the duty of fulfilling basic human needs. Thus, the model of state cosmopolitans would like to prosper is the welfare state, though it does not necessarily mean the Northern type-welfare state, as understood by Habermas. But, economic differences in the world are so high that redistribution is needed in order to guarantee the inclusiveness of the global democratic processes (Cheah 76–77).

Conditions for global deliberation have to be created mostly domestically (if the point we are starting from in our cosmopolitan endeavour is carefully analysed), and this does not mean the return of “methodological nationalism”. The focus on the individual citizen as a moral being in the first phase of the cosmopolitan reforms process has to take over frameworks of existing states, in order to guarantee the survival, security and basic freedom. However, entire international relations and arenas have to be devoted to the dialogue on human needs, common human nature and rights to be declared as such, and this would be the dialogue of individuals and groups, not just (nor even dominantly) of states. The practice of disagreement, debate and non-violent conflicts would not be reserved to the nation-state, but will also characterize the global deliberation on needs. Cosmopolitanism should aim to conciliate universalism and particularism, and local conditions and life with differences have to remain an integral part of the idea (Baban 2003, 18). Multiple belongings and intertwined identities would allow us to experience otherness on a daily basis (Baban 2003, 22), while global democratic bodies will enforce states to obey their obligations towards the needs and rights of their citizens. Yet, priority should be given to changing the actual state-of-affairs, because a lack of real chances of millions of people to live their life without existential concerns is the main reason cosmopolitanism is not more widely adopted. Furthermore, the normative prop of cosmopolitanism gets more benefits by making lives of populations better at the local, regional, national and all other levels of governance, than of the immediate formation of new institutions and organizations of global reach in which very few (and almost exclusively the elites) would participate, respect it and have hope in.
Finally, too much emphasis on rights, courts and the adjudication of basic needs claims can have a negative impact on participatory politics and democracy (Liebenberg 2007, 184). Needs are usually depoliticised by representing them as problems of the market or family, and that is why recognizing their satisfaction as entitlement is important (Liebenberg 2007, 185). However, needs have to be implemented and interpreted through democratic procedures even when they are protected as social rights, and people should participate in defining the content and method of their satisfaction (an idea of Nancy Fraser, in: Liebenberg 2007, 186). Politics have to be more prominent than law in this process, because courts can also depoliticise needs since they perceive people as passive recipients of its orders, and the focus is on judgment instead of social relations that caused deprivation (Liebenberg 2007, 187). It is evident, therefore, that needs are better than rights in empowering human beings, and without empowerment cosmopolitanism is both inaccessible and to a large degree pointless.

5. CONCLUSION

A real democratic community of substantively equal persons will not be established unless cosmopolitanism overcomes obstacles and defeats other circulating ideas. The very process of deliberation will contribute to the strengthening and steering of the cosmopolitan identity and cosmopolitan norms, but the universalizing background (rooted in human needs discourse) must not be abandoned. Even if it is assumed that universalism has lost the battle (with postfoundationalist and postmodernist thinkers), the author of this paper thinks it is in practice nowadays needed perhaps more than before; the unintended consequence of deconstructing all grand narratives might be the weakening of the only set of ideas that is normatively authoritative enough to overthrow the violent and unfair institutions, rules and norms of contemporary societies. So, instead of compiling forces to try to somehow answer the post-foundational theoretical critiques, cosmopolitans should focus on advocating concrete reforms heading towards improving as many lives as possible in different countries. That is how reliance on moral concerns could be persuasive.

To avoid our universalizing background to represent a supplement to the Empire, a strong inclusive culture and “grassroot” political practice of people with basic needs satisfied can serve as the most important mechanism. The version of cosmopolitanism that seems dominant today (liberal and rights-based) is not convincing enough, because it is accompanied by politics of power and sometimes brute force. Universalism can always be misused, but it is not easy to see how cosmopolitanism can be sustainable without universalist aspirations. So, perhaps more time and energy should be devoted to different universalism, the one that is human needs-based. All people should participate in the dialogue on needs, including questions of identifying legitimate political claims and how needs are interpreted and satisfied, but also in determining obligations of individuals and states towards human beings within and across state borders. Supremacy of the needs-based approach will be proved in political practice, not in theory, where it is difficult to weigh arguments and their potential implications.

What must be taken care of is the tendency of some need-theorists to postulate final solutions to all problems and to offer ultimate accounts of human nature. One might say that need is a dangerous notion with possible totalitarian effects, and that it perceives people as passive, dependent receivers of help or satisfaction. However, there is no
logical nor necessary relationship between needs and dependency (Evrenosoglu 2007, 6). Only if there is an assumption that man is powerless, and that he has no realistic chance of influencing the interpretation of needs or of accessing the object of his need, could it be said that a person is passive and dependent. Bureaucratic, elitist and authoritarian/totalitarian tendencies in institutionalizing needs can be successfully fought with democratic practices, and individual freedom always remains the ultimate objective of social organization (Noonan 2006, 130). The discourse of needs is also criticized for being paternalistic, but Hamilton gives us four mechanisms for ensuring the anti-paternalistic character of the philosophy of needs (Hamilton 2003, 167). Moreover, whether paternalism is always bad is something that is not undisputed.

Cosmopolitanism is the best and perhaps only ethically plausible answer to the challenges of globalization, and to the problems of justifying political order in general. If it is rooted in the philosophy and practice of human needs, it has a better chance of ensuring all people are ready and willing to participate in the global deliberation. Men have the responsibility to enable the needs of others to be met (Brock 2009, 68), and this should be of extreme importance to cosmopolitanism. The democratic community of the world, with a universalizing moral code in its base, can be created when individuals and groups have their basic needs met, and participate (from a more or less equal social standing) in a dialogue on the development of (other, non–material) needs, their satisfaction, as well as on the rights and obligations of all men. The debate between universalism and anti-universalism may continue, while, at the same time, mankind engages in a constructive critique of the system in which many people are deprived of satisfiers necessary to preserve their essential dignity, and in which, therefore, the cosmopolitan identity is extraordinarily difficult to be achieved and developed. This is just a very clumsy beginning, a possible proposal and agenda for redirecting cosmopolitan thinking, and hopefully there will be more (and more important) contributions in that regard.

REFERENCES


OŽIVLJENI UNIVERZALIZAM: 
KOSMOPOLITIZAM ZASNOVAN NA POTREBAMA 
KAO TEMELJ GLOBALNE DEMOKRATIJE

U ovom radu se tvrdi da bi kosmopolitizam zasnovan na potrebama bio najlegitniji način organizovanja globalne zajednice u nastajanju. Ovakav kosmopolitizam treba da bude utemljen na pojmu osnovnih ljudskih potreba, kao što su, na primer: bezbednost, autonomija, identitet i blagostanje. Iako je pojam ljudske potrebe univerzalistički (time oslobađajući prostor za meta-konsenzus), “ljudska priroda” koja se izvodi iz ovog pojma nije nužno fiksn. Promišljanje potreba i politička praksa njihovog zadovoljenja će omogućiti istinski napredak kosmopolitizma, i to brže i bez brojnih problema sa kojim se danas suočava pristup zasnovan na ljudskim pravima. Globalna demokratija zahteva izvestan univerzalizam u etici, ali on mora da bude drugačiji od onih sa kojima se do sada pokušavalo, dok, u isto vreme, svakodnevna pozicija pojedinaca u različitim delovima sveta mora da bude značajno poboljšana.

Ključne reči: ljudske potrebe, kosmopolitizam, univerzalizam, deliberacija, globalna pravda, demokratija.