Miloš Vuletić

DOI Number
First page
Last page


I argue that Henry Lee is the earliest known proponent of moderate anti-liberalism in epistemology. I reconstruct Lee’s argument for the conclusion that Locke’s epistemological views lead to skepticism. Then I show that Lee proposes a type of hinge epistemology as a way of dealing with the skeptical challenge. He argues that we must assume the truth of epistemic hinge propositions, such as the proposition that our cognitive faculties are veridical. Such propositions do not require proof or justification and are not provable because, in Lee’s view, they are presupposed by all rational inquiry. Finally, I show how Lee’s brand of moderate anti-liberalism can deal with one notable recent objection to contemporary relatives of his view.


Henry Lee, hinge epistemology, skepticism, anti-liberalism

Full Text:



Adriaenssen, Han Thomas. “An Early Critic of Locke: The Anti-Scepticism of Henry Lee.” Locke Studies 11 (2011): 17–47.

Benschop, Hans Peter. “Berkeley, Lee and Abstract Ideas.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5.1 (1997): 55–66.

Coliva, Annalisa. Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense. History of Analytic Philosophy. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

———. Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015

Coliva, Annalisa, and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, eds. Hinge Epistemology. Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2016.

Huemer, Michael. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

Hutton, Sarah. British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

———. “Women, Philosophy and the History of Philosophy.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27.4 (2019): 684–701.

Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle. Understanding Wittgenstein’s on Certainty. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004.

Pryor, James. “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.” Noûs 34.4 (2000): 517–49.

Rickless, Samuel C. “Locke’s Polemic against Nativism.” In The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” edited by Lex Newman, 1st ed., 33–66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Shapiro, Lisa. “Revisiting the Early Modern Philosophical Canon.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2.3 (2016): 365–83.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. On Certainty. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

Wright, Crispin. “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78.1 (2004): 167–212. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.x.

———. “Replies.” In Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Annalisa Coliva, 377–485. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.22190/FUPSPH2103183V


  • There are currently no refbacks.

ISSN 1820-8495 (Print)

ISSN 1820-8509 (Online)