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HOW TO TEACH SUBJECTIVE TRUTH? KIERKEGAARD’S DOCTRINE OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

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Abstract The main goal of the paper is to determine the structure, meaning, and origin of Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication. Since Kierkegaard claimed that subjective truth cannot be directly imparted, the question arises as to how this type of truth can be conveyed to a student in the teaching process. Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication should provide the answer - the invention of poetic characters, irony, and dialectical knots in the speech should provoke the student and entice him to awaken existential interest and begin existential development. In order to explain this combination of aestheticism and the ethical value of indirect communication, the paper will first address the difference between a subjective and objective reflection, which establishes the difference between direct and indirect teaching methods. In the main part of the analysis, the paper will examine the structure of indirect communication and explain the difference between aesthetic and existential reduplication. In the concluding part, the paper will briefly refer to Socrates’ maieutics to determine the significance and benefaction of indirect communication as a teaching method.

Key words: indirect communication, direct communication, subjective reflection, objective reflection, subjective truth

1. INTRODUCTION

In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus writes: “The difference between subjective and objective thinking must express itself in the form of the communication, that is, the subjective thinker has to be aware from the start that artistically the form must have as much reflection as he himself has when existing in his thinking.” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 62)

According to Climacus, indirect communication is a form of speech that serves to express subjective reflection and subjective truth. Kierkegaard believes that the student
can awaken subjective reflection and begin the quest for subjective truth only if the teacher abandons the form of direct communication and employs an indirect method. Hence, the question inevitably arises: what is the difference between direct and indirect communication? In what way is it possible to apply indirectness in the teaching process?

However, before employing a detailed analysis of the importance and structure of indirect communication, the paper should address general questions. According to Climacus’ writings, there is an “organic” connection between the form of speech and the type of reflection. Direct communication is a vehicle for objective reflection; indirect communication is a suitable medium for subjective reflection. This means that the examination of the concept of indirect communication should first grasp the meaning of subjective reflection and its opposite – objective reflection. Therefore, the first part of the paper will be devoted to considering the following problems: What is subjective reflection, and why is it important? Why does the teacher have to assume the position of a subjective thinker? What is the difference between objective and subjective reflection?

2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE REFLECTION

To understand the meaning of subjective and objective reflection, and their differences, the investigation will start with Pojman's interpretation, presented in the Logic of Subjectivity. According to Pojman’s understanding, objectivity “stands for a composite of attitudes, including unemotionally, disinterested evaluation, neutrality, impartial judgment, which leaves the interested subject out of the scene, and consensus, based on the public’s assessment of the situation” (Pojman, 1984, p. 57). Subjectivity is at the opposite pole. In contrast to the objective attitude, subjectivity requires strengthening interest, intensifying passion, and initiating introspection (see: Pojman, 1984, p. 58).

Following this general difference, Pojman will introduce the difference between the subjective and objective relation to the truth. In this regard, Pojman finds that “juxtaposing objectivity and subjectivity may be outlined as follows: Subjective reflection yields subjective understanding; that is, deep introspection produces self-knowledge whereas objective reflection yields objective knowledge” (Pojman, 1984, p. 58).

Before embarking on a detailed consideration of the concepts of subjective and objective reflection, and subjective and objective knowledge, the analysis should take into account another general thesis on which Pojman's interpretation is based. In the section The Failure of Objectivity, Pojman opens the problem of the difference between subjective and objective approaches, and notes that these two types of cognitive acts are in an exclusively disjunctive relationship: “One asks about the truth either objectively or subjectively, but he cannot do both at the same time” (Pojman, 1984, p. 36). This conclusion is well founded. In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus writes that “precisely because (the individual human being) exists, he will not be able to walk both paths at the same time” (Kierkegaard, 1996, p. 213). In addition, Pojman adds another assumption, which outlines that “one cannot be both interested and disinterested in the same object in the same respect at the same time” (Pojman, 1984, p. 37). Following these insights, Pojman formulates his Cognitive Disjunct theses, which establishes the relation between subjective and objective thinking: “There is an exclusive disjunctive relationship between a subjective inquiry and objective inquiry” (Pojman, 1984, p. 37). At first glance, Pojman’s thesis on cognitive disjunction seems to claim nothing more and
nothing different than what Climacus himself states in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. The situation of an existing individual does require the positing of a cognitive *either-or*: the subject will either initiate objective reflection and focus on the object to discover the truth about it, or he will turn to himself through subjective reflection and start searching for the truth that would bring about his existential transformation. However, Pojman’s thesis on cognitive disjunction becomes problematic upon further investigation.

Starting from the cognitive disjunction thesis (CD), Pojman first states that “Kierkegaard lacks sufficient distinctions with regard to possible attitudes toward truth” (Pojman, 1984: 48), and that, when considering the problem of truth, Kierkegaard excessively and unnecessarily insists on positing the “either-or”. In addition, Pojman claims that “the implications of Climacus’s thesis (CD) seem disturbing” (Pojman, 1984: 37), and that Kierkegaard’s conveniently formulated “either-or” “seems to falsify what most of us believe to be the case” (Pojman, 1984, p. 37). What does this mean?

Pojman answers: “I think there is a fundamental confusion here. Disinterestedness or impartiality is not necessarily opposed to subjectivity. The opposite of interestedness is the spirit of neutrality” (Pojman, 1984, p. 48). On the one hand, the position of a neutral observer implies an objective assessment of the situation, consideration of conflicting propositions, and weighing the evidence, but not the conclusion about their truth value. On the other hand, impartiality, in addition to implying an objective assessment of the state of affairs, consideration of the evidence, and suspension of subjective moments, also involves accepting one of the opposing positions. Of course, the decision regarding the opposing views results from an objective assessment of the situation.

So, contrary to Kierkegaard’s teaching, which is based on the thesis of cognitive disjunction, Pojman wants to establish two positions:

1. First, that objectivity can precede and condition a subjective attitude, and that objective research and questioning of the truth of beliefs can awaken existential interest.
2. Subjectivity does not exclude objectivity, i.e., rational questioning of beliefs does not diminish the passion and interest with which the individual relates to them.

Both positions are based on an inadequate interpretation of the difference between subjective and objective positions, namely, the subjective and objective interests that constitute them. Here’s what Climacus notes: “When the truth is asked about objectively, reflection is directed objectively at truth as an object to which the knower relates. (...) If the truth is asked about subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively on the individual’s relation” (Kierkegaard, 1996, p. 217-218). In other words, “the objective accent falls on what is said, the subjective on how it is said” (Kierkegaard, 1996, p. 220). It should be noted that Pojman is fully aware of this. According to Pojman’s interpretation, the problem of Kierkegaard’s teaching lies in the relationship of exclusive disjunction, the incompatibility between these two attitudes. Pojman asks the following: why is it not possible for an individual to be guided by the same passion and existential interest in the objective examination of the truth? Why would existential interest exclude or at least diminish interest in the truth value of a proposition?

The problem with Pojman’s interpretation is that he fails to detect the difference between the two types of interests that respectively constitute these two attitudes toward truth. First, Pojman understands both types of interests in the light of objectivity, and then he explores the difference between these two interests under the category of quantity. The analysis will first address the problem of Pojman’s objectification of interest.
This is how Pojman understands the difference between a subjective and an objective thinker: “The objective inquirer is basically disinterested in the results of the inquiry; interest might be a relative, motivating factor, but the inquiry must be impartial, disinterested (...). For the subjective thinker, on the other hand, interested in the results, the inquiry is more than an intellectual exercise” (Pojman, 1984, pp. 36-37). Here, it can be seen that Pojman reconstructs both types of understanding according to the model of objective research. Both types of research have the same structure - a thinker who focuses exclusively on a given object in the research process. The difference between these two types of thinkers lies in their attitude toward the result of the research: while the subjective thinker is interested in the advance in the proposition that has yet to be determined, the objective thinker can suspend interest in the outcome of the research and remain impartial. Following this understanding, Pojman develops a critique of the thesis of cognitive disjunction and introduces the difference between impartiality and neutrality. Since interest is defined as an interest in the result of research, Pojman concludes that a thinker can be driven by complex motivation, while remaining disinterested in the outcome and managing to conduct research objectively.

Another problem in Pojman’s interpretation is the quantification of interest. This means that the difference between subjective and objective interest becomes a question of the extent or degree to which the thinker is interested in the results and the research itself. This is precisely why Pojman believes that one of the key positions for understanding the difference between subjectivity and objectivity is expressed through the following principle: “Minute subjectivity for things of minute value, absolute subjectivity for that which is of absolute value” (Pojman, 1984, p. 62).

It should be noted that Kierkegaard is largely responsible for creating this confusion by introducing the notions of finite and infinite interest. Namely, to set forth the demarcation between subjective truth and subjective madness, Climacus explores the nature of the object to which the subjective thinker is related. If an individual invests infinite interest in an idea of finite importance, we have a case of subjective madness. On the other hand, if an individual treats an idea of infinite value neutrally, freed from infinite passion and interest, the process results in objective madness. Therefore, Climacus concludes that ideas of infinite importance should be treated adequately – “otherwise subjectivity becomes a final stage, and objectivity disappears” (Kierkegaard, 1996, p. 215).

It is important to note that the difference between subjective and objective attitudes parallels the distinction between finite and infinite interest. However, this distinction should not be the main criterion for differentiating subjective and objective attitudes. So what should be the key determinant? Here’s what Climacus states: “Subjective reflection turns in towards subjectivity, wanting in this inner absorption to be truth’s reflection” (Kierkegaard, 1996, p. 215) and also: “Subjective thought invests everything in becoming” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 62). The first movement in the constitution of a subjective attitude is the suspension of self-forgetfulness and the awakening of interest in existence. The constitution of a subjective position begins with the question - Who is seeking the truth and why? - to which Climacus answers, “I guess so that he could exist in it” (Kierkegaard, 1996, p. 211). What drives the subjective thinker to search for the truth is not interest in the result of research, but the need to transform his existence. On the other hand, the main assumption of an objective attitude is the state of self-forgetfulness. To initiate an objective inquiry, the thinker must focus on the object and completely devote himself to the examination. Subjective interest is thus suspended not because research requires the
scientist to exclude emotion and interest, but because he must ignore the question “How should I live?” to answer the question “How should the object of research be understood?”.

Self-forgetfulness is inherent in objective research - as long as he is devoted to the problem of the object, the thinker cannot consider the problem of his existence. Objective inquiry renders fundamentally important topics existentially irrelevant – “Yes, Hegel is right; and yet we have not come a single step further. The good, the beautiful, the ideas are in themselves so abstract as to be indifferent to existence, and indifferent to anything except thought-existence? (...) Am I the Good because I think it, or am I good because I think the Good?” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 276). What does Climacus want to say? As long as the thinker remains committed to theoretical questioning and is interested in finding the correct definitions of moral values, he fails to see his existence under ethical determinations.

Therefore, the difference between a subjective and an objective attitude is not a question of the degree of interest in the object of research. What is crucial in the constitution of the subjective attitude is the awakening of interest in existence, which implies the suspension of self-forgetfulness. The main condition for adopting an objective attitude is the state of self-forgetfulness and the intensification of (theoretical) interest in the object. However, this is only the first moment in the constitution of the subjective attitude. Namely, in this part of the research, Climacus realizes that he has to introduce a further distinction between subjective truth and subjective madness. Hence the need to distinguish between finite and infinite interest and to introduce another constitutive moment of the subjective attitude - transformation (which implies eternalization) of interest. Aside from awakening awareness of the importance of self-development and transformation of existence, the constitution of a subjective attitude also demands the awareness of the importance of the idea according to which existence is to be transformed. Otherwise, the process would end with a case of disturbed interiority, i.e., subjective madness, which is recognized by the fact that “this something, which is of such infinite concern to the unfortunate, is some fixated particular that is of no concern to anyone” (Kierkegaard, 1996, p. 215).

In conclusion, it should be noted that the subjective relationship to the truth, and subjective reflections, is constituted through abolishing self-forgetfulness, and awakening interest in (one’s) existence. On the other hand, objective reflection demands the state of self-forgetfulness, suspension of questions about existence, and interest in the object of research. How, then, is the difference between the two types of reflection reflected in the difference between direct and indirect communication? Why is it necessary to apply indirect communication in the process of teaching ethical truths?

3. THE NEED FOR INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

The meaning and necessity of direct communication arise from the need to transmit and receive information. Hence, the prerequisite for this type of speech is a lack of knowledge, which induces a question, places the individual in the role of a student, and posits the need for a teacher. When the relationship between two individuals is thus established, the speaker must find a suitable expression for his thought to convey it without interference. In order to communicate a factual situation or theoretical knowledge, the speaker requires unambiguity and precision of speech, and the learner - openness to new content. The ambiguous speech would only create confusion and omit the goal of communication. This is always the case when it comes to objective knowledge. The student asks because he needs information, and
the teacher answers to convey it to him. If the student is unaware of a lack or error in his
cognitive structure, the teacher removes the wrong content and replaces it with the truth. So
why not use the wisdom of the direct method? Why can't we inform the individual about his
state, and directly communicate the content of essential knowledge?

To answer this question, Kierkegaard refers to the phenomenon of the illusion of
Christendom. According to Kierkegaard's understanding, the essence of this illusion is
that the members of the Christian Church mistakenly believe that they are Christians,
while they exist under different categories. They fulfill their religious obligations, gather
in the church once a week, take communion, listen to the sermon, and regularly confess
their sins. This external practice of religion creates and maintains the illusion that the
individual is a believer. If the priest were to try to question their commitment to the faith
(in a direct way), he would only be met with resentment and resistance. So how could this
illusion be removed?

Judge Wilhelm advises as follows: “Fairy tales portray people who were enchanted by
mermaids and water spirits. In order to get rid of the spell, the fairy tale teaches, it was
necessary for the bewitched to walk the same path backward without making a single
mistake. It is very well thought out but very difficult to implement, yet that is how things
are. The delusion that has taken over the individual must be eradicated just like that, and
every time a mistake is made, he must start from the beginning” (Kierkegaard, 1990, p.
577). What does the fairy tale have to teach us? To remove the illusion, the individual
must go back to the start. Before making further progress, the individual must make a
decisive turn – he must return to himself and eliminate self-forgetfulness. But that is not
the only message of the fairy tale. The Enchanted Hero must perform this movement
alone. This is where the fairy tale discloses the problem of the beginning of the movement.
The individual is required to rely on his strength to awaken existential interest; at the same
time, self-forgetfulness prevents the individual from looking backward and returning to
himself. The endurance of self-forgetfulness requires a teacher’s presence, while awakening
the existential interest requires solitude. The teaching situation both demands and undermines
the role of the teacher. This is one of the key problems of teaching subjective truth.
Kierkegaard’s answer to this paradox would be the doctrine of indirect communication.

If the paradoxical teaching situation generates the need for indirect communication,
then it could be assumed that the nature of this form of speech would reflect its
paradoxical origin. But before answering the question about the structure of indirect
communication, the analysis should first introduce the general definition. Anti-Climacus
states the following: “Indirect communication is shaped through the art of duplicating
speech. The secret of art consists in the skill of combining qualitative opposites into a
unity...If an individual wants to use this kind of speech, he must be able to untie the
dialectical knot” (Kierkegaard, 1944, p. 132). What does the skill of combining qualitative
opposites represent? What does the reduplication skill refer to?

4. THE STRUCTURE OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION – TWO REDUPLICATIONS

The investigation should start with some general remarks. Following Pool’s and
Lübecke’s research, the analysis will first introduce the difference between two indirections
or reduplications that constitute the phenomenon of indirect communication. The next step
will be a detailed examination of each structural moment. In addition, the analysis will
address the problem of the difference, or incommensurability, between direct and indirect forms of speech and expose the reasons for the inadequacy of direct method in teaching subjective truth.

It is widely known that indirect communication is a method that Kierkegaard used in his aesthetic writings. However, Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication is complex and cannot be reduced to communication skills or writing style. In this regard, Roger Pool finds that it is necessary to distinguish between two indirections, two (re)duplications, or two dimensions of indirect communication - aesthetic and existential (see: Pool, 1993, pp. 158-159). The aesthetic dimension refers to the author’s characteristic style, which requires a duplication skill (first duplication). Hence, the aesthetic dimension refers to Kierkegaard's practice of an incognito mode of communication, combining opposites such as earnestness and humor, using parables, etc. On the other hand, Pool finds that the existential dimension, the second indirection, refers to the phenomenon of double reflection, which is realized at the level of “the relationship between the author and what is said” (Pool, 1993, p. 159). While the first indirection discloses (re)duplication as a tool of aesthetics, a clever deception that allows the author to hide his intentions, the second indirection refers to an authentic, existential double reflection. Namely, double reflection requires the subjective thinker “to exist in a way that dictates thinking” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 104). The secret of double reflection is that it is a “reflection of the inwardness, a reflection of possession” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 161), which means that the thought, contemplated on the reflective level, is repeated and actualized on the level of existence. Therefore, Pool concludes that the authentic meaning of reduplication can only be recognized within the second indirection because it refers to the reduplication “between written text and lived expression” (Pool, 1993, p. 159). First, it should be noted that the essential function of indirect communication is to provoke the listener (reader). Encrypted content and confusion about the speaker’s identity should prompt the listener to take action. In what way?

The true meaning of indirect communication is not to help the author find his expression but to motivate the reader to existential development. This is when Pool concludes that “what is true for the author must also be true for the reader” (Pool, 1993, p. 160). What does this mean? At this moment of analysis, Lübcke’s research should be introduced. Namely, Lübcke tries to discover why Kierkegaard insists on the inadequacy of direct communication and the necessity of the indirect method. His thesis, presented in his work Kierkegaard and Indirect Communication, is that “this shift is not provoked by problems within semantics but has to do with the pragmatic aspect of language” (Lübcke, 1990, p. 32). Lübcke finds that the misunderstanding of Kierkegaard’s indirect communication is mainly based on the traditional interpretation that relies on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. However, unlike Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard does not consider ethical and religious problems inexpressible. Therefore, the need for indirect communication is not constituted at the semantic level. The problem of ethical concepts is not related to their unspeakable or semantically problematic content, but to how this content should be adopted. In fact, Lübcke believes that, according to Kierkegaard, moral principles, imperatives, and the difference between good and evil, are already universally known. Therefore, communication of the ethical can “abolish the object of speech” because “there is simply nothing left to teach” (Lübcke, 1990, p. 34). However, it is necessary to motivate the reader to practice what he has always known: “we ought to take the object and the message about it as a given and pass from the semantic to the pragmatic level of speech, so as to concentrate on the pragmatic task of motivating the listener to do what he knows to be his duty” (Lübcke, 1990, p. 34). Combined with Pool’s remark that “what is true for the
author must also be true for the reader” (Pool, 1993, p. 160), it can be concluded that the use of indirect communication is based on the need to awaken the reader’s double reflection.

4.1. The Aesthetic Dimension of Indirect Communication

The investigation should first open the question of the meaning of the first indirectness. As already stated, the first sense of reduplication refers to the style of speech used by the teacher. Practicing indirect communication implies, first of all, the dialectic of humor and seriousness, the introduction of allegories and parables, poetic expression, etc. Aesthetic reduplication has two main goals: hiding the speaker’s identity (and his "teaching" function) and then creating the vagueness of the content of the speech. Since the main function of the aesthetic dimension is to create confusion on every level of speech, the question follows – How is it possible to teach anything at all by employing the indirect method? How do the secret identity of the speaker and the uncertainty of the content of the communication result in the student's subjective (existential) progress?

It was already stated that the need for indirect communication derives from a paradoxical teaching situation. On the one hand, it was stated that the individual must choose to abolish self-forgetfulness and awaken existential interest, but also that he is unaware of the necessity of such a choice. On the other hand, the investigation revealed the need for a teacher, but also exposed the negative aspects of his function. Indirect communication now shows a way of combining these opposites. This masked speech simultaneously posits the teacher and forces the student to rely on his strength and capabilities. How is this possible?

In the Point of View for My Work As an Author, Kierkegaard writes about indirect communication as follows: "I can absolutely never impose one opinion, conviction, belief on someone; but I can do one thing, in a certain sense the first (because it conditions the following, the adoption of opinions, convictions, beliefs) and in another sense the last: I can force him to become attentive" (Kjerkegor, 1981, p. 31). The true origin of indirect communication is the teacher’s endless care and respect for the student. First, it should be noted that the teacher is completely aware of the student’s state of self-forgetfulness and illusion. Hence the impossibility of direct communication. But even if he could speak directly, the teacher would decide against it. Preaching to the individual about his condition, and forcing him to make a choice, would be the most severe violation of his autonomy. The only thing the teacher can do is to become provocative enough to attract the student’s attention and force him to make a judgment. That is why awakening attention is, in a sense, the first and the last thing a teacher can do for his student. Becoming attentive can be the first movement of subjectivity that heralds the movement of becoming. But awakening attention can also be the last instance of the teacher's activity. Teaching does not necessarily result in accepting the task of existence.

Due to the awareness of the student's freedom, the teacher must teach through presence and absence, approach and withdrawal. He must recognize the student’s need for self-development and existential progress. However, the teacher must always keep in mind the limits of his activity. That is why it is necessary to acknowledge the moment that requires the withdrawal of the teacher. Cultivating the self, making choices, and making life-critical decisions are processes that take place in the deepest solitude because “confession can be salutary only when one gives it to oneself, alone, and in silence” (Kjerkegor, 1981, p. 24).
4.2. The Existential Dimension of Indirect Communication

The second level of reduplication problematizes the very content of what is conveyed. It has already been said that indirect communication requires a dialectical doubling of the spoken content and the vagueness, openness, and ambiguity of the content of indirect speech. What does this instability of the semantic dimension imply? Lübcke's research has already partially answered this question. However, it is now necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of his understanding.

One of the contemporary authors, Jamie Turnbull, recognized the difficulties that arise when analyzing indirect communication and the contradiction that emerges when considering Kierkegaard's different definitions of this problematic concept. First, through the character of Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard states that the content of indirect speech is always determined: “the tirelessly active irony; the parody of speculation in the entire plan, the satire in so much effort being made as though something (...) new should come out of it, while what constantly emerges is old-fashioned orthodoxy in fitting severity” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 230). Although it seems that Kierkegaard is communicating something new by using highly stylized speech, Turnbull finds that, behind the creative rhetorical devices, there is well-known content. On the other hand, by exploring different definitions of the indirect method, Turnbull concludes to the ambiguity of the content of indirect communication, and the instability of semantics. How can this tension be resolved? How is it possible, at the same time, to demand definiteness and vagueness of content?

The problem can be solved by appealing to the definition of subjective reflection. Previously, the analysis of the structure of subjective reflection discovered that it unites two moments: intensification and transformation of inwardness. The transformation of inwardness is, in fact, the movement of eternalization through which the subjective thinker focuses on the sphere of eternal values. The first task of subjective reflection is to consider and understand principles and ideals with eternal validity, which means that subjective reflection includes a moment of objective reflection. Nevertheless, the result of subjective reflection is not an obsession with the object, but the application of the idea in the domain of practice, enforcing value into existence and translating eternity into finitude. Hence, it turns out that the key goal of subjective reflection is the existential appropriation of ethico-religious knowledge.

Therefore, while the direct method stems from the need to communicate scientific results, necessary truths, or historical data, indirect communication serves to “teach” essential, ethico-religious knowledge. However, the goal of indirect communication is not a simple transfer of knowledge: “Neither the Church nor the doctrine should be reformed. If there’s something that can be done - it is the reformation of all of us. This is what my existence is trying to express” (Kierkegaard, 2003, p. 223). This means that the need for indirect communication arises at the level of the pragmatic dimension of speech. The goal of indirect communication is to awaken subjectivity, build a special relationship with ethico-religious propositions, and translate truth into existence. However, the issue of semantic instability remains. Is semantics abolished by insisting on the pragmatic dimension of speech? Kierkegaard answers: “In life, is not important what is said, but how it is said. Because the same thing has been said countless times - the old saying is right: there is nothing new under the sun” (Kierkegaard, 2003, p. 269). The pragmatic dimension of speech presupposes the semantic one. Indirect communication purports that the listener is informed about the content (the “what”) of essential knowledge that has been communicated
countless times. However, while the individual has given his cognitive assent to essential knowledge, he has never existentially acceded to it. Indirect communication has to achieve the balance between the objective and subjective aspects of reflection, the incognito way of communicating and the cognitive dimension of speech. What does this mean?

In the Postscript, Johannes Climacus provides the most important definition of indirect communication: “The communication’s form is something other than its expression. When the thought has found its suitable expression in the word, which is achieved by means of the first reflection, there follows the second reflection which concerns the relation between the matter to be imparted and the imparter, and reflects the imparter’s own relation to the idea” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 65).

Here we can clearly see that indirect communication combines both types of reflection. The reference to the first, objective reflection is given in the first part of the definition: to convey the meaning of an idea, the speaker has to articulate it through words/concepts. But what about the second reflection? The second reflection seems to bring about an additional doubling. On the one hand, the teacher has to motivate his student to grasp ethico-religious knowledge existentially and to transform his existence according to the content of the idea thus conveyed. This aspect of indirect communication has already been recognized as the goal of the indirect way of teaching. However, apart from awakening the inwardness of his student, the teacher must also express his own relationship to the idea, and testify to the truth with his existence. Indirect communication is the conveyance of inwardness for the sake of inwardness – this is its function and, simultaneously, its reason for existence (raison d’être). Direct communication is not a suitable method for teaching subjective truth and enticing the existential development of a student. Why?

To answer this question, the analysis should take into account Kierkegaard’s understanding of knowledge and language. Namely, in The Concept of Irony, Climacus finds that “if the concept is not in the phenomenon (...) and if the phenomenon is not in the concept (...), then knowledge would be impossible.” In the first case, we would lose truth, in the second case – actuality” (Kierkegaard, 1989, pp. 241-242). Therefore, if the conceptualization of the phenomenon weren’t possible, that is, if the constitution and revision of concepts weren’t based on the development of the phenomenon itself, the truth (which implies a certain degree of agreement of being and thinking) would not be possible either. On the other hand, if the term did not reflect the phenomenon, i.e., if it weren’t possible to grasp at least the general characteristics of the phenomenon or group of phenomena through the term (because concreteness always escapes conceptualization), then it would not refer to actuality at all. However, it should be noted here that, even though the concept and the phenomenon refer to each other, they are mutually irreducible. There will always be a gap between conceptual reality and concrete, empirical existence. This is the main reason for the inadequacy of direct communication and the problem of language in general. Teaching subjective truth aims at achieving a synthesis between the universal and the concrete, the eternal and the temporal. The main requirement for a student is the existential appropriation of knowledge and application of acquired knowledge at the level of existence. However, just as the consideration of empirical knowledge discovers a gap between the conceptualization of reality and concrete empirical existence, in the same way, analysis reveals a disproportion between the generality of ethical concepts and the concreteness of the individual. This is precisely why Climacus claims that “existence-actuality [Existent-Virkelighed] cannot be communicated” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p.
How to Teach Subjective Truth? Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Indirect Communication

300), at least not directly. This is exactly what Socrates understood. According to Kierkegaard's understanding, Socrates’ maieutics was a form of indirect communication and teaching of the truth: “It has been argued that Socrates’ own conception of maieutics was overly intellectualist; that although he did not consider it possible to teach by straightforward instruction, he did see teaching as a means for making the student acquire knowledge of the essence of ethical concepts” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 60). In what way?

First, Climacus refers to the aesthetic dimension of Socrates' maieutics: “He did not have quite so favorable an appearance as that described; he was very ugly, had clumsy feet, and, above all, a number of growths on the forehead and elsewhere, which would suffice to persuade anyone that he was a demoralized subject. This was what Socrates understood by his favorable appearance... Why was this old teacher so happy over his favorable appearance, unless it was because he understood that it must help to keep the learner at a distance, so that the latter might not stick fast in a direct relationship to the teacher, perhaps admire him, perhaps have his clothes cut in the same manner. Through the repellent effect exerted by the contrast, which on a higher plane was also the role played by his irony, the learner would be compelled to understand that he had essentially to do with himself, and that the inwardness of the truth is not the comradely inwardness with which two bosom friends walk arm in arm, but the separation with which each for himself exists in the truth” (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 208). The first level of Socrates' maieutics, that indirect teaching method, refers to the contrast and balance between his unpleasant appearance and the seductiveness, the allure of his speech. Although his questioning and philosophical discussions attracted the attention of the youth, Socrates' appearance maintained a distance between him and his students. Socrates knew how to teach through attraction and repulsion; he was aware that he should provoke the student, and make him interested in learning essential knowledge. At the same time, he knew that the teacher must work on his student’s emancipation, keep him at a distance so that the student could awaken his subjectivity and see his existence in the light of ethical categories. This is the second dimension of Socrates’ maieutics, which builds on its aesthetic form. It is known that maieutics is a midwifery method, a type of teaching through which the teacher, as a questioner, compels the student to discover the truth independently. Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication works in the same way – Kierkegaard’s invention of pseudonyms, his poetic expression, irony, and ambiguity of content aim to provoke students. It is necessary for the student to become interested enough to start listening - first to Kierkegaard’s speech, and then to his own inwardness. In the end, the main goal of indirect communication is the emancipation and independence of students. In contrast to direct communication, where the teacher is the source of knowledge, and the student is the tabula rasa on which the teacher writes the content, through indirect communication, the student himself comes to the understanding of knowledge (which has always been known) and decides to transform his existence according to it. Here's how Climacus describes the benefaction and the true meaning of indirect communication: “What, then, is the greatest benefaction? … the lover knows to make himself unnoticed, so that the recipient does not become dependent on him – by crediting him with the greatest benefaction. This means that the greatest benefaction is precisely the mode in which the only true benefaction is accomplished … Let us get this clear. When I say ‘This man, by my help, stands on his own’ and what I say is true, have I done the best [for] him? … What do I mean by this? I say ‘He stands by himself, independent, by my help’. But then, of course, he does not stand by himself; then he has in fact not become his own, then he is indebted to my help for all this – and he is aware of this. To
help a person in this way is really to deceive him … Consequently, the greatest benefaction cannot be accomplished in any way whereby the recipient gets to know that he is indebted. … On the other hand, if one says ‘This man stands alone – by my help,’ and what he says is true – then he has done for the other person the highest that one man can do for another: he has made him free, independent, unto himself, unto his own, and simply by hiding his help helped him to stand alone” (Kierkegaard, 1998, p. 255).

The teacher, therefore, makes the student free - free from tutelage and idols, independent enough to make decisions about his existence. The greatest gift a teacher can bequeath to his student is the ability to “stand on his own” (Kierkegaard, 1998, p. 255) – to independently search for the answers, take upon himself the task of existence, and embark on the quest for subjective truth.

REFERENCES

KAKO PODUČAVATI SUBJEKTIVNU ISTITU?

KJERKEGOROVO SHVATANJE
INDIREKTNE METODE SAOPŠTVANJA

Cilj ovog istraživanja jeste da razotkrije smisao, strukturu i potrebu za Kjerkegorovom metodom indirektnog saopštavanja. Budući da je Kjerkegor smatrao da se subjektivna istina ne može direktno preneti učeniku, postavlja se pitanje kako je uočite moguće učenje i podučavanje ove vrste istine. Odgovor donosi Kjerkegorovo shvatanje indirektnog opštenja sa učenikom - kreiranje pseudonima, ironija, dijalitičke smicalice u govoru treba da isprovociraju učenika i navedu ga da probudi egzistencijalni interes i otpočne egzistencijalni razvoj. Kako bismo razjasnili ovu estetsku i etičku dimenziju indirekne metode, otvorićemo istraživanje razmatranjem razlike između subjektivne i objektivne refleksije na kojoj je utemeljena i razlika između direktnih i indirektnih metode opštenja. U ključnom delu rada, bavilićemo se analizom strukture indirekne komunikacije, te sagledati razliku između estetske i egzistencijalne reduplikacije. Na samom kraju, uputit će se na Sokratovo shvatanje majestate kako bismo istakli značaj i beneficije Kjerkegorove indirektnje metode.

Ključne reči: indirektna (metoda) saopštavanja, direktna (metoda) saopštavanja, subjektivna refleksija, objektivna refleksija, subjektivna istina