

## TERMINUS – TERMINAL – TERMINOLOGY

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**Abstract.** *Musical terminology is laden with difficulties. The present article will pinpoint some of the most problematic areas of musical terminology, and attempt to get them systematically organized. We will include “false friends” when translating from English into Serbian or Croatian (i.e. parallel keys), words that are polysemous within a language, even if they belong to the technical vocabulary of music theory. We will also discuss the fact that verbal accounts of music are heavily dependent on extra musical metaphors and models.*

*Although these problems are not specific only to music, there are peculiar reasons why precisely music is so difficult to verbalize. It can be argued that of all the arts, music is the closest to the earliest (primal) modes of mental functioning, ruled by primary processes. As they are unconscious and preverbal, they are extremely elusive when subject to verbal, conscious interpretation.*

**Key words:** “false friends,” metaphor, translation, primary process, Daniel Stern.

Nearly forty years ago Charles Rosen’s *Classical Style* was translated into Serbian. The book contains a footnote mentioning Johann Sebastian Bach and his Mass, considered by the translator to be in B-flat minor (Rozen 1979, 72). To be more accurate, it reads *Misa u b-molu*, yet this is the Serbian equivalent of B-flat minor. The translator was indeed not very competent in music. For my part, I flatter myself to have a reasonably good command of both English and music, and yet I can recall certain occasions when I was off my guard and allowed H minor to slip into my text. Following Germanic nomenclature, B in Slavic languages is B-flat in English, and English B is German or Slavic H, as shown in Figure 1.

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English	Serbian
B	H
B-flat	B

Fig. 1

`False friends` – words looking similar, sounding similar, but having different meanings in different languages – exist whenever we compare various languages, and words` meaning in various domains. As a member of the academic staff in daily contact with students, I am in a very good position to observe that for younger generations English has become the measure of all things, musical or otherwise. Students may write their assignments, term papers and the like in Serbian, but they rely on sources that are chiefly in English. Let us suppose they come across the word “figure.” In my experience, they invariably translate it with an almost identical Serbian word *figura*. Yet, the meanings of these words in their respective languages are not the same. In English usage, figure is generally thought of as a short melodic idea with a specific rhythm and contour, often equated with motif (Bent and Drabkin 1987).<sup>1</sup>

To the contrary, the standard Serbian textbook on formal analysis by Skovran and Peričić defines *figura* as a less salient tone structure, usually occurring in the accompanying voice. As a rule, it is repeated many times, preserving its generally narrow ambit. The most typical figures (such as the one in the left-hand part in Ex. 1) consist of arpeggiated chords in uniform rhythm (Skovran and Peričić 1991, 19–20). Thus, the two meanings not only differ: they are opposite.<sup>2</sup>

Ex. 1 W. A. Mozart, *Sonata facile*, KV 545

The image shows a musical score for the piano part of Mozart's Sonata facile, KV 545. It consists of two staves: a treble clef staff for the right hand and a bass clef staff for the left hand. The right hand has a melody with notes G4, A4, B4, and C5, with a slur over the last three notes. The left hand has an arpeggiated chord pattern with notes G3, B3, D4, and E4. The score is marked with 'mp' and 'p'. The bass clef part is labeled 'C:I' and 'V'.

Since this word has been ascribed other musically relevant meanings, it will create a different type of problem, to be discussed in due course.

Another example of a similar kind is the word `passage`. In typical English usage its meaning tends to be very broad, including virtually any type of phrase or short section of a musical composition; part of a composition generally characterized by some particular treatment or technique but without implications as to its formal position, e.g. a passage in double counterpoint or a scale passage.<sup>3</sup> In Serbian, the equivalent word is *pasaž*, using

<sup>1</sup> Hepokoski and Darcy talk about “ideas or figures” (Hepokoski & Darcy 2006, 95), and of “principal figures” within a given theme space (Hepokoski & Darcy 2006, 97); for Charles Rosen, “one of the principal motifs” is identified with “a little four-note figure” (Rosen 1988, 197). William Caplin (1997), in addition, repeatedly talks about cadential figures.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted, however, that English ‘figure’ and Serbian *figura* sometimes strike a true friendship, when the English word actually refers to accompaniment, but then, it is usually specified as ‘accompanying figure.’

<sup>3</sup> We could complicate the matter further by introducing another related word, *passaggio*, with its several meanings.

French pronunciation. Together with *figura*, it is classified as a less salient element. Unlike *figura*, however, it occurs as a rule in the leading voice, connecting elements with greater thematic weight. It is not characterized by repetition, and its ambit is usually wider. It consists mostly of scale-like motion or arpeggiated chords or a combination of both (Skovran and Peričić 1991, 21). Therefore, whereas in English passage seems to be somewhat vaguely defined and flexible enough to accommodate diverse elements, in Serbian it is basically restricted to elements such as indicated in Example 2.

**Ex. 2** F. Chopin, Ballade Op. 23 in G minor

The image shows a musical score for F. Chopin's Ballade Op. 23 in G minor. It consists of two systems of staves. The top system features a piano part on the left and a violin part on the right. The piano part begins with a *con forza* marking and a series of arpeggiated chords. The violin part starts with a *fz* marking and a series of notes. The bottom system continues the piano and violin parts. The piano part has a *fz* marking and a series of notes. The violin part has a *p* marking and a series of notes. The score includes various performance instructions such as *riten.*, *accel.*, *p* (*pesante*), *f*, and *fz*. There are also some markings like *Sec.* and *\** at the bottom of the staves.

One more example before I proceed to the next area of discussion relates to tonality. It is presented in Fig. 2 and hardly requires any additional explanation.

In English keys can be:  
 relative: C major / A minor  
 parallel: C major / C minor

In Serbian keys can be:  
*istoimeni* (homonymous) C major / C minor  
**paralelni** (parallel) C major / A minor

**Fig. 2**

Within the scope of this paper it would be impossible to discuss ‘false friends’ when more languages are involved. There is one example, admittedly fictitious, but too tempting – amusingly so I dare say – to be passed over. Symphony number six by Tchaikovsky bears the title *Патетическая* (Pateticheskaya). In the Western world it is largely known by its French title *Pathétique*, which is a generally accepted translation, albeit with some nuances of difference. Let us suppose, as a thought experiment, that we wanted a proper English translation. Etymologically, the English equivalent is “pathetic.” The respective meanings may overlap somewhat, but on the whole, such a translation would be preposterous, since in English, this word now seems to be used mostly in the sense “pitifully inferior or inadequate” or “absurd, laughable” (as found, for instance, in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary).<sup>4</sup> Be that as it may, to continue our imaginary experiment let us consider our Serbian student who – as we have already learned – relies not on French or Russian, but on English sources. Suppose this student comes across this inept English translation, and accepts as a given fact that there is such a thing as Tchaikovsky’s Pathetic Symphony. He or she would – I have not a trace of doubt –

<sup>4</sup> This is especially corroborated by examples from the section Recent Examples from the WEB.

translate it into Serbian as *Patetična*. This is again the same word etymologically, and this is the translation he or she would have found on Google Translate or in subtitles on television. Such a translation of the English word in question is `pathetically` inadequate, but the irony of it is that it is an accurate translation from Russian, roughly equivalent to the word ‘passionate’ in English.<sup>5</sup> If two wrongs can’t make one right, try three. Indeed, in Serbian, we do call Tchaikovsky’s Sixth, or Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in C minor *Patetična*.

Such disingenuous friendships exist even within a single language. Namely, a given term may belong to purely professional, technical vocabulary, and yet have different meanings in different sub-fields.

I will again refer to the word *figure*. Apart from it being a formal unit in music analysis, it can have other musically relevant meanings. In English (not in Serbian), it can relate to the figured bass. Next, the study of interrelationships between rhetoric and music involves the concept of rhetorical figures, and consequently, musical figures analogous to them (especially typical of German musicology: *Figurenlehre*). In yet another sense, the word “figure” is used when we talk about perception. One of the key concepts of Gestalt psychology is the figure-ground organization. Although primarily belonging to the visual realm, it proves to be useful in music, *i.e.* we perceive a great deal of music, especially homophonic music from the common practice era, as salient (thematic) entities (figures) unfolding against a more neutral accompaniment (background). If used in that sense, the word *figure/figura* means the same in both English and Serbian, hardly any false friendship there. Yet, in Serbian, confusion arises when we teach formal analysis because we interpret the segment shown in Ex. 1 as a motive in the right hand set against an accompanying figure (*figura*) in the left. When we talk about perception, it is the exact opposite, the foreground entity in the right hand is the figure against the background consisting of, well, accompanying figures.

To continue in the same vein, for a student of mediaeval music, *sequence* means something entirely different from what this word signifies in traditional music-theoretical disciplines (harmony, counterpoint, form); so does the term “enharmonic” in Ancient Greek and in common practice tonal harmony. In Serbian, *kadenca* signifies both cadence and cadenza, *koncert* both concert and concerto; in English, *part* is a section, a portion of the work, as well as an individual voice or line in the score, and so on.

As I was applying the final touches to this article, an examination paper that I simply must share with the reader was handed to me. The misguided student wrote a sentence which, translated back into English reads: “[in the given composition] Bartok dispenses with big and small *ključevi* (‘devices for locking and unlocking’).” There is hardly any need to look up the original to know that it reads “major or minor keys.” Our imaginary experiment with the Tchaikovsky Symphony is pathetically dwarfed by this real-life example.

One could argue that within the broader realm of musical terminology, the fields in which the two disparate meanings of sequence or enharmony occur are far apart. Indeed, if we discuss enharmonic modulation in some harmonically intricate late nineteenth-century piece, it is not very often that you need recourse to Ancient Greek theory. Issues become more sensitive when such “namesakes” appear within a narrower field. Suppose

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<sup>5</sup> The entry in a Serbian dictionary of foreign terms (translated into English): 1. full of pathos, moving. 2. excessively expressive, inciting feelings and passions in an artificial, affected manner (Клајн и Шипка 2011).

you are dealing with a late eighteenth-century sonata. You have reached the final portion of the development, and you are now discussing retransition, the dominant preparation of the return of the first theme in the home key. The dominant function is extended (lengthened, protracted, made to sound longer), allowing tension to build up and making the return to the home key more effective. If we look for yet another English synonym, we could say it is prolonged. A certain note or a chord may be prolonged. A performer may slightly prolong a certain note for an added expressive or structural emphasis. Not so if you are a Schenkerian. Then, prolongation has a specific technical meaning: the prolonged entity is something that exists at a deeper structural layer and is elaborated to yield an event at the surface; “the prolonged event remains in effect without being literally represented at every moment” (Forte and Gilbert 1982, 142). To increase confusion, even the authors who wrote major publications on prolongation are not always clear whether they use the term in the everyday or in the technical sense.

Suspensions begin to creep as to what kind of scholarship *is* that, if we cannot agree within our own field, in our own back yard, so to speak, on the meaning and usage even of technical vocabulary.

Yet, there is a potentially more challenging issue that concerns the language we use to describe musical phenomena. The processuality of music, its quality of unfolding in time, is felicitously captured by the syntagma musical flow (*muzički tok*): the syntagma that recurs frequently, at least in Serbian theoretical and pedagogical discourse. It is obviously a metaphorical representation; it may be a dead metaphor – we do not experience it as such – but there is no doubt it did not originate within musical discourse. Music flow can be divided into certain discrete units, the most basic one being the motive/motif. The difference in spelling suggests perhaps a difference in connotation.<sup>6</sup> When styled as *motif*, we may think in terms of a salient recurring thematic element. I have not been able to precisely trace its origin in music, but there is sufficient reason to believe that it was borrowed from decorative arts and/or literature. As *motive* it is rather like the prime mover, something that sets the music flow in motion, the generator and conveyor of energy according to the Serbian theorist Berislav Popović (1998, 103–109). It also causes the given piece of music to behave in a certain way, thus showing affinity with the psychological notion of motive. Both motif and motive seem to hail from regions other than musical.

Next, for a larger, relatively independent, self-contained unit we borrow a term from linguistics and call it the ‘musical sentence’. In linguistics, when there is a sentence, there must be syntax. The rules of syntax determine how disparate units combine into an *organic* whole. By introducing this term, we have achieved a seamless transition from linguistics to biology. Biological metaphors proliferate in certain areas of music scholarship, culminating in Schenker’s *Tonwille*. *Color* enters musical terminology either through specific qualities of given sound sources – timbre in other words – or as an attribute of certain chords or keys. Of course, for Scriabin, Messiaen or Ligeti color was probably integral part of their synesthetic audio-visual experience; for those who are not synesthetic, it is simply a metaphor. If music is a flow, something that moves, then it is only natural to talk about energy, to talk about forces that propel the motion. Steve Larson (2012), for instance, writes a book-length study on musical forces, distinguishing between gravity, magnetism and inertia. He is not talking about physical forces exerted by sound waves, as a material phenomenon. He is concerned with the immaterial aspect

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<sup>6</sup> This does not apply to Serbian, which uses only the term *motiv*.

of music, his forces are abstract, lacking the physical carrier, but the terminology is nonetheless physical.

Notice what happens when you want to construct a highly formalized theory that would dispense with anything poetically descriptive, picturesque or metaphorical. We may think, for instance of Allen Forte's set theory. It is fashioned on a mathematical, hence external model, but at least a musical event can be treated as a set of pitches in the literal sense, and so can the basic relations such as inclusion or complementarity. But what is the chief property of a set? Is it its interval content? Is it the interval *vector*? What does it have to do with either the mathematical or the physical concept of vector? I fail to see. Forte does not explain, and all those concerned with set theory accept it without questioning. Perhaps we ought to think of it merely as a suggestive term, chosen to emphasize the dynamic nature of music.

Let us consider another example, theories of tonal pitch space such as the one developed by Fred Lerdahl (Lerdahl 2001). It relies on exact geometric and algebra models, simultaneously with a vague and metaphorical concept of tonal space. Apparently, whatever the logic, methodology or ideology lying at the foundations of a given theory or method, we cannot avoid parasitizing on other disciplines. This means noise in communication, this means distortion of the original concept, this means that discourse about music is never sufficiently in accordance with its object. The cliché about ineffable music comes to mind, and we will shortly give this question due consideration.

Metaphors are a double-edged sword. They can be fruitful and stimulating, showing the interconnectedness among diverse phenomena, revealing broader and deeper patterns behind the surface that may appear incoherent and disjointed. On the flip side, they offer vague allusions where precise definitions would be in order. They may lead to misconceptions, unwarranted generalizations, and false analogies. This could be one of the reasons why definitions in music seldom withstand logical scrutiny. Take for instance the musical sentence – the holy cow of music theory pedagogy in Serbia. We teach our students that the sentence is a musical idea – musical thought/*muzička misao* would be the literal translation – rounded with a cadence. On this occasion, I will leave aside the “musical thought” part of the definition – even if it is not without caveats – and concentrate on the cadence. We teach that it is a harmonic progression that ends a composition or a portion. So, our definitions boil down to the following: what is a sentence? It is an entity which ends in a cadence. What is a cadence? It is an entity which ends a sentence. The definitions are circular but we heavily depend on them, and nobody seems to complain.

Having introduced the concept of sentence, I will dwell for a while on linguistics as a source of musical terminology. On the face of it, it is perfectly natural. Language and music have so much in common. For instance, they both unfold in time, and both are parsable into hierarchically organized discrete units. Observed from the opposite direction, elements are combined according to a set of rules to produce units of a higher order. Relationships between music theory and the study of language have a long history, but without going far back into the past, let us mention scholars such as Raymond Monelle and his linguistically informed semiotics of music, and, of course, Noam Chomsky, probably the most influential linguist in the domain of music theory. Monelle himself was influenced by Chomsky,<sup>7</sup> and when it comes to Lerdahl's and Jackendoff's

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<sup>7</sup> Compare, for instance, the following two statements, one by Chomsky, whereby “a generative grammar must be a system of rules that can iterate to generate an indefinitely large number of structures” (Chomsky 15-

Generative Theory, we can safely claim that Chomsky was its direct inspiration. In addition, a parallel can be drawn between the linguistic dichotomy between the deep and surface structures, and the concept of structural levels, as in Schenkerian analysis.

However, we ought to be wary of reading too much language into music. Leaving aside the tantalizing issues of semantics, music-language parallels prove inadequate even on the syntactic level. Music is not always organized along the lines of syntactic hierarchy. It is also capable of simultaneity in ways inaccessible to language, whether we consider intricate polyphonic webs of the Flemish masters, or Ligeti's micropolyphony, or else any composition that works with sound masses. No human language could possibly tolerate such a blurring of boundaries between its units, such fusion of words or sentences. And whereas no meaningful use of human language is possible without sentences, here the very notion of musical sentence is collapsed. At the opposite pole from these striking examples of condensation, we find equally striking examples of fragmentation in pointillistic texture, such as usually associated with Anton Webern. They are not only thematic units, but also the very tissue of music fragments to the point of disintegration. Unless you are a James Joyce, you cannot use language that tolerates such an amount of either fragmentation or condensation.

I admit that what I have said so far may not be particularly enlightening. Naturally, languages evolve in not entirely predictable directions, sometimes converging, sometimes diverging. Scholarly work proliferates, and it is only to be expected that scholars do not always agree on the meaning of certain terms. The fields of study are being continually deepened and broadened; scholars may not understand each other even if they work in the same field and speak the same language. *Babelization* of the discourse about music – the expression used by Kevin Korsyn (2013, 16) in a different context – seems applicable here. Homonymy, polysemy, metaphors, loanwords, calques, poorly defined terms and false friends exist in every field.

Yet, there is something peculiar about music. I do not mean only the degree to which we are dependent on borrowed and tentative terminology. There are deeper reasons why any discourse about music inevitably breaks down. We must be aware of the underlying issues concerning the intricate relationships between language and music, and behind these relationships, intricate and intriguing psychological issues. When Arnold Schoenberg called music the language of the unconscious (Schoenberg 1975: 193), he may not have been quite accurate, but he did grasp the fundamental isomorphism between unconscious primary processes, on the one hand, and musical structures and processes on the other.

According to a model proposed by some psychoanalytically oriented psychologists, notably the post-Freudian psychoanalyst Daniel Stern (1985), the earliest stages of individual development are ruled by so-called primary processes of mental functioning that are unconscious and *preverbal*.<sup>8</sup> This oldest layer is dominated by auditory representations. To put it simply, the world was first *heard* – even during the pre-natal

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16), and the other by Monelle, who talks specifically about jazz improvisation, but with broader implications, and who uses expressly linguistic terminology: “The improviser is like a native speaker of a language; possessed of competence in the language of jazz, he is able to make an infinite variety of sentences by the operation of a limited range of devices on an underlying structure” (Monelle 1992, 134).

<sup>8</sup> This shamefully brief account of individual development is rendered in a more extended form in Zatkalik & Kontić 2015; 2019 forthcoming.

period – before it was *seen*. The visual image of the world is fragmented, to be meaningfully organized at a later stage; the mastering of language, the development of the verbal-conceptual apparatus (verbal self in Stern's terminology) is due at yet a later one. These developmental stages overlap: there are no clear-cut demarcation lines between them. The more recent developmental acquisitions do not obliterate the archaic ones, and the mind is capable of fluctuating between them.

Powerful archaic affects exist alongside auditory perceptions. These affects have best been described by Stern, who coined a special term for them: "vitality affects." They do not – says he – fit into our existing taxonomy of affects. Their elusive qualities are better captured by dynamic terms, such as "surging," "fading away," "fleeting," "explosive," and very importantly "crescendo," "decrescendo," and so on... We are never without their presence, while "regular" affects come and go (Stern 1985, 65; Zatkalik and Kontić forthcoming).

The development of personality includes the development of the ego and its synthetic, integrating functions; in Freudian parlance, thing presentations (non-linguistic representations characteristic of the unconscious), are linked with affect in order to construct experience. This means that these primordial, vitality affects will be associated with auditory images as the dominating ones at that stage, and organized into the archaic core of the self.

Vitality affects are furthest removed from the conscious mind, which is at the periphery of mental processes, but they do strive to be discharged by movement to periphery, this discharge being important for the psychological, and even somatic equilibrium. At this early developmental stage, connection between auditory images and vitality affects is very close, so there is little to obstruct this process of discharge. However, first visual, then verbal representations will gradually form, all of them with corresponding affects. These developmental stages will be increasingly governed by secondary processes of mentation, oriented toward external reality, formal logic and – most crucially – language. Owing to that, the developmentally more recent affects are easier to verbalize and control.

However, for the discharge of *vitality* affects, it is necessary to offer them a corresponding thing presentation, that is, an auditory image divested of visual or verbal content. Remember that Orpheus entered the underworld – we can easily read that as a reaching for the unconscious realms of the psyche – through the agency of music, but there, he is not only unable to verbally communicate with Eurydice: he is not even allowed to see her.

To forestall misunderstanding, my insisting on the role of the unconscious in artistic creation (or reception) on no account denies the role of knowledge, craft, convention, social and cultural factors: aspects that involve a conscious, rational attitude towards reality or, psychoanalytically speaking, highly developed *secondary* processes. Gilbert Rose, a musically competent psychotherapist, links music with interplay between primary and secondary processes (Rose 2004). By partaking of secondary processes, music overlaps with language, lending credibility to such terms as the musical sentence, musical syntax and linguistic models in general.

Yet, music never severs ties with its archaic, *preverbal* roots. The isomorphism, mentioned at the beginning of this paper, between musical structures and processes on the one hand, and primary processes with their typical mechanisms of condensation, displacement or fragmentation on the other, is revealed in various aspects of music:



thematic procedures, large-scale formal processes, elaborations of fundamental structures etc. In that respect, music compares not so much with language as it does with dreams (the study of which is the royal road to the unconscious, as Freud famously said). The transformations that real-life percepts undergo in dreams have close parallels with the transformations of thematic materials in music, with the amount of condensation or fragmentation – let us reiterate it here – unimaginable in words (Zatkalik and Kontić 2013, based on the case study of Freud's famous patient known as Wolf Man).

Music resuscitates the archaic links between affects and auditory images, those that long ago existed in our personal history as virtually the only ones, but were relegated to the unconscious; it severs the link between word presentation and thing presentation; serves as an open path for the vitality affects in their movement to periphery and their discharge. Fluctuating between the primary and secondary, it also reaches for the preverbal depths of the archaic psyche. This is the reason why music cannot be fully verbalized. No conscious verbal discourse can accurately describe the preverbal unconscious mind. This also explains some peculiar musical experiences such as depersonalization, but this would go far beyond the scope of the present paper.

As the paper draws to its end, I would like to add one final thought. We need musical terminology in order to define concepts, to establish their definitive meanings, to draw precise boundaries of the domains to which they refer. The very etymology suggests that much: *terminus* in Latin means boundary, or limit, akin to Greek *termōn* with a similar meaning (boundary, end). There is something final, irrevocable, even sinister if we recall the phrase `terminal illness`. Yet, our terminology proves to be fluid, elusive, even obfuscating as much as clarifying the phenomena it relates to. I have no solution to this paradox. Instead, I will conclude with another piece of etymological curiosity. Tracing back the origin of the word we come to the Sanskrit *tarman*: top of the post. Sacrificial post to be more specific, the one to which the sacrificial animal is tied before being put to death. Or a human sacrifice, in more ancient times. I leave to the readers' discretion to draw any conclusions as they deem appropriate.

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## TERMINUS – TERMINAL – TERMINOLOGIJA

*Muzičko-teorijska i šire gledano muzička terminologija opterećna je brojnim problemima. Jedan od njih, koji se javlja prilikom prevođenja, odnosi se na takozvane „lažne prijatelje“: reči koje se u različitim jezicima slično pišu i izgovaraju, ali im se značenja razlikuju. Uzimajući srpski ili hrvatski na jednoj, i engleski kao dominirajući jezik današnje nauke na drugoj strani, možemo navesti primere kao što su „paralelni/parallel“ tonaliteti, ili ton B (na engleskom B-flat). Dalji problemi nastaju kad u jednom jeziku određeni termin ima šire značenje nego njemu sličan u drugom (engleski „passage“ naspram „pasaž“). Čak i čisto tehnički termini mogu imati različita značenja u različitim užim oblastima, recimo 'enharmonija' u smislu u kom se koristi u tonalnoj harmonskoj i u antičkoj grčkoj teoriji; slično i pojam 'sekvenca' u tradicionalnim teorijskim disciplinama i u srednjovekovnoj crkvenoj muzici. Lažna prijateljstva mogu postojati između sličnih ili identičnih termina u njihovoj svakodnevnoj i profesionalnoj upotrebi (na primer „prolongacija“).*

*Druga vrsta problema se odnosi na metaforičnost disukrsa o muzici. Kao odlična ilustracija može poslužiti pojam „muzička rečenica“ pozajmljen iz lingvistike. Mada on odražava bitne aspekte analogije između muzike i jezika (na primer kombinatorika i hijerarhijska struktura), on može postati izgovor za neosnovane generalizacije. Biološke, pak, metafore su u nekim teorijskim pristupima dovedene do takvog nivoa da kad se racionalno razmotre graniče se s apsurdnim (Šenkerova „volja tonova“ – Tonwille). Zanimljivo je posmatrati i one teorije koje teže visokom stupnju formalizacije, poput Freda Lerdahla i njegove teorije tonskog prostora, čiji geometrijski i algebarski modeli obećavaju maksimalnu egzaktnost, ali se cela teorija drži na koncepciji tonskog prostora, koji ne može biti drukčije nego sasvim maglovit.*

*U članku se identifikuju glavne problematične oblasti muzičko-teorijske terminologije. Pored toga, ukazuje se na moguće razloge zašto su problemi diskursa o muzici takvi da se muzici često pripisuje atribut neizrecivosti. Objašnjenje bi trebalo tražiti u činjenici da je muzika duboko ukorenjena u arhaičnim mentalnim strukturama svojstvenim najranijim stadijima individualnog razvoja. Oslanjajući se naročito na post-frojdovski orijentisanog psihoanalitičara Daniela Sterna, možemo ustvrditi da u tom najranijem razdoblju dominiraju primarni procesi mentalnog funkcionisanja koji su nesvesni i – što je od prevashodnog značaja – preverbalni. Čak i najsofisticiranija i najkompleksnija muzička dela nose karakteristike takvih procesa.*

*Ključne reči: „lažni prijatelji“, metafora, prevođenje, primarni procesi, Daniel Stern.*