

MIGRATION AS A FACTOR OF CHANGING THE ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

UDC 314.7:314.18(4-672-4)

Dejan Ž. Đorđević¹, Danica Šantić²

¹University of Niš, Faculty of Economics, Niš, Serbia

²University of Belgrade, Faculty of Geography, Belgrade, Serbia

Abstract. *In the age of raising global migration flows and increased mobility of the labour force in the world, there is a need to understand the main determinants of this phenomenon and to direct the focus of migration research to the various challenges it brings. This is a very important theme, especially in Europe, because 2014 and 2015 were the years of the highest number of immigrants, since WWII. Migrants are economic migrants and refugees, but in unique term they are asylum seekers as they want to stay, live and work in EU countries. Their population structure is quite different from that of EU population: they are young and in optimum reproductive and working age. Is that going to change not only quantitative, but also qualitative characteristics of population living in EU countries which are facing population decline or stagnation, low fertility rate, ageing and lack of labor force? Can we expect the redistribution of EU population due to intensive migration flows in certain countries, or a change in religious structure of the continent? Those are the questions of great importance because the migration flows today are shaping the future of EU population.*

Key words: *migration, labour force, refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants*

JEL Classification: J61, J19

INTRODUCTION

International migrations are an increasingly important element of contemporary demographic dynamics and due to its high volatility, it remains the most unpredictable element of population change (Coleman, 2008). Today, the world is facing mass migration flows, which are the most obvious indicator of globalization process. The voluntary and

¹Received October 26, 2016 / Revised February 24, 2017 / Accepted February 27, 2017

Corresponding author: Dejan Ž. Đorđević

Faculty of Economics, University of Niš, Trg kralja Aleksandra 11, 18000 Niš, Serbia

E-mail: ekngео@gmail.com


irregular migrations are the main demographic factors that are shaping nations and states worldwide. More than 230 million people are international migrants, which represents 3% of total world population. But together with internal migrants that number reaches 1 billion people which means that every 7th person in the world changed their place of residence. More than 60 million people around the world in 2014 had been forced to flee their homes due to armed conflict, violence, environmental stress and were living in displacement within or outside of their home country. That is the largest number of displaced persons since WWII with 33 millions IDPs and 16 millions refugees. This includes 11 million people who were newly displaced during the year in comparison to 2013, the equivalent of 30.000 people a day (UNHCR, 2015).

Europe is facing highest peacetime level of migration flows for centuries, both in absolute numbers and in relation to population size. It is the dominant factor of changing demographic characteristics determining the size, spatial distribution, rate of change, and composition of the most EU countries, and also affects the age-structure of their population (Coleman, 2008). In this paper we will analyze the contemporary migration flows to EU, pointing out how the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of migrant population can affect the current demographic profile of EU. Also, the diversity and importance of migration to and within EU with all its consequences to contemporary and future demographic development will be emphasized.

1. POPULATION DYNAMICS OF EU – MAIN TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS

On 1 January 2015, the population of the European Union was estimated at 508.2 million which was 70% of population living in whole European continent. Compared to the data from 1 January 2014 (506.9 million), that is the increase of 1,3 milion people. However, between 1960 and 2015 the population has increased by 100 million people. In the same period the share of the world's population living in EU members states fell from 13,4 % to 7,1 %.

In 2014 EU as a whole recorded a positive natural change of its population of 0.2 million or 0,4‰. That was two times higher than in 2013. The crude birth rate was 10.1‰ or in absolute terms 5.1 million births. The highest crude birth rates were recorded in Ireland (14.4‰) while the lowest were registered in Portugal (7.9‰). The crude death rate was 9.7 ‰ or 4,9 million deaths. The highest crude death rate was in Bulgaria (15.1 ‰), while the lowest was in Cyprus (6.2‰). The highest positive natural change of the population was registered in Ireland (8.1‰), Cyprus (4.7‰), France and Luxembourg (both 4.0‰), United Kingdom (3.2‰). Among the eleven EU Member States which registered a negative natural change in 2014, the largest were in Bulgaria (-5.7‰), Romania (-3.5‰), Latvia and Lithuania (both -3.4‰) and Hungary (-3.3‰) (www. epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).



Graph 1 Population change by component, EU 28, 1960-2013. (Eurostat, 2015.)

The contribution of net migration to total population growth has exceeded the proportion of natural increase since 1992 and became the main determinant of population growth. Compared to 2012, the natural change halved and net migration doubled. In terms of crude rates in 2012 net migration was 1.7 and a year later 3.4 ‰. It peaked in 2003 (95% of total population growth), decreased to 57% in 2009 and peaked again at 95% in 2013. Conversely, the proportion of natural change in total population growth declined from 43% in 2009 to 5% in 2013.

Considering the previous data it is obvious that countries in the eastern part of EU are facing population decline from very low and sustained fertility levels and negative net migration, while in western part the number of population is growing because of the attractiveness and opportunities to migrants. In some countries of Western Europe immigration is driving up population growth. The examples are Germany and Italy, countries with total population increased in 2015, even in spite of negative natural change, meaning that the population growth was driven by net migration. On the other hand, the Member states on the east recorded slow or reverse decline. In some countries in the east emigration predominates and accelerates the reduction of numbers arising from natural decrease (Graph 2; Coleman, 2008).


2. MIGRATION PATTERNS IN THE EU – MACRO FLOW, MICRO MOTIVES

The history of Europe has been shaped by migration, either across continent, beyond it, or (increasingly) into Europe (Moses, 2011). Since the Age of great discoveries until the second half of the XX century, Europe was continent of emigration, mainly into the New World, but also in colonies in Asia and Africa. That means that for most European countries, large scale of immigration is a more recent phenomenon (Hall, 2000).

In the second half of the XX century two main types of migration formed new, ethnically different population in advanced Europe industrial countries: "guestworkers" and "colonial workers" (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 97). The rapidly expanding economies of the West utilized the labour reserves of the less developed European periphery: Mediterranean countries, with strong influx of labour force from Turkey and North Africa. Also the former Yugoslavia was a one of the major sources of guest workers, especially from the eastern part of Serbia (Šantić et al, 2016). On the other hand, migrants from former colonies were important for Britain, France and the Netherlands. In the period 1945-1973 the number of foreign workers in Western Europe doubled from 3 to 6% of the total labour force (Hall, 2000). Economic motivations for migration were predominant, but that led also to family reunion and formed very strong chain migrations, which caused the formation of new ethnic minorities.

The fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), ending of the Cold War (1991) together with process of globalization brought a new phase in European migration patterns. Transformation in both North and South regions worldwide increased the pressure to migrate and generate new forms of mobility: decline of organized labour migration in Western Europe, family reunion of former foreign workers, transition of many countries of, so called, EU periphery to countries of immigration, shifts in the origin and forms of migration, emerging forced and irregular migration, increase in the international mobility of highly qualified persons (Castles & Miller, 2009).

Since 1991, the migration component became the major factor in increasing the EU population and exceeded the value of the natural growth rates. Political obstacles have ceased to exist and the people start to migrate from Central and East Europe toward the West. The enlargements of the European Union eastwards in May 2004, January 2007 and July 2013 completed a geo-political shift in post-1989 Europe that in terms of the migration and mobility of population poses the biggest demographic change in Europe since the end of the WWII. Migration issues played a significant role in the negotiations with new and future member states, greatly contributing to differentiation within the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. (Favell, 2008). The growing role of the EU in the field of migration has contributed to the strengthening and expansion of the migration system, concentrated around the countries of the Union. Significant shift in migration patterns in the first decade of XXI century can be explained by more restrictive migration policies, both at the level of the European Union and within its Member States. Also, spreading economic recession and unemployment which started in 2008 caused significant drop in the scale of migration flows (Graph 2).



Graph 2 Net migration in Europe, EU, Russian Federation and in other regions of Europe
(Eurostat (2010), Council of Europe (2006), Rosstat (2009), Sobotka (2009))

The EU Member states are very important destinations of immigrants. In the period 1985-2008 net migration gain was 22 million immigrants or one million per year on average, with a strong acceleration after 2000, which marked the beginning of a new era of the EU as a major immigration destination. Immigration has become the main driver of population increase, because two-thirds of the EU population growth were attributable to migration. But, at the same time, European regions are very diverse in their immigration and emigration levels and trends, with many Eastern European countries losing population due to emigration (Sobotka, 2009). In 2013 3.4 million people immigrated, while 2.8 million

emigrants were reported to have left an EU-28 Member State. In the most states a higher number of immigrants than emigrants was recorded. Germany is the country with the largest absolute net migration among the Member States, with 592.200 persons in 2012, followed by the UK (498.000), Italy (350.000), France (327.400) and Spain (304.100). States in which the amount of net migration is less than 10.000 are: Croatia, Malta, Slovakia. The exceptions are Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and three Baltic republics: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In absolute numbers, Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom received the largest number of migrants, which amounts to more than half of the total number of migrants in the European Union. The biggest decline in the number of immigrants was recorded in Italy (100.000 people), and, on the other hand, the largest increase recorded in Germany (200.000 persons). In relation to the total population, Luxembourg has the highest share of migrants, as much as 36%, which means that every third inhabitant of the country is immigrant (80% of all immigrants are from EU member states). In the same period, it recorded the highest rate of emigration: 21% (<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>).

The first decade of the twentieth century is characterized by large migration waves both from EU member states, and from other countries worldwide. Among 3.4 million immigrants moving to and between the EU in 2013, 1.4 million citizens were from non-member countries, 1.2 million people with citizenship of a different EU Member State from the one to which they immigrated. On 1 January 2014, the number of people living in the EU-28 who were citizens of non-member countries was 19.6 million (3.9% of the EU-28 population), while the number of people living in the EU-28 who had been born outside of the EU was 33.5 million, an estimated 6.6 % of the population were foreigners. It is important to emphasize that at the beginning of XXI century the number of foreigners living in EU-27 has increased by 10.2 million. People born outside the EU-28 outnumbered persons without the citizenship of a Member State in all EU- 28 Member States except the Czech Republic. In absolute terms, the highest numbers of non-nationals were in Germany (7 million), United Kingdom (5 million), Italy (4.9 million), Spain (4.7 million) and France (4.2 million). Non-nationals in these five Member States collectively represented 76% of the total number of non-nationals living in the EU-28, while the same five Member States had a 63% of the EU's population (www.eurostat.eu).

But from where are people coming to EU? Slightly more than half of the total number of immigrants originating from EU member states, in a first place from: Romania (384.000 persons), Poland (266.000) and Bulgaria (98.000). It is obvious that there is a clear division, within the EU, in net migration between the 'older' members (15 EU countries as of 2003) and the 'new' member states (12 countries of which only two, Cyprus and Malta, do not belong to the post-communist societies). The EU-15 countries have been attractive for immigrants because of their economic development, which surpassed their small natural increase ever since 1989. In contrast, most of the 'new' member states have recorded both negative net migration (since the late 1980s) and negative natural population increase (since the mid-1990s), resulting in a continuous population decline. Exceptions are Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, who have recorded considerable immigration after 2000.

Considering the immigrants from non EU – 28, there were significant changes in the countries of origin. In the first decade of new millennium, most migrants were coming from Morocco (157.000), followed by residents of China (97.000), India (91.000), Albania (81.000) and Ukraine (80.000). The largest number of Moroccans immigrated to Spain (94.000) and Italy (37.000), while most Chinese chose Spain (27.000). The main destination for the people from India was the United Kingdom (<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>). But in the

last five years there have been considerable changes. Due to the wars in MENA region, population pressure in Sub Saharan Africa and worsening the economic situation due to global economic crisis, Southern Europe became an example of a massive immigration fueling the strongest population increase in Europe. Refugees and economic migrants are coming from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea, Somalia, and many other Asian and African countries. The highest pressure of immigrants is in Greece, Italy and Spain, countries at the external EU borders. Those migrants usually represent the asylum seekers whose number in 2013 was 435.000, increasing to 626.000 in 2014 and over a million in 2015. Among those who are seeking asylum in the EU-28 in 2014, the highest number were from Syria (122.000), followed by Afghanistan, Eritrea and Serbia (each accounting for between 31 and 41.000 asylum seekers). In 2015 the highest number of asylum seekers was from Syria (180.000), then Afghanistan (80.000), Iraq (50.000), Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea. Most of those refugees went to Germany, Sweden and Austria. The conflict in Syria continues to be by far the biggest driver of the migration. But the ongoing violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, abuses in Eritrea, as well as poverty in many other countries are also leading people to leave their countries. Because of the rapid increase of refugees there is a rising tension in EU Member States, especially the ones with the highest influx of asylum seekers. That is why the EU ministers voted to relocate² 120.000 migrants from Hungary, Italy and Greece over 2 years period: in Germany 30.000 migrants, in Britain 20.000, but within 5 years and directly from Syria, in Sweden 2.700. But many EU countries, especially at the East refuse that relocation plan because their governments think that migration is a burden to their economy (Carrera & Guild, 2015; <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>).

It is important to emphasize that given data of total immigrants residing in EU member states are underestimated, because they do not include undocumented immigrants. Quantifying the size of undocumented migration is difficult as EU member states do not apply comparable internal apprehension practices, and comparison of country-specific migration. Number of immigrants irregularly residing in the EU 15 countries are different: ranged between 1.8 and 3.3 million in 2008 (Kovacheva & Vogel, 2009), and 10.8 million (Hofer et al., 2010). That means between 7% and 28% of total migrants were unauthorized immigrants.

3. THE IMPACT OF MIGRANTS ON THE EU ECONOMY

The old member states have, for many years, been an attractive destination for both the residents of economically less stable EU countries, as well as for the inhabitants of the Third world. The reasons why people migrate to the EU are different, but the European Commission points out that, since 1995, job search has become the main reason for the migration to the EU. Thus, higher earnings and better working conditions in the EU market are the main factor of modern migration within the EU (Gallardo et al., 2016).

When it comes to the impact of migrants on the economic changes within the EU, it is important to begin from the fact that the main driving force of migrants are economic

² Key to relocation plan:

- a) the size of the population (40%) as it reflects the capacity to absorb a certain number of refugees;
- b) total GDP52 (40%) as it reflects the absolute wealth of a country and is thus indicative for the capacity of an economy to absorb and integrate refugees;
- c) average number of spontaneous asylum applications and the number of resettled refugees per 1 million inhabitants over the period 2010-2014 (10%) as it reflects the efforts made by Member States in the recent past;
- d) unemployment rate (10%) as an indicator reflecting the capacity to integrate refugees.

factors. Even for refugees, who leave their home countries for mostly political reasons, the economic factor is important and difficult to separate. That this is actually so is shown in the data on tens and hundreds of thousands of Middle Eastern refugees, who chose Germany, Austria, Sweden or France as their final destination, as opposed to those who remained in Macedonia, Serbia or another economically weaker EU country (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia).

As noted, the impact of the influx of migrants to the EU demographic conditions is one of the key problems that pressures European countries. However, changes in the economies of these countries, which are directly caused by the rapid increase in population, are equally important for the understanding of the issue of migrant crisis. The population that comes in the highest percentage belongs to the younger age group (children and labour contingent), compared to the European population that is aging, the migrant population is on average younger by almost 20 years. Although this primarily refers to refugees and not economic migrants, the impact on the European economy is no less drastic. Although the main cause of this type of migration is war conflict, the age structure of migrants more or less remains the same. In both cases it is a young population, the only difference being the fact that the gender structure of refugees is more uniform, while in economic migrants they are mostly men.

How significant the impact of migrants on the economy is, is best illustrated in the increase in the labor force of Europe in the last decade, with a migrant share of 70%. The arrival of migrants is at the same time both desirable and undesirable for the economies of European countries. With the arrival of fresh labour force, vacancies are being filled, especially in the 3D job sector (dirty, dangerous, difficult) that the resident population of the EU countries does not want to perform. On the other hand, the high influx of skilled and highly educated migrants as cheap labor suppresses educated locals. Of course, one must take into account that the influx of migrants affected the developed countries in such a way that, relatively soon after the Second World War, they became economic empires.

At that time, economic migrations corresponded to both emigrant and immigrant countries. This can be seen in the case of Yugoslavia, where, in a relatively short period, during the 1960s, a surplus of unskilled labour force was reported, because the influx of the rural population from rural to urban areas was disproportionate to the economic development. All that excess labour was directed towards Western Europe, which at that time had the opposite problem. Already in 1980s there occurred the saturation of the labor market in Western European countries, but not when it comes to educated migrants. The process of "brain drain" became particularly strong during the civil war in Yugoslavia, but continues even today with no less intensity. The EU member economies are affected not only by the fact that there is the increased inflow of unskilled labour, but also the fact that migrants come from areas with different cultures, customs and religious beliefs.

Precise parameters that might quantitatively show the impact of modern migration on economies of the EU countries can not be determined. What is possible to monitor is the number of migrants who reach the EU countries from countries threatened by war and poverty, and thus perform certain migrant impact assessment. For example, only in 2014 almost 285,000 migrants reached these countries, mostly Syrians, Eritreans and Albanians (Annual risk analysis, 2015).

4. HOW IMMIGRANTS ARE CHANGING EU POPULATION STRUCTURE?


Migration flows have important demographic and economic implications on the development of EU Member states, primarily in transforming the main characteristics of their population for over a half of the century. Those countries are characterized by a low levels of fertility (SUF 1,5) which is in almost every country below replacement level (Ireland is an exception). Life expectancy is increasing and populations are aging, and fewer people in working age in future will have to support more elderly people (Castles, Miller, 2009). Ageing society represents a major demographic challenge for many economies. Falling fertility rates over several decades and a modest increase in the most recent decade, combined with the impact of the baby-boomer cohorts on the population structure causes greater gender imbalance within the EU-28 among older age groups (Eurostat, 2014).

Immigration to EU Member states is very heterogeneous in terms of the different recipients and countries of origin, ethnicity of migrants, as well as in terms of education. For instance, in Spain 47% of the foreign born residents are coming from Latin America, in France 40% of immigrants from North Africa, in Portugal, 45% of immigrants are from Africa and 21% from Latin America and in UK 29% of immigrants are coming from Asia (Dustmann, Frattini, 2012).

Those immigrants, especially from non-EU states, have different demographic characteristics. Foreign-born women tend to have more children. In 2008, 27% of foreign-born women lived in households with one dependent child, 19% with two dependent children, and 8% with more than two children (compared respectively to 24%, 16% and 4% of native-born women). It is important to mention the two different models of reproductive behavior: progressive within group of foreign-born women of Muslim confession and regressive or stationary model of native, predominant Christians. The higher levels of fertility among immigrants in future will cause the changes in both qualitative and quantitative characteristics, in the first place in number, age structure, religion. On the other hand, postponement of motherhood among native-born women may in part be attributed to increases in the average length of education of women, increased female employment rates, and changes in attitudes towards the position of women within society and the roles of men and women within families. (Dustmann & Frattini, 2012; Eurostat, 2015).

Regarding gender distribution in 2013, there were slightly more men than women immigrants (53 % compared to 47 %). The Member State reporting the highest share of male immigrants was in Slovenia (61 %) and the highest number of female immigrants was reported in Ireland (52 %). In Cyprus, for example, women outnumbered men among immigrants with Filipino, Sri Lankan and Vietnamese citizenship. On the other hand, in Italy and Spain women outnumbered men in the biggest group of immigrants (with Romanian citizenship in the case of Italy, and Moroccan citizenship in the case of Spain). In addition, among immigrants to Italy, women outnumbered men among citizens of Ukraine, Moldavia, Poland and Russia, while in Spain, the same applied for citizens of Pakistan and Senegal (Graph3; Eurostat, 2015).

Immigrants into EU Member States in 2013 were, on average, much younger than the population already resident in the country of their destination. The median age of the EU-28 population was 42 years. By contrast, the median age of immigrants to the EU-28 was 28 years. Apart from Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and France, the foreign-born population tends to be younger than the native population. The youngest foreign-born populations reside in Iceland, Ireland, Finland and Spain.



Graph 3 The number of men and women immigrants, 2008-2014.
(Eurostat, 2015.)

Considering the levels of education there are certain regularities: 'old' EU Member States are receiving an influx of highly educated, talented or (in any case) ambitious East Europeans, driven by the very positive selection mechanisms working in the European context (Borjas 1999). East European migrants are in fact regional 'free movers' and, with the borders open, they are more likely to engage in temporary circular and transnational mobility flow of economic demand. On the opposite side are quite different migration trends connected with the post-colonial, guestworker and asylum immigration that has proven such a long-term permanent immigration and asylum-seeking (Favell, 2008). The foreign-born population in the prime working age group of 25–54 tends to have a lower educational attainment than the native born population and they are marginally underrepresented at the high educational level and over-represented to a much greater extent at the low educational level. Only in Ireland the proportion of the foreign-born who are highly educated exceed 40%. Several countries tend to attract immigrants with a lower level of education (Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain and France), where 40% or more of the foreign-born population have a low level of education. Those immigrants are predominantly positioned at the bottom of the wage distribution and they are employed in so called 3D jobs (Dustmann & Frattini, 2012; Eurostat, 2015).

Across all countries, it seems that immigrants are economically disadvantaged, even if we compare them to natives with the same characteristics. The reason for this is that institutions in EU countries have not yet been sufficiently adapted to accommodate foreign born individuals and with no clear immigration policy or strategies about the long-term integration into economic and social structures. This might be more a problem for non-EU immigrants, as EU laws facilitate access of EU immigrants to labor markets of EU member states (Dustmann & Frattini, 2012). More recently, certain migrant worker policies have focused on attracting highly skilled or educated migrants. EU member states are looking for better type of immigrants: better educated and possessing skills that can be adopted to modern and fast developing technologies (Bonifazi at all). This approach has been seen in several national programs (such as in Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom), and now forms the basis of the EU Blue Card Scheme. Student migration has become particularly important in some parts of the EU, with generally young adults migrating to take part in university courses and other educational opportunities (Eurostat, 2015).

Some predictions are that there will be lack of labor force in EU Member States for 10% every year if there will be no migration influx. According to available projections, the proportion of the population of foreign origin in some European countries will increase from 5–15 % to 15–30 % by mid-century. Such projections depend primarily on the assumptions about the level of international migration. EU will have in future an almost desperate structural need, in both demographic and labour force terms, for increased intra-European population movements. For the next 20-30 years, regardless of what happens to birth rates, this demand will persist; and if more countries come to very low birth rates and fertility levels, the situation will get worse. Who will fill these 3D ('dirty, dangerous and difficult') jobs? EU authorities argue for their neighbors from the East, who are likely to be temporary rather than permanent, and are ethnically 'similar'? (Favell, 2008) The EU thus must be seen as a concentric, territorial project in regional integration that has used its external partner agreements to set up new mechanisms of managing regional migration flows, while closing doors to others (Favell, 2008; Rogers, 2000).

The current context within which EU member states are drawing up their migration policies is complex and confusing. In recent years the EU has been actively trying to develop a common EU immigration policy because of the increasing number of irregular migrants entering Europe. But on the otherhand, Member States are simultaneously confronted with an ageing population that asks for policy responses to secure employment demands in the coming decades. By 2030 the labour shortage in Europe is predicted to rise to 8.3 million workers. Without migration, the EU's working age population will decline by 15 million this decade alone (2010-2020). To overcome these challenges, EU authorities have identified labour market integration of legal migrants and increasing the attractiveness of the EU as key priorities.

CONCLUSION

Some of the most rapid and radical changes in the history of European international migration have taken place over the last fifty years. New destinations, new regions and new flows emerged. European continent form predominantly emigrant turned to predominantly immigrant. Economic transition, political changes and ethnic conflicts have affected the size and directions of the EU migration flows. Restrictive immigration policies have produced the shift from the traditional migrant workers and their families to large flows of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. As a result, different countries in Europe today are home to very dissimilar immigrant populations, in terms of origin, ethnicity and education (Bonifazi et al, 2008; Dustmann & Frattini, 2012).

Basic characteristics of the EU population are declining numbers, due to lower fertility rates below the replacement levels as well as an intensive process of population aging. Estimates are that by 2040 the population of the continent will decline, mainly in Romania, Germany, Bulgaria, Lithuania for almost 1/5 of the total population (www.worldpopulationreview). Patterns of migration flows can change greatly over time, with the size and composition of migrant populations reflecting both their current and historical patterns. Combined with the complexity and long-term nature of the migrant integration process, this can present challenges to policymakers who need good quality information on which to base decisions.

No one knows what will happen to asylum trends. One estimate puts the number of irregular migrants in the EU each year to 400.000. The probability is that wars and the economic crises will keep the asylum numbers high. But immediate attention in Europe is likely to shift back to more conventional labour-shortage recruitment. There will be no return to the open door policy of the 1960s, but the EU economy will require an increase in selective primary immigration.

The present xenophobia mainly spread with radical right-wing parties across EU Member states calls for restriction of migration because the foreigners at the doorstep are a threat for the creation of common EU identity and free labour mobility (Moses, 2011). There are initiatives for suspension of Schengen agreement, new controls on the borders, introducing quota systems, rising divergence between Christian and Muslim immigrants and selectiveness by main types of migrants (mainly between refugees and economic migrants). Nevertheless people are still coming to the EU Member States changing their demographic structure, facing EU governments with new challenges of integration and creation of multicultural society, instead of deportations and xenophobia.

REFERENCES

- Anex (2015). *Communication on the european agenda on migration annex*. Eurostat.
- Bonifazi, C., Okolski, M., School, J. & Simon, P. (2008). *International migration in Europe: New trends and new methods of analysis*. IMISCO research: Amsterdam University press.
- Borjas, J. G. (1999). Immigration and Welfare Magnets. *Journal of Labor Economics*. 17(4), Part 1, 607-637.
- Carrera, S. & Guild, E. (2015). Can the new refugee relocation system work? Perils in the Dublin logic and flawed reception conditions in the EU No. 334.
- Castles, S. & Miller, M. (2009). *The Age of Migration. International population movements in the modern world*. 4th edition, Palgrave, Mac Millan.
- Coleman, D. (2008). The demographic effects of international migration in Europe. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*. 24(3), 452-476.
- Dustmann, C. & Frattini, T. (2012). *Immigration: The European Experience* (Discussion Paper No. 2012-01), NORFACE MIGRATION.
- Duvel, F. (2006). *Illegal Immigration in Europe Beyond Control?*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Eurostat (2015). *Demographic Report Employment, Short Analytical Web Note 3/2015, Social Affairs & Inclusion, Population and social conditions*.
- Eurostat regional yearbook 2007. (2007). *Statistical books*, Luxembourg.
- Eurostat. (2010). *Eurostat online statistical database*. Accessed 20 January 2015 at «http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database».
- Eurostat. (2015). *Population and population change statistics*. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_and_population_change_statistics. Accessed on: 24 June 2016.
- Favell, A. (2008). The new face of East-West migration in Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 34 (5), 701-716.
- Frontex. (2015). *Annual risk analysis*. European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, Poland
- Gallardo De Luna, G., Korneeva, E. & Strielkowski W. (2016), Integration of migrants in the EU: lessons and implications for the EU migration policies. *Journal of International Studies*, 9(2), 244-253
- Hall, B. (2000). *Immigration in the European Union: problem or solution?*. OECD Observer, No 221-222. Retrieved from: http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/337/Immigration_in_the_European_Union:_problem_or_solution_.html#sthash.sfs2hrd.dpuf. Accessed on: 24 June 2016.
- Hoefer, M. & Baker, B. (2010). *Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2009*. Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- Kovacheva, V. & Dita V. (2009). *The size of the irregular foreign resident population in the European Union in 2002, 2005 and 2008: aggregated estimates, Database on Irregular Migration*, (Working paper No. 4), Hamburg: HWWI.

- Moses, J. W. (2011). *Migration in Europe: in Europe Today, A twenty first century introduction*. 4th Edition, ed. Tiersky R., Jones E. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, UK.
- Rogers, A. (2000). *A European Space for Transnationalism?* WPTC-2K-07, School of Geography Oxford University Mansfield Road Oxford.
- Rosstat 2009., Federal State Statistics Service, Moscow. (2009). *Population projection for 2010-2030 and preliminary data on population trends in January-September 2009* (in Russian). Retrieved from: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_105/Main.htm and http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b09_00/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d10/8-0.htm. Accessed on: 11 June 2016.
- Sobotka T. (2009). *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* 217-233, DATA & TRENDS.
- Šantić D., Kozlovs M., Antić M. (2016). Migrant Remittances in Serbia, a New Approach, *Collection of paper of the 4th International Congress: 'Migration in XXI century, Causes and Consequences'*, Vol. 2, Brčko, BiH
- U.S. Census Bureau 2010. (2010). *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2010 (129th Edition)*. Washington, DC, US Census Bureau. Retrieved from: <http://www.census.gov/statab/www/>. Accessed on: 24 June 2016.
- UNHCR (2015). *Engaging with IDPs, UNHCR Global Appeal 2015 Update*.
www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
www.worldpopulationreview.com

MIGRACIJE KAO FAKTOR PROMENE EKONOMSKOG I DEMOGRAFSKOG PROFILA EVROPSKE UNIJE

U vreme globalnog širenja migracionih tokova i povećane mobilnosti radne snage, postoji potreba da se razumeju glavne determinante ovog fenomena i da stavi akcenat na istraživanja migracija i izazove koje one donose. Ovo je veoma važna tema, posebno u Evropi, jer su 2014. i 2015., bile godine sa najvećim brojem imigranata, od Drugog svetskog rata do danas. Migranti mogu biti ekonomski migranti i izbeglice, ali univerzalni naziv je azilanti, jer oni žele da ostanu, žive i rade u zemljama EU. Njihova struktura stanovništva se prilično razlikuje od strukture stanovništva EU: oni su mladi i u optimalnom reproduktivnom dobu i radno sposobni. Da li će to promeniti ne samo kvantitativne, već i kvalitativne karakteristike stanovništva koje živi u zemljama EU, koja se suočava sa padom ili stagnacijom stanovništva, niskom stopom nataliteta, starenjem i nedostatkom radne snage? Možemo li očekivati preraspodelu stanovništva EU zbog intenzivnog priliva migranata u određenim zemljama ili promene u verskoj strukturi kontinenta? To su pitanja od velikog značaja, jer migracioni tokovi današnjice oblikuju budućnost stanovništva EU.

Ključne reči: *migracije, radna snaga, izbeglice, azilanti, ekonomski migranti*