

THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IN PERSPECTIVE: ARE A RESOLUTION AND A TRUMP-PUTIN AGREEMENT ON THE HORIZON?

UDC 327(477)

Dragan Petrović

Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Serbia

ORCID iD: Dragan Petrović

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8538-5119>

Abstract. *This paper examines the possibility of ending the Ukrainian conflict and explores how such a resolution might be achieved. The armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine has lasted for more than three years, stemming from a long-standing Ukrainian crisis. Over this period, most Western countries have supported Ukraine and imposed sanctions on Russia. The Trump administration shifted some of the basic principles of previous U.S. policy, aiming to find a compromise. Russia has achieved superiority and strategic successes in the conflict, creating the impression that the outcome will favor its interests. It is likely that part of the Russian-speaking southeastern region of Ukraine will remain under Russian control, and Kyiv will be required to commit to remaining outside NATO, along with other concessions. Leading EU powers currently oppose such an outcome and continue to support Ukraine's war efforts.*

Key words: *Ukraine, Russia, the Ukrainian crisis, armed conflict in Ukraine, European Union, United States.*

1. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 1990s, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, and the disintegration of the USSR, the global order quickly shifted to a unipolar system, dominated by a single world power and one military-political bloc (the U.S. and NATO). In the years that followed, America and NATO pursued policies driven by their own interests around the world. These included various pressures and even military interventions against sovereign states, violations of international law, and other abuses. The neoliberal economic-social model they promoted simultaneously collapsed during the global economic crisis which started in 2008, severely affecting the U.S. and many Western powers. This crisis accelerated a shift in the global balance of power, as

Received June 3, 2025 / June May 13, 2025

Corresponding author: Dragan Petrović

Institute of International Politics and Economics, 25 Makedonska St., 11103 Belgrade, Serbia

E-mail: drdraganpetrovic83@gmail.com

countries like Russia, China and to a lesser extent other leading SCO and BRICS members (India, Brazil, etc.) grew stronger, catching up with – or even surpassing – major Western powers, including the United States. In terms of purchasing power parity GDP, China has risen to the top globally, followed by India in third place and Russia in fourth (and first in Europe). Thanks to the U.S. dollar's continued role as the world's primary reserve currency and America's influence over international financial institutions (IMF, the World Bank, WTO, etc.), the U.S. remains the leading global power, alongside a group of emerging multipolar actors striving for more equitable international relations.

The conflict in Ukraine is formally a Russian-Ukrainian issue, but its significance is much broader. The U.S., the UK, and NATO were behind the 2014 coup in Kyiv, which established the "Ukraine as Anti-Russia" model. This represents the core challenge for the Russian-speaking and pro-Russian population in Ukraine – especially in the southeast – and for the entire "Russian World" (Russkiy Mir), particularly the Russian Federation, which was a guarantor of the Minsk II peace agreement. The broader context of this confrontation is the global transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order, with Russia positioned as one of the key proponents of multipolarism.

Even back in the mid-1990s, Samuel Huntington, in his renowned work *The Clash of Civilizations*, stated in the chapter on Ukraine that the country is geopolitically and civilizationaly irreversibly divided – with a larger, pro-Russian part, and a western part that is not. This divided Ukraine functioned, in principle, as an independent state for the first time in history through a pluralist system, where "pro-Russian" and "pro-Western" governments alternated in power – until the coup of February 2014, after which it effectively ceased to exist in its prior format and balance.

Even before that, power had been taken from pro-Russian parties and politicians on two occasions under suspicious circumstances: in late 2004 during the so-called "Orange Revolution," and in the spring of 2006, when President Yushchenko controversially dissolved the second Yanukovich government. However, the third instance – in February 2014 – saw the sovereign government of President Viktor Yanukovich and Prime Minister Azarov overthrown in the streets, with the help of Western-backed structures. Subsequently, the previously dominant pro-Russian parties, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party, were banned. From that moment on, nothing would be the same again, leading to well-known events: the secession of Crimea and Donbas, and the onset of conflict and heightened tensions. The victory of Zelensky over Poroshenko in the 2019 presidential election gave hope for calming the situation. However, after Biden came to power in the U.S., Zelensky continued the Ukraine-as-anti-Russia policy – both domestically (a new national church, marginalization of the Russian language and Russian-speaking population) and internationally (non-compliance with the Minsk II Agreement) – which likely played a decisive role in Moscow's decision to initiate armed conflict.

The conflict in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, can be viewed within a broader context. Due to numerous parallel global processes over several years, the world order has been shifting toward multipolarity. The Ukrainian conflict is part of this confrontation between the forces that uphold the old unipolar order – led by the U.S. and NATO, who strongly support official Kyiv – and Russia, which is not only a party to the conflict but also one of the leading powers promoting a multipolar world. The causes and triggers of the conflict are multifaceted, with the most significant being the February 2014 coup, which aimed to establish the Ukraine-as-anti-Russia model. Minsk II was undermined from the start – mostly by Kyiv – and the Western powers failed to act as

neutral mediators. Domestically, Ukraine saw the disenfranchisement of its Russian-speaking population, the creation of a new national church at the expense of the centuries-old Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate, and the banning of formerly prominent pro-Russian political parties like the Party of Regions and the Communist Party. That process briefly slowed when Zelensky came to power, but starting around Biden's inauguration, Zelensky tightened his policies against the Russian-speaking population and the pro-Russian opposition (such as the OPZH party and its leader Medvedchuk, and the Shariy Party), as well as against Russia itself. Western centers of power showed favoritism toward Kyiv and turned a blind eye to the human rights violations suffered by Russian-speaking citizens. The ceasefire in Donbas was repeatedly violated, resulting in thousands of deaths even while the Minsk II agreement was officially in effect. In February 2022, Russia first recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – in their entirety – and shortly after launched a full-scale military operation against Ukraine.¹

It is a fact that Russia invaded a sovereign country on 24 February, 2022; however, it points to a range of reasons and justifications for its actions. Serbia, for its part, recognizes the territorial integrity of Ukraine, as it does with all countries around the world. The collective West unanimously labeled Russia as the aggressor, imposed sanctions against it, and has since supported Ukraine in various ways.²

After more than two years of conflict, Russia has demonstrated internal economic, social, and political stability. Countries outside the so-called “collective West” have not imposed sanctions on Russia; on the contrary, many maintain active cooperation with it. Despite substantial Western aid, Ukraine is facing increasing challenges in maintaining the quality of its troops along the frontlines, while Russia maintains superiority in aviation, artillery, naval power, and ammunition supply. Over the past six months, both the intensity and consistency of Western support have begun to decline. Early signs of fatigue and divergence of interest are appearing among Western states regarding their willingness to continue comprehensive support for Ukraine. It is evident that Ukraine and Russia possess vastly different capacities—particularly given Ukraine's internal identity divisions—and there is a growing perception that Moscow is avoiding large-scale offensive operations and instead pursuing a strategy of multi-layered attrition against the Ukrainian side.

Over the course of two years of war, Ukraine has demonstrated considerable resilience, heavily bolstered by support from the collective West. On the other hand, Russia has shown strong resilience to sanctions, maintaining a stable and robust economy, political coherence, and social order, as well as tacit support – or at least neutrality – from the rest of the world outside the “collective West.” It is important to abandon the illusion that this is merely a localized conflict; in fact, it represents a critical arena in the global confrontation between the remnants of the (former?) unipolar world order – embodied by the U.S. and NATO – and the emerging proponents of multipolarity. Over the past two years, we have witnessed NATO expansion into Scandinavia, the significant enlargement of BRICS, and a recalibration of global power dynamics, notably in Africa and other regions of the world. The West itself is not without internal contradictions, particularly the growing discontent in several EU countries with blindly following Washington's policies on the Ukrainian conflict – including sanctions against Russia and broad-based aid to Ukraine.

¹ On the rising tensions in Ukraine from autumn 2013 until the outbreak of armed conflict in February 2022, see more in: Petrović 2022; Petrović & Bukvić 2019.

² For more on how the collective West (with few exceptions) came to support Ukraine and imposed sanctions on Russia from the very beginning of the conflict, see: Petrović 2022, 77-82.

Not to mention former President Donald Trump in the United States, who advocates for a fundamentally different strategic approach.

By the autumn of 2022, the Russian “special military operation” had encountered fierce resistance from Ukrainian forces, heavily supported by the collective West. Since then, Russia has adjusted its posture on the battlefield, increasing its military capacity and leveraging its resources to exhaust Ukrainian forces through active defense. By May 2023, Russia had broken through Ukraine’s second defensive line in Donbas (notably in Soledar and then Bakhmut), and successfully withstood an ambitious Ukrainian counteroffensive, which ultimately yielded no significant results.

From the fall of 2023 onward, with the escalation of the crisis in the Middle East, deliveries of military and financial aid from the West – especially from the United States – began to slow. As the conflict has progressed, Russia’s greater strategic capacity has become more apparent, while the quality of Ukrainian forces has diminished, largely due to the replacement of experienced units with new recruits lacking comparable training and capability. This shift has increasingly given the Russian side the upper hand and operational momentum, a trend that has become especially evident since early 2024. The capture of Avdiivka and Russia’s initiative along other segments of the front line confirm this development.

The replacement of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, with General Oleksandr Syrskyi, likely was not the most prudent decision. While Ukrainian forces have conducted bombardments against the southeastern territories (now annexed by Russia) and even Russian Federation territory, it is Russian strikes deep into Ukrainian territory that have inflicted particularly damaging blows to Ukraine’s military functionality and logistical infrastructure.

As for the current situation on the front: despite an outward appearance of static positions, Russian dominance has become increasingly pronounced in recent months, and this advantage continues to grow. The main obstacle facing Russian forces remains the exceptionally fortified Ukrainian defensive lines, especially in the Donbas region. Ukraine’s second major line of defense was breached in 2023 with the capture of Soledar and later Bakhmut. Furthermore, the taking of fortified positions in Marinka and particularly in Avdiivka reduced the threat of Ukrainian shelling of Donetsk. The fall of Avdiivka created a breach in Ukraine’s defensive network, pushing the front line toward the Karlivka reservoir area. From there, a push toward Berdychi and other locations may allow Russian forces to approach Ukraine’s final defensive line in Donbas from the south.

This third and last major Ukrainian defensive belt in Donbas stretches across the Konstantynivka–Druzhkivka–Kramatorsk–Sloviansk axis, forming a significant barrier to Russian advances toward the steppe and the Dnipro River basin in the Ukrainian hinterland. In order to reach this line head-on, Russian forces must first take Chasiv Yar – a city that has recently seen Russian incursions. Additionally, the last remaining forward-held sector of the second Ukrainian defensive line in the Severesk region, currently semi-encircled, is under growing threat from multiple directions, including a northern thrust toward Krasnyi Lyman. Should Russian forces seize Krasnyi Lyman, they would effectively approach Sloviansk from the north and complete the encirclement of the Severesk salient.³

³ For the situation on the front during the first two and a half years of the conflict, see: Karapandžin 2024, 176-202; Petrović 2023, 96-100.

This is the current state of Russia's so-called active defense posture, which has been in place since the autumn of 2022.⁴ Should the long-anticipated Russian offensive materialize, it would pose a significant challenge for the Ukrainian side.

As the conflict now moves beyond its third year and well into the fourth, the key question is how and when it will end. For Russia, the paramount issue is Ukraine's military neutrality – namely, ironclad guarantees that it will not join NATO and that Western nuclear weapons will not be stationed on its territory. In this respect, territory is not the primary concern. However, since Kyiv and NATO have not demonstrated readiness to accommodate Russia's core security interests, the conflict continues to escalate. Additionally, the Ukrainian government has, since the beginning of the war, increasingly distanced itself from its Russian and Soviet heritage – further entrenching the “Ukraine-as-Anti-Russia” paradigm. This includes banning the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, introducing new religious holidays and calendars by presidential decree aligned with the Western (Catholic) calendar, suppressing the Russian language and toponyms, and revising historical narratives. These policies not only conflict with human rights and identity protections but indirectly facilitate the further alienation—and potential secession—of a growing segment of Ukraine's population.

Given that both GDP and living standards in Russia are significantly higher than those in present-day Ukraine (even when compared to prewar figures), this too could motivate segments of the Ukrainian population to favor integration with the Russian Federation. The Ukraine that remains after this conflict will be saddled with the obligation to repay debts to Western powers. Should it lose its resource-rich southeastern territories and access to the sea, its economic and geopolitical capacity will be substantially diminished.

Western support remains the Kyiv government's principal source of hope – including the possibility of using parts of the frozen Russian assets in Western countries.

The outcome of the Ukrainian conflict remains difficult to predict, but one thing has become increasingly clear: in the absence of direct NATO involvement (which appears unlikely), Russia is poised to prevail. Following the referenda held in occupied territories, Russia considers four annexed regions – Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson – as integral parts of its sovereign territory in their entirety. Under current circumstances, one can reasonably expect Russia to pursue full control over the remaining areas of these four regions. Moreover, if Kyiv remains uncompromising, further escalation is likely, with the potential annexation of additional Russian-speaking regions in southeastern Ukraine (such as Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa). In the remaining territory still controlled by Kyiv, the population has declined significantly, and economic activity has deteriorated sharply. Although further Western assistance is anticipated, it is realistic to expect that it will be less comprehensive than before. For Russia, ensuring that Ukraine remains outside NATO remains the central strategic objective – an outcome the United States currently rejects. At the same time, Western states expect to participate in Ukraine's eventual reconstruction and anticipate debt repayments. Hidden behind these plans are the historical and minority-related interests of Ukraine's western neighbors (Hungary, Poland, Romania, and even Slovakia). While NATO has expanded into Finland and Sweden and the West has largely consolidated against Russia, the BRICS bloc has also grown significantly. The possibility that the conflict will spill over into the region cannot be ruled out entirely – particularly involving Poland, Belarus, Lithuania, and others. The

⁴ See also: Opačić 2024, 147-148, Karapandžin 2024, 198-202.

vulnerabilities of the collective West in maintaining unrestricted support for Ukraine are increasingly visible, especially as public dissatisfaction rises in many Western European countries due to the socioeconomic costs of the current policy approach.

Additionally, the prospect of Donald Trump returning to power in the U.S. presidential election in November presents a major variable. A Trump victory is widely believed to improve the chances for a negotiated compromise. Furthermore, the geo-economic interdependence between so-called “Old Europe” (France, Germany, and Italy) and Russia – interrupted by the war – could potentially soften their stance toward Moscow in the near future.

Russia, on the other hand, appears to lack significant internal or external vulnerabilities. The likelihood of the conflict expanding via NATO intervention is low, as such a move would endanger global peace. However, there remains a hypothetical possibility that a neighboring NATO member might act independently, outside the framework of Article 5. Poland is considered the most likely candidate in relation to Belarus. Additionally, there is a theoretical possibility that some of Ukraine’s western neighbors could use the crisis to pursue territorial ambitions – particularly those countries actively supporting Ukraine’s fight against Russia. Chief among these are Poland, followed by Romania, Hungary, and possibly even Slovakia.

The resolution of the Ukrainian crisis will influence the global order: a likely Russian success would accelerate the emergence of a multipolar world, whereas its failure could slow that process. These are large uncertainties. What is certain, however, is that Ukraine will not return to its pre-war structure and orientation, just as the world is changing – seemingly irreversibly – toward multipolarism.

For the Serbian people, the era of the unipolar world order – personified by the U.S. and NATO – has brought great harm. The U.S. and the UK largely disregarded Serbia’s alignment with the victorious side in both world wars, prioritizing geopolitical interests in which Russia continued to be perceived as a main rival, even during its weakened Yeltsin-era concessions. Western power centers likely view the Serbian people as historically and culturally close to Russia (Orthodox Slavs and long-standing allies, particularly in the centuries-long Eastern Question). The gradual shift to a multipolar world is not contrary to Serbian national interests – quite the opposite. While it is regrettable that the conflict in Ukraine has claimed so many lives, it was largely provoked by Western-backed attempts to reshape Ukraine from a state of diverse identities into an “Anti-Russia.”

Should the conflict continue, it is highly probable that Russia could take control of additional southeastern regions of Ukraine, potentially through referenda. This includes the Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa regions. Other eastern regions – such as Sumy, Chernihiv, and even parts of Poltava and Kyiv oblasts east of the Dnipro – could hypothetically fall under Russian control if the war persists. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to retake and hold lost territories. As Colonel Opačić notes: “The scenario most favorable to Russian patriotic circles is the capitulation of the Kyiv regime and its agreement to a neutral status.” He also raises the possibility of a territorial division of Ukraine involving neighboring countries (besides Russia and possibly Belarus, also Poland, Hungary, Romania, and hypothetically Slovakia). This scenario also touches on the status of Transnistria and Gagauzia in relation to Moldova (Opačić 2024, 364-367).

After more than three years, the conflict seems to be converging toward certain outcomes. From the outset, the “collective West” has largely accepted two central assumptions about the war: first, promoted by the U. S. administration and NATO leadership, that Russia is the sole

or primary aggressor; and second, that Ukraine, with Western support, can either defend itself or defeat Russia.

Over the past three years, Russia has weathered Western sanctions, maintaining political and societal stability. Despite economic harm, it has pivoted toward alternative markets and, in terms of purchasing power parity GDP, rose to fourth globally (and first in Europe), surpassing Germany and Japan. The expansion of BRICS – hosted by Russia in Kazan in 2023 – and active cooperation with its members show that Moscow has not been isolated. On the battlefield, Russia maintains the initiative, though territorial gains remain incremental. Russia's declared strategic objectives include keeping Ukraine out of NATO and securing recognition of the annexation of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, as well as Crimea.

The return of Donald Trump and his administration to power in the U.S. quickly demonstrated Washington's willingness to engage in negotiations with Russia. Statements from leading Trump officials and diplomatic actions suggest that Russia is no longer viewed as the sole or primary aggressor. Washington also seems to acknowledge that further increases in aid to Ukraine will not alter the war's trajectory. Trump appears willing to bargain with Putin not only over the war's end but also over broader spheres of influence and interests across Eurasia and the world. It is possible that even if a deal is reached, its full contents may not be made public. Trump's priorities lie in restoring U.S. economic strength and reducing defense expenditures – objectives that require agreements on security issues with Russia. He also seeks to preserve the dollar's role as the global currency, while viewing China as America's long-term strategic rival. Amid complex U.S.-Russia-China dynamics, Trump aims to restore relations with Russia, which had deteriorated to a nadir under Biden. His approach to the EU differs as well, sidelining it from the core decision-making process on Ukraine.

In the EU, ruling elites are not satisfied with Trump's stance, nor are they ready to accept a Russia emerging as a conditional victor. Some EU members and the UK continue to view Russia as a threat and rival and are thus committed to supporting Zelensky and Ukraine – going so far as to increase defense spending. However, internal EU economic troubles and growing political opposition could weaken this support. Moreover, the EU may lack the military and financial capacity to support Ukraine if the U.S. and Russia strike a broader agreement. Thus, it seems increasingly realistic that a preliminary agreement between the U.S. and Russia could be reached to end the war – potentially with China's support. Current EU leadership is unlikely to welcome such a resolution. Nevertheless, resolving the Ukrainian issue is only part of a broader framework Trump and Putin appear to be negotiating.

The U.S.-Russia talks have a broader agenda than just Ukraine. They cover bilateral relations, economic cooperation, and influence over key geopolitical areas. Given Russia's initiative on the battlefield, a ceasefire suits Ukraine – but Russia aims for a comprehensive agreement and has little interest in a mere truce. For tactical reasons, Russia may temporarily agree to ceasefires, such as recent ones involving energy infrastructure or the Black Sea. According to available reports, Trump has accepted that Ukraine will not join NATO and must cede territories currently held by Russia. Since Moscow insists on retaining all four annexed regions, it is almost certain that Trump would accept this, especially as he has expressed interest in reintegrating Russia into the G7. Russia's demand for a European security agreement may also be part of the discussions.

Nonetheless, many questions remain – about the course of negotiations, whether fighting will continue, and for how long. Ukraine is likely to hold the long-delayed presidential election later this year. The overall position of Ukraine remains fraught with uncertainty,

not only due to Russia's battlefield advantage but also due to Trump's willingness to strike a broader deal with Putin. As for the Balkans and the Serbian sphere, the impact of these developments remains to be seen. One thing is certain: the influence of a multipolar world will become increasingly visible in the region.

By April, it became increasingly clear that a peace agreement would not be achieved soon, and Russia is not prepared to agree to a ceasefire without a final settlement. The situation on the front lines reflects continued Russian initiative over most of the battlefield. Particularly significant are the developments near Pokrovsk – including advances on both its left and right flanks – and along the Torske axis, where progress is being made diagonally toward Kostiantynivka. The offensive toward Kostiantynivka is expected to intensify after the complete capture of Chasiv Yar (although fighting there has lasted more than a year, only a small western portion remains under Ukrainian control).

CONCLUSION

The Ukrainian conflict is not merely a war between Russia and Ukraine; it also reflects long-standing internal Ukrainian divisions dating back to its 1992 independence. Huntington addressed this in *The Clash of Civilizations*. These internal divisions were historically managed within the bounds of electoral processes and minor unrest – until the 2014 coup. The 2014–2015 crisis and hostilities were temporarily suppressed by the Minsk II Agreement. The secession of Crimea and Novorossiia disrupted the electoral balance between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian constituencies. The banning of key pro-Russian parties (e.g., Party of Regions, Communist Party), the creation of a new national church, suppression of the Russian language as an official language, and the implementation of the Anti-Russia model, alongside Kyiv's violations of Minsk II, further exacerbated tensions domestically and with Russia. Zelensky's victory in the 2019 presidential elections seemed to offer hope for de-escalation. After a brief thaw, tensions escalated again with Biden's arrival in the White House in late 2020. Zelensky's administration began suppressing remaining pro-Russian and neutral political forces within Ukraine and intensified both internal repression and hostilities toward Russia. All of this led to the outbreak of war in 2022, when Russia formally invaded Ukraine – although the situation had already reached a critical boiling point. This is not only a war between two countries – it is a confrontation between the advocates of a multipolar world order and those defending the legacy of unipolarity. In this context, it appears that a Russian victory would accelerate the development of multipolarism and create opportunities for restructuring international relations on new foundations and platforms.

REFERENCES

- Karapandžin, Stevica. *Geopolitički gambit – specijalna vojna operacija*. Beograd: Katena mundi, 2024.
- Opačić, Zvezdan. *Na putu za armagedon – Rat u Ukrajini*. Beograd: Ključ izdavaštvo, 2024.
- Petrović, Dragan. *Ukrajinska kriza i ukrajinsko-ruski sukob 2019-2022*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 2022.
- Petrović, Dragan. *Ukrajinski geopolitički čvor*. Pančevo: Mali Nemo, 2023.
- Petrović, Dragan & Rajko Bukvić. *Ukrajinska kriza 2013-2019*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 2019.

UKRAJINSKI SUKOB U PERSPEKTIVI: NAZIRE LI SE NJEGOVO PREKID I DOGOVOR TRAMPA I PUTINA?

U radu se posmatra mogućnost okončanja ukrajinskog sukoba, kao i način na koji bi to bilo moguće. Duž od tri godine traje oružani sukob između Rusije i Ukrajine, koji ima svoje izvore u prethodnoj višegodišnjoj ukrajinskoj krizi. Najveći deo zapadnih zemalja tokom prethodne tri godine podržava Ukrajinu i uveo je sankcije Rusiji. Trampova administracija menja neke osnovne postulate prethodne američke politike i pokušava da pronađe kompromis. Rusija ima nadmoć i uspehe u sukobu, pa se stiče utisak da će ishod sukoba biti u njenu korist. Tako će verovatno deo ruskojezičkog Jugoistoka Ukrajine ostati deo Rusije i da će Kijev morati da se obaveže da bude van NATO i druge obaveze i ustupke. Za sada se sa tim ne slažu vodeće sile EU koje su spremne da pomažu Ukrajinu u daljem sukobu.

Ključne reči: *Ukrajina, Rusija, ukrajinska kriza, oružani sukob u Ukrajini, Evropska Unija, SAD.*