

## **(DE)LEGITIMIZATION AS THE DISCURSIVE STRATEGY OF IDEOLOGY**

*UDC 316.75*

**Dušan Ristić**

University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Sociology, Serbia

**Abstract.** *In this paper the processes of (de)legitimization are analyzed as discursive practices and forms of knowledge and discursive strategies which enable articulation and functional constituting of ideology. The processes at issue here are those emerging as a consequence of imbalance in the power relations, that is, as consequences of articulation of different interests and struggles of social actors. In the paper we start from the assumption that ideological discourses as forms of knowledge and discourses of (de)legitimization provide the members of social groups with the resources for social classification, their understanding of social relations, social events as well as other social groups. (De)legitimization discourses likewise represent requests for certain behavior and actions, that is, the discourses that justify and/or discredit particular social practices and groups. They are also ways of monitoring social relations. In the paper four major categories of legitimization are emphasized, namely, authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis as well as the most important areas of (de)legitimization, namely affiliation, action, goals, norms, values, social positions and accesses to social resources. In the conclusion the processes of (de)legitimization are qualified as important strategies of ideologies contributing to changes, classification and reproduction of social practices.*

**Key words:** *(de)legitimization, discourse, social practices, ideology, strategy.*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The paper deals with the processes of (de)legitimization as those of discursive articulation and the phase of functional constituting of ideology. Identification and theoretical explication of the process and its *sociologic* is an attempt to explain one of the

---

Received February 12, 2016 / Accepted February 15, 2016

**Corresponding author:** Dušan Ristić

University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Philosophy, Dr Zorana Đinđića 2, 21000 Novi Sad, Serbia

E-mail: risticd@ff.uns.ac.rs

most important *discursive strategies* of ideology regarding the fact that ideology in society always appears due to discourses. In other words, it is discursivity which is its key feature (Marinković and Ristić 2013a).

Sociologic of discourse refers to the basic elements, technologies and regularities that can be perceived in social practices and that contribute to their articulation, organization and structuring. Ideological discourses represent those discourses having specific social functions or, better to say, those causing specific social *effects* and consequences. The discourses at issue here are those shared by members of particular social groups. They are *common* to a certain number of people and, likewise, they represent expressions of the social technologies of power. Regarding the fact that the “deepest grammar of ideology” is its request for the unity of theory and practice while the fundamental symbolic means are conceptual and linguistic (Gouldner 1976, 167), its structure and mechanisms should be looked for in the discourse. To explore and to explain ideology means to interpret the connections between meanings mobilized by the symbols and relations of domination based upon them. The interpretation of ideology should also comprise a social-historical analysis as well as a formal or discursive analysis while still “preserving” a critical dimension thus revealing the ways in which knowledge serves power (Thompson 1990, 23).

In the paper we start from the conception of ideology as a *rational discourse*, i.e. a genre of thinking that poses “diagnoses” about the social reality and social life. Ideological discourses are those discourses which pretend to *truthful diagnoses* of the social world (reality) and express the need for action and activities, for the changes of social order and social structures. These are the discourses of limited reflexivity since they do not question validity of their own “diagnoses” – unlike, for instance, the discourses of science and philosophy which are reflexive and which question both credibility and legitimacy of their own statements with respect to the criteria and rules for determining their truthfulness. Ideology as a type of rational discourse as well as a form of the symbolic system connecting and uniting heterogeneous statements about “what there is in the world” and “what is to be done” (Gouldner 1976, 55) does not represent a form of thinking which is legitimized in the pre-modern way – by referring to the *revelation* or dogmas “outside” the social world. It appeals to *reason* and “arguments”, to the facts, to what *people do* and *how they do it*. It differs from both religion and metaphysics because, in addition to the question concerning “what there is in the world” it also speaks about what is to “be done” in the society – thus calling for social action (1976, 31). In that sense, it can be said that the ideological discourses have replaced traditional forms of legitimization of social power and that they represent a means or instrument of domination and hegemony as well as resistance. Yet, no matter if we understand them as means of domination or of resistance, the ideological discourses always offer, to paraphrase, a coherent yet incomplete critique of the things as they are (Price 2011, 107).

Ideologies as ways of articulating and connecting discourses do not depend only on the linguistic “features” of the practices but also on diverse “semiotic chains” attached to different social practices or to the different ways of encoding, to biological, political, economic chains, etc., thus introducing into the game not only different systems of signs but statuses of the states of things as well.

Discourses can be understood, following the analyses by Deleuze and Guattari, as *assemblages (agencement)* that are different with respect to the social field, region or field of objects they form. They are like *abstract machines* that connect language with

semantic and pragmatic contents of the statements with collective assemblages of enunciation, with one whole micropolitics of the social field. Therefore, these are different semiotic chains, organizations of power and phenomena referring to arts, sciences, social struggles (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, 8). Each discourse, like each rhizome, contains “lines of segmentation according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc.” (2011, 11). Ever since Foucault it has been known that the *frontiers* of the discursive social practices are articulated and formed due to “separating out of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the subject of knowledge” (Foucault 1990, 9). These frontiers represent a product of various *recontextualizations* of social practices (ideological, scientific, religious, etc.) as well as social classifications. *The regions of discourse* in the society are formed on the foundations of various criteria (scientific, political, economic, technical, etc.) that represent social practices; they are constantly being defined and redefined while “a number of actors engaged in a discourse (that) is never brought to a permanent standstill” (Neumann 2011, 135–136).

Society abounds with multitudes of discourses and many of them “are not systematically codified as formal bodies of knowledge or principles of practice (as they are in law and medicine) (...) Moreover, discourses (examples of these might be 'commonsense,' or sexism or racism) function to empower some people while subordinating others. Clearly, different kinds of discourse function in diverse ways and perform multiple roles. For example, racism and sexism are also ideologies which attempt to justify forms of inequality, while 'commonsense' may have broader connotations and perform rather more diffuse functions“ (Layder 2006, 120). Each *regional discourse* is “a performative discourse which aims to impose as legitimate a new definition of the frontiers and to get people to know and recognize the *region* that is thus delimited in opposition to the dominant definition, which is misrecognized as such and thus recognized and legitimate, and which does not acknowledge that new region” (Bourdieu 1992, 119). The question of *differentiating discourses* is a sociological-historical problem *par excellence* that can start by exploring the transformation of *social practices* as systems that include and exclude, that assume sets of rules and regulations according to which the given inclusions, exclusions and choices are done, i.e., according to which *differences* are established in the social life (Foucault 2007). This is, in essence, the problem of (de)legitimization, that is, the question of the ways in which certain discourses and social practices are getting *legitimized* or *delegitimized*.

Ideological discourses are said to be all those discourses whose social effects come from the importance of the *answers* they offer to the following important questions: “*Membership*: Who are we? Where are we from? What do we look like? Who belongs to us? Who can become a member of our group? *Activities*: What do we do? What is expected of us? Why are we here? *Goals*: Why do we do this? What do we want to realize? *Values/norms*: What are our main values? How do we evaluate ourselves and others? What should (not) be done? *Position and group-relations*: What is our social position? Who are our enemies, our opponents? Who are like us, and who are different? *Resources*: What are the essential social resources that our group has or needs to have?” (Van Dijk 2006, 101).

From all mentioned above it can be concluded that ideological discourses represent an unavoidable element of the formation and reproduction of social groups, processes of

(de)legitimization and even social life on the whole. In other words, ideological discourses contribute to the formation and reproduction of different *social technologies of management*, that is, of processes and relations among social groups.

## 2. PRACTICES AND TECHNOLOGIES AS SOCIAL FRAMEWORKS OF (DE)LEGITIMIZATION

The exploration of ideological discourses should be directed to identification and explication of different *places* of their emergence in the order of social power which is provided by *social technologies* among which, of course, media technologies and media as technical means of production and transfer of information occupy a special and important (or maybe even decisive) place today. Still, in the context of this analysis, it is important to stress that it is not enough to explore ideological discourses through the constitution of different symbolic systems as also pointed out by Van Dijk, since they are reproduced through real practices – through what people do and what is possible to historically locate and explore. The forms with which every social technology “wraps itself up” are, generally speaking, images or representations (paleosymbolic), discourses and the practice in which the rules are ordered by genuine institutions (Foucault 2010, 271). Ideological discourses do not represent the *causes* of certain types of rationality and technologies in social practices; rather, they are their articulation. They are elements of the social technologies of normalization, practices and means of “discursive varying“ of these technologies.

The processes of the discourse (de)legitimization are determined by peculiarities of social regions and discursive practices (everyday life, media, public sphere, etc.). The discourses which are of special importance for the functioning of particular society become legitimate discourses thanks to the institutions. Ideological discourses can be said to become legitimized not only due to the institutions but also to the processes of normalization affecting the process of taking in of certain practices as acceptable for the members of a given group. Thus, ideological discourses can be understood as effects of different social technologies which contribute to the modification of the social rules of behavior.

The importance of social technologies as social mechanisms of surveillance and control was especially pointed out by Michael Foucault in his writings about different *technologies of power* (technologies of surveillance, punishment, discipline, normalization, etc.)<sup>1</sup>. He was interested in what kinds of forms the power relations are expressed in and manifested in society due to different *institutional technologies* and *technologies of the self* (Foucault 2014), procedures of normalization on behalf of state power, etc. (Foucault 2010, 430). Any of the “regimes“ of social practices contains particular forms of rationality which determine what people do and the ways in which they do it. Therefore, the forms of rationality *organize ways of doing things*. Social

---

<sup>1</sup> Foucault was engaged in “the study of the development of the technological theme that I find important: important within the great reevaluation of power mechanisms that took place in the eighteenth century, within the general history of techniques of power”, that is, in the history of relations “between rationality and (execution of) power” (Foucault 2010, 292).

technologies are rationally established social practices that can be applied in different social regions in order to achieve certain social goals. Thus, for instance, various disciplinary techniques used in the sphere of economy contribute to higher work productivity. Technologies of thought contribute to higher precision and elaboration of ideas, concepts and notions. Thanks to the social technologies a variety of rules and norms are established and modified such as relationship to the self, to others and to things. These are kinds of relationship that *distribute* technologies as well as discourses as articulations of power/knowledge.

The discursive practices in different social spheres always contain traces of a certain regime of rationality contributing to homogenization and systematization, that is, their conceptions. However, the practices as social intertwining of people's rational and irrational behavior, in addition to technological aspects, always comprise "strategic games of liberties" (2010, 292) which means they represent certain disproportion or *economics of power* – they are not only practices of social control but also those of different kinds of resistance. Ideological discourses, due to different social technologies, are *reproduced* through practices.<sup>2</sup> This does not mean that they are exclusively expressions of some specifically calculated interests of particular social groups but that they also depend on the possibilities of social technologies "to individualize every element of the social body" or generalize and connect different techniques that should be appropriate for local goals (2010, 304) of education or economy, for instance.

Programs, technologies and dispositives of social practices are not ideal types, as stated by Foucault, but elements of the social play, "a set of diverse realities articulated onto each other: a program, the connection that explains it, the law that gives it its coercive power (...) are all just as much realities – albeit in a different mode – as the institutions that embody them or the behaviors that more or less faithfully conform to them" (2010, 305). Gilles Deleuze also writes about social technologies by stating that technologies are always and primarily social before becoming technical (in a narrow sense). In other words, *material technologies* always represent articulations of *social technologies*. Social technologies are articulated all over the social field; yet, in order for them to be possible, it is necessary that "the tools or material machines have to be chosen first of all by a diagram and taken up by assemblages" (Deleuze 1989, 45). What should be also understood, in this context, is the importance of social institutions and processes of (de)legitimization – which "are not sources or essences, and have neither essence nor interiority. They are practices or operating mechanisms which do not explain power, since they presuppose its relations and are content to 'fix' them, as part of a function that is not productive but reproductive" (1989, 80).<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> The concept of *reproduction* as used in this context refers to the repetitive acts of repetition of particular practices: "reproduction here implies continuity of a system or structure as well as human agency. More theoretically, the notion is used to bridge the well-known gap between the macro-level and the micro-level of social structure. Systems or abstract structures, such as ideologies, natural languages, and societal arrangements are thus said to be both manifested in, as well as made to persist as such through, social practices of social actors at the micro-level" (Van Dijk 2006, 306).

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, an analysis devoted to the transfer of medicalized technologies in Serbia during the First World War (Marinković et al. 2014).

### 3. (DE)LEGITIMIZATION AS A DISCURSIVE STRATEGY OF IDEOLOGY

Articulation of some *regime of discourse* or discursive order in society always represents a historical consequence of the imbalance in the power relations as well as a consequence of the struggle among the social actors, that is, of the existence of diverse ideological discourses and possible (individual and collective) subject positions that are available. These positions are organized and systematized thanks to the institutions, that is, processes of symbolization and ritualization in particular regions of sociability as well as thanks to the affirmations that originate from different social groups.<sup>4</sup>

An analysis of the relationship between *discourse* and *ideology*<sup>5</sup> that we find in the sociology of knowledge of Tim Dant underlines the inseparability of knowledge, discourse and ideology. In Dant's approach we find traces of Foucault's ideas there is no knowledge without a defined discursive practice and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms (Foucault 1998, 196). Thus Dant says at one point that *to define "social contingency of a particular knowledge (...) is a discursive strategy"* so that it is important "to focus attention on the social contingency of all knowledge" (Dant 2011, 5). The task of contemporary theories as well as research of ideology would be, in that sense, to reveal the processuality of social values and beliefs, that is, the "taken-for granted knowledge that is necessary for the operation of society." Ideological discourses can be observed as "general determinative relationship between the social and material conditions of existence and the abstract relations construed in knowledge" since knowledge can be defined as "the construal of relations between abstract entities that are taken to represent the world of human experience, that can be shared by humans through communication and that can be used by them both to understand their experience of the world and to guide their actions" (2011, 5–6). Regarding the fact that "knowledge becomes available for sharing when it is uttered" (as a text or speech), it is always articulated as discourse. Though "certain types of knowledge may reside within people (the teacher, the technician, the skilled worker)" the fact is that they always transfer their knowledge through discourse.

Thus, *ideology as a form of knowledge* makes up the basis of social representations shared by members of a social group. It allows "people, as group members, to organize the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong, *for them*, and to act accordingly" (Van Dijk 2006:21). In exploring ideology as a discursive social phenomenon, reductionism represents accentuation of its *semantic identity* exclusively. It means that ideologies are not only some fixed, static and abstract systems (of ideas, values and beliefs) that individuals "apply", that is represent through discursive practices but they are also sets of complex effects that are immanent to these practices. Ideology, as written by Terry Eagleton, is to be viewed "less as a particular *set* of discourses, than as a particular set of effects *within* discourses" (Eagleton 2007, 194). Yet, despite the fact that discourse can be understood as a general phenomenon or, in

<sup>4</sup> Distinction between ritual and "material affirmation" is here, surely, only analytical since it is difficult, indeed, to practically differentiate intrinsic ritual and non-ritual social practices.

<sup>5</sup> On various approaches in the study of discourse and ideology see, for instance, Dant 2011; Downing 1991; Fairclough 1995; Frow 1985; Gruenais 1979; Keller 2012, 2013; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Maldidier et al. 1972; Marinković and Ristić 2013b; Purvis and Hunt 1993; Schäffner and Kelly-Holmes 1996; Wodak 1989.

Foucauldian terms, as *general region of all utterances* or *dispositive of ideology*, discourse is at the same time both a visible and concretized *means* of ideology.

The discursive strategies of ideology represent various *ways*, that is, *phases* of functional constitution and articulation of ideology. The term *strategy* has several connotations and can be used in at least three meanings: firstly, to denote choice of *means* "employed to attain a certain end"; secondly, to denote "the manner in which a partner in a certain game acts with regard to what he thinks should be the action of the others and what he considers the others think to be their own" or, briefly, "the way in which one seeks to have the advantage over others" and, thirdly, "the procedures used in a situation of confrontation to deprive the opponent of his means of combat and to reduce him to giving up the struggle" – in this case, the term refers to "the means destined to obtain victory" (Foucault 2010, 409). As for the first mentioned meaning, Foucault speaks about "rationality functioning to arrive at an objective", that is "strategies of power" as sets of means used for the functioning, that is, sustaining the power dispositive"; due to the term strategy it is possible to "decipher power mechanisms... immanent in force relationships" (2010, 410). Following these statements, ideological discourses can be said to be means for attaining social goals, i.e., for realizing interests of particular social groups.

However, social goals which are being realized due to ideological discourses are never completely exhausted through social interests. It is surely possible to think about *unintended consequences* but important goals are always represented by different processes of *rationalization* of practices. One way of rationalizing practice is, among others, the process of (de)legitimization – which is realized through mobilization of social actors and their practical and *symbolical integration*. The character of the discursive strategies of ideologies is determined, to a large extent, by different rules of language and speech, that is, strategies and possibilities of speech, utterances and textualization. They determine semantic and syntactic coherence of discourse. However, the strategies of spoken and textual production of meaning and sense are only a part or elements of ideological discursive practices in which the relations of power are grounded but also the social struggles about meanings and resources that are considered important and desirable in a particular society.

Regarding the fact that in principle, all discourse may have *ideological effects*, whether or not it expresses particular interests, socio-discursive research of (de)legitimization is, in practice, always necessary to *limit* – that is, to direct the analysis to those discourses that express ideologies (Van Dijk 2006, 324, 328).

An important criterion that may be used, in that sense, for differentiation of ideological and non-ideological discourses are *social strategies* themselves. The reason for this is that these strategies as phases of functional constitution of ideological discourses, express, on the one hand, *power relations* established in a certain social field or in certain sets of practices – as more or less normalized social relations while, on the other hand, they represent a consequence of always "concrete" and "local" social struggle. In other words, they articulate contrariety of interests that different social groups have in a *particular society* or on the occasion of some *concrete* social event, important problem or cause of conflict.

Yet, it seems that ideological "effects" on social actors are exerted by discourses not (only) due to the "themes" they launch (or they exclude) – therefore, not due to the very contents of discourse or region of the social relations that are problematized or articulated

in them (which may be, for instance, social identities). The contents, problems or “themes” articulated by ideological discourses do not only refer to the essential issues regarding existence and survival of given social groups – though these issues are often an object of ideological struggle (different levels of determining the relation between “us” and “them”). The contents of ideological discourses are always expressions of certain constellations of social life since the very questions of the importance of social resources and their meaning are articulated on completely different levels in different societies. This surely depends, as well, on the extent of social and cultural development of society and “discursive capacities” of a given community.

Ideological discourses have different social functions starting from a display of group *knowledge*, membership and *allegiance*, comparison and *standardization of values* and *evaluation criteria* to evaluating social practices, *socialization*, *persuasion* and *manipulation*, etc. (Van Dijk 2006, 309). In summing up various forms of social reproduction of ideology, Teun Van Dijk especially emphasizes its following dimensions: use and implementation of abstract ideological beliefs in concrete social practices (system-action), sustaining and changing the socially shared system by its daily uses in social practices (action-system) – along this dimension, ideologies are being constructed and changed due to discourse – then, the dimension of ideological communication, socialization and initiation of new members, then, acceptance or non-acceptance of the group beliefs, generalization, decontextualization of concrete experiences and opinions to similar or abstract contexts, experiences, cases or circumstances (2006, 308).

(De)legitimization as a social process of articulation of ideological discourses can be also viewed as a type of *pragmatics of ideological discourses*. It means that the process of (de)legitimization always represents some kind of *application* of ideological discourses in social interactions. The discourses of (de)legitimization are those that *bring into question* legitimacy, that is, truthfulness, meaning and importance (validity) of particular discourses in society, that is, their actual or anticipated social consequences. Legitimate social processes are those that are “in force” in a given society and that represent sets of practices that articulate the most important social rules and norms. These processes, therefore, articulate discourses as “regimes of truth” in different social spheres. The processes of (de)legitimization, in that sense, *assume imbalance* in social relations – power, hegemonic discourses and domination. The discourses of domination are those having social authority and whose legitimacy is established thanks to institutions. One of the assumptions for the existence of the ideological discourses of (de)legitimization is exactly the existence of *public domain* of society as the domain in which articulation and confrontation of different discourses about questions of importance for the functioning of a community or society are possible. In the classical approaches and research of ideologies, it was, as “dominant” usually explained in terms of its role “in the legitimation of the ruling class, in particular, and the dominant order, in general” (Van Dijk 2006, 340).

The process of legitimization<sup>6</sup> is, like that of delegitimization, a “prominent function of language use and discourse” and it cannot be reduced to an illocutionary act. These processes always represent communicative acts or acts of communication, i.e., complex discursive practices as sets or networks of interrelated discourses (2006, 341). They

---

<sup>6</sup> More about it in, for instance, Della Fave 1986; Walker et al. 1986; Habermas 1988.



always presuppose some *evaluation* and *estimate* of social practices – by correlating the practices with some course of action, decisions, norms and the rules by which institution function. The processes of legitimization, as described by Van Dijk, can be viewed as *top-down* and *bottom-up* ones, in other words, as processes by which social elites or institutions *justify* their actions and norms of behavior or as processes that involve the legitimization of, for example, the state, elites or leaders by the “masses“ (2006, 343). The basic issue expressing the problem of the relationship between ideological discourses and processes of (de)legitimization is related to the way in which the given discourses become means or mediators of the given processes. It is a sociological phenomenon *par excellence* regarding the fact that the discourse of legitimization should always be put into some concrete institutional context – while in everyday discursive practice these processes are manifested through different justifications, explications, expressions of beliefs, and the like (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). The discourses of legitimization are those that *justify social functioning* (purpose, reasons, ways) of institutionalized practices. Therefore, the primary aspect of legitimization is important in the context of institutional order of society, that is, for the processes of structuring and functioning of social institutions.

Any system of authority or institutionalized social order has different mechanisms of legitimization which ask for “submission“ or behavior in accordance with the defined social rules. Discourses are among the most important elements of these mechanisms since they represent forms of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1992); due to them it is not only *what* we do is explained but also *why* we do it. The “anatomy of discourse“ can simply be represented through three major elements of every discourse: *evaluations* of practice, *estimate* of practice and *legitimizations* of practice (Van Leeuwen 2005, 104–105).

The ideological-discursive construction of legitimization comprises four major categories though it is important to note that the fundamental legitimizing “explanations“ are always built in in the vocabulary. They are authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis (Van Leeuwen 2008, 105). *Authorization* assumes that legitimization is done by reference to particular authority such as tradition, law, custom or personal authority of an individual. *Moral evaluation* as a legitimization category assumes reference to particular value system. *Rationalization* refers to the goals, functions or uses of institutionalized social practices and to the knowledges that society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity or that have already been “checked“ and affirmed in some other practices. *Mythopoesis* refers to the narratives whose outcomes reward certain behavior as acceptable and desirable while others are rejected or excluded as undesirable and unacceptable. All the mentioned categories or aspects of the legitimization process also refer to the processes of delegitimization, i.e., they can be used to critique already established discourses and practices (2008, 106).

#### 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It can be said, following the beliefs of Mary Douglas (2001), that different discourses of (de)legitimization represent *a cognitive basis* of institutional practices since the discourses are materialized through institutions and social practices and thus they obtain certain legitimization thanks to them. To values and discourses, as Iver Neumann (2009)

would say, institutions “borrow reality.” It is they that enable a continual effect of people or the “looping effect” as Ian Hacking (2012, 57) named it. These are the practices in which individuals are subsumed under ideas, interactions between ideas and people, that is, matrices that provide for human interactions. Social institutions represent *standardized practices* that particular discourses of (de)legitimization are attached to as discursive articulations of resources and rules that give meaning to social life. Though ideological discourses are never fully institutionalized, it does not mean that they cannot be part of the institutional practices, i.e., that they fill in certain “legitimization deficits” (Thompson 1984, 187) of institutions.<sup>7</sup>

John Thompson writes that to study ideology is “to study the ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination” in society (Thompson 1984, 130) which implies the exploration of its three major traits. Due to these traits it becomes “operational” and “acting.” These are: *legitimization*, *dissimulation* and *reification*. Every system of domination, as Max Weber also wrote about it (1976), implies a tendency “to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy.” The relations of domination are sustained due to the fact that people *believe* in their legitimacy and because they behave *in accordance* with these beliefs. The dissimulation refers to the fact that ideological discourses conceal different social interests that do not have to be nor are they explicitly represented very often - nor is it possible to completely articulate them discursively. Reification refers to the fact that particular social relations – though they *always* emerge as a consequence of concrete socio-historical affairs – are represented as if they were universally valid, permanent, and “natural.” In ideological discourses social relations are estimated and explicated as if they were free from history (Thompson 1984, 131; Lefort 1986).

It is crucial that ideological discourses as discourses of (de)legitimization always attain for the members of particular social groups *resources* for classification, judgment and perception of social relations, social events and other social groups (Van Dijk 2006, 343). With respect to these resources certain behavior and actions are called forth; yet, these are also the resources that justify certain social practices as desirable, moral and acceptable – at least within the social group that an individual belongs to. Legitimization and ideology are ways of *monitoring the relations between social groups* while the classical approach to ideology was to define its importance and in terms of their role in the *processes of legitimization of social dominance* (2006, 344). Social conflicts thus take the form of a struggle not only over scarce social resources or over ideas, but also over legitimacy of particular practices (2006, 345).

---

<sup>7</sup> A good example for this can be found in the “ideology of professionalism” which represents “that factor which has silently posed a new class as a paradigm of legitimate authority; professionalism makes up a major requirement for legitimization of the new class which gradually weakens the authority of the old one. On the one hand, this is a requirement for prestige within the established social order; on the other hand, this is a silent representation of the new class as an alternative to the old one. By legitimizing as new authorities science, specialized knowledge, expertise as consistent application of the method in practice, autonomy of the technical knowledge from political-ideological influence of any class, the new class has achieved privilege of power which is founded upon their individual control of specialized culture, language, techniques and qualifications that are coming from it (Marinković and Ristić 2013b, 174–175). From the above mentioned it can be concluded that legitimization of the ideology of professionalism has been founded both on the system of social institutions (science) as well as through the discourses that have “filled in” institutional deficits (control of specialized culture, language, etc.).

The processes of (de)legitimization are always articulated as attempts at “social elimination“, that is, discrediting of rival groups through *delegitimization of affiliation* (“they are foreigners, they do not belong here“), *delegitimization of acting* including discourse (“they have no right to engage in what they do or say“), *delegitimization of goals* (“they come only to take advantage of us“), *delegitimization of norms and values* (“their values are not ours“), *delegitimization of social status* (“they are not real refugees“ or “native“, they are not who they claim to be“), and *delegitimization of access to social resources* (“they have no priority to get jobs, housing, work, etc.“) (2006, 345). The mentioned processes represent, therefore, processes in which the *key role* is played by *ideological discourses* since it is with respect to them that it is possible to classify social practices as well as articulate, change and reproduce particular social representations and knowledge as well as the beliefs concerning what is desirable or/and undesirable behavior and action or what types of social practices are acceptable or unacceptable for members of particular social groups.

## REFERENCES

- Berger, Peter L. i Thomas Luckmann. *Socijalna konstrukcija zbilje*. Zagreb: Naprijed, 1992.
- Boltanski Luc and Laurent Thévenot. *On Justification – Economies of Worth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Što znači govoriti – ekonomija jezičnih razmjena*. Zagreb: Naprijed, 1992.
- Daglas, Meri. *Kako institucije misle*. Beograd: Fabrika knjiga, 2001.
- Dant, Tim. *Knowledge, Ideology and Discourse*. New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Delez, Žil. *Fuko*. Sremski Karlovci/Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, 1989.
- Delez, Žil i Feliks Gatari. “Rizom.“ U *Moć/mediji/&*, priredili Jovan Čekić i Jelisaveta Blagojević. Beograd: FMK, 2011.
- Della Fave, Richard L. “Toward an Explication of the Legitimation Process.“ *Social Forces* 65/2 (1986): 476–500.
- Downing, David B. *Image and Ideology in Modern/Postmodern Discourse*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1991.
- Eagleton, Terry. *Ideology*. London and New York: Verso, 2007.
- Fairclough, Norman. *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. London and New York: Longman, 1995.
- Frow, John. “Discourse and Power.“ *Economy and Society* 14/2 (1985): 193–215.
- Fuko, Mišel. *Predavanja*. Novi Sad: Bratstvo-Jedinstvo, 1990.
- Fuko, Mišel. *Arheologija znanja*. Beograd: Plato, 1998.
- Fuko, Mišel. *Poredak diskursa*. Loznica: Karpos, 2007.
- Fuko, Mišel. *Spisi i razgovori*. Beograd: Fedonk, 2010.
- Fuko, Mišel. *Tehnologije sopstva*. Loznica: Karpos, 2014.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology – The Origins, Grammar and Future of Ideology*. London: The Macmillan Press, 1976.
- Gruenais, M. P. “Pratique, discours, idéologie.“ *Langage et société*, supplément au n°9 (1979; Sociétés dominées, pratiques langagières dominées et stratégies alternatives): 61–64.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Legitimation Crisis*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988.
- Heking, Ijan. *Društvena konstrukcija – ali čega?* Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing, 2012.
- Keller, Reiner. “Entering Discourses: A New Agenda for Qualitative Research and Sociology of Knowledge.“ *Qualitative Sociology Review* 8/2 (2012): 46–75.
- Keller, Reiner. *Doing Discourse Research: An Introduction for Social Scientists*. London: Sage Publications, 2013.
- Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony & Socialist Strategy – Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London and New York: Verso, 2001.
- Layder, Derek. *Understanding Social Theory*. London: Sage Publications, 2006.
- Lefort, Claude. “Outline of the Genesis of Ideology in Modern Societies.” In *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism*, edited by John B. Thompson, 181–237. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986.

- Malldier, Denise, Claudine Normand et Régine Robin. "Discours et idéologie: quelques bases pour une recherche." *Langue française* 15 (1972): 116–142.
- Marinković, Dušan i Dušan Ristić. "Diskurzivni karakter ideologije". *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu* 38/2 (2013): 167–181.
- Marinković, Dušan i Dušan Ristić. *Nacrta za sociologiju ideologije*. Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing, 2013b.
- Marinković, Dušan, Lada Marinković i Dušan Ristić. "Uloga ženskih stranih misija u Srbiji tokom Velikog rata: transfer medikalizovanih tehnologija i rađanje biopolitike." *Социолошки преглед* 48/4 (2014): 459–483.
- Nojman, Iver B. *Značenje, materijalnost, moć: Uvod u analizu diskursa*. Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Alexandria Press, 2009.
- Nojman, Iver B. *Upotrebe Drugog: „Istok“ u formiranju evropskog identiteta*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2011.
- Prajs, Stjuart. *Izučavanje medija*. Beograd: Clio, 2011.
- Purvis, Trevor and Alan Hunt. "Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology..." *The British Journal of Sociology* 44/3 (1993): 473–499.
- Schäffner, Christina and Helen Kelly-Holmes, eds. *Discourse and Ideologies*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1996.
- Thompson, John B. *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984.
- Thompson, John B. *Ideology and Modern Culture – Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.
- Van Dijk, Teun A. *Ideologija – multidisciplinarni pristup*. Zagreb: Golden Marketing/Tehnička knjiga, 2006.
- Van Leeuwen, Theo. *Introducing Social Semiotics*. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Van Leeuwen, Theo. *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Veber, Maks. *Privreda i društvo*, I. Beograd: Prosveta, 1976.
- Walker, Henry A., George M. Thomas and Morris Zelditch. "Legitimation, Endorsement, and Stability." *Social Forces* 64/3 (1986): 620–643.
- Wodak, Ruth, ed. *Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989.

## (DE)LEGITIMIZACIJA KAO DISKURZIVNA STRATEGIJA IDEOLOGIJE

*U radu su procesi (de)legitimizacije analizirani kao diskurzivne prakse i oblici znanja i diskurzivne strategije koje omogućuju artikulaciju i funkcionalno konstituisanje ideologije. U pitanju su procesi koji se javljaju kao posledica neravnoteže u odnosima moći, odnosno kao posledice artikulacije različitih interesa i borbi društvenih aktera. U radu polazimo od pretpostavke da ideološki diskursi kao oblici znanja i diskursi (de)legitimizacije, pribavljaju članovima društvenih grupa resurse za društvene klasifikacije, razumevanje društvenih odnosa, društvenih događaja, kao i drugih društvenih grupa. (De)legitimizacijski diskursi takođe predstavljaju pozive na određeno ponašanje i delanje, odnosno diskurse koji opravdavaju i/ili diskredituju određene društvene prakse i grupe. Oni su takođe načini nadziranja društvenih odnosa. U radu su istaknute četiri bitne dimenzije legitimizacije – autorizacija, moralna evaluacija, racionalizacija i mitopoeza, kao i najvažnija područja (de)legitimizacije – pripadnost, delovanje, ciljevi, norme, vrednosti, društveni položaji i pristupi društvenim resursima. U zaključku se navodi da procesi (de)legitimizacije predstavljaju važne strategije ideologije koje doprinose promenama, klasifikaciji i reprodukciji društvenih praksi.*

**Cljučne reči:** (de)legitimizacija, diskurs, društvene prakse, ideologija, strategija.