GLOBAL RELATIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-REFUTATION

Biljana M. Radovanović

DOI Number
https://doi.org/10.22190/FUPSPH250510001R
First page
001
Last page
010

Abstract


The main task of this paper is to present and examine the self-refuting position of global relativism in epistemology. We start from the earliest formulation of relativistic teaching that belongs to the ancient philosopher Protagoras. Even in antiquity, the self-refuting viewpoint of global relativism was observed. The position of global relativism is difficult to defend because universality requires that the very claim that expresses relativism be included in the general relativization. In the paper, we consider the notions of pluralism of truth and perspectivism. In the end, we conclude that the self-contradictory position of global relativism can be removed only if relativistic teaching is set up as a meta-theory in which the object level and the meta level are distinguished. 


Keywords

relativism, global relativism, truth, pluralism, meta-theory, perspectivism.

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22190/FUPSPH250510001R

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