SUBJECTIVITY EMERGENCE IN PANPSYCHISM

Janko Nešić

DOI Number
https://doi.org/10.22190/FUPSPH1803169N
First page
169
Last page
178

Abstract


A combination problem in Russelian panpsychism arises when we try to understand how macroexperience comes from microexperience. I will argue that panpsychists could avoid the combination problem if they endorse an intelligible form of emergence. They should endorse Shoemaker’s account of emergence or realization which states that there are “micro-latent” powers beside “micro-manifest” ones and accommodate this account to panpsychism. One possibility is that a macrosubject is part of a microsubject whole on Shoemaker’s “subset” account of realization. I will investigate if and how a possible solution to these panpsychist troubles could be distilled from Shoemnaker’s emergence account. 


Keywords

panpsychism, emergence, latent powers, combination problem, subject-summing, subjectivity

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22190/FUPSPH1803169N

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