

General paper

**HEIDEGGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF ART
IN THE ESSAY *THE ORIGIN OF THE WORK OF ART***

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Abstract. *The paper analyzes Heidegger's understanding of art, presented in the essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*. The research is divided into two parts: destructive, dedicated to the exposition of Heidegger's understanding of the process of aestheticization and criticism of modern aesthetics, and constructive, which presents a detailed analysis of Heidegger's understanding of art and the work of art. Although in the first part, Heidegger claims that the Hegelian thesis about the end of art has merit, as he finds that aestheticization is a process in which the work of art disappears into experience, in the second part, Heidegger opens up space for its reconsideration and thus introduces the thesis about defiant potential of art and the possibility for expelling representation and metaphysical aesthetics. This is why Heidegger begins a complex analysis of the way of being of the work of art, which is first opened in contrast to the being of thing and the being of equipment. The research reveals that the work of art should be understood within the dialectics of the world and the earth, through the concept of truth as aletheia, and concludes that art is simultaneously the truth's setting-itself-into-work and the setting-of-truth-into-the-work. Heidegger's double definition of art suggests the introduction of a balance between the reflexive and revolutionary understanding of art, between the autonomy of the work and the need for the artist and the audience, and the ontological determinations of thrownness and projection. In the end, the examination of the origin of a work of art shows that art itself is a kind of origin from which the truth as unconcealment springs.*

Key words: *work of art, truth, aletheia, world, earth, origin*

Heidegger's essay *The Origin of the Work of Art* has two main tasks. On the one hand, Heidegger's task is to answer the question about the meaning and way of Being (Sein) of the work of art. On the other hand, it is equally important to identify the mistakes and shortcomings of modern aesthetics that predetermine our understanding and prevent an

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authentic understanding of the work of art. Therefore, in order to get to the constructive part of the essay, it is important to make a brief review of the critical, destructive part and ask the question: in what way does Heidegger oppose modern aesthetics?

In the *Afterword*, Heidegger writes, "Everything is experience. But perhaps experience is the element in which art dies" (Heidegger 2002, 50). Why does experience represent the end of art? To answer this question, the analysis should take into account Heidegger's stance presented in the essay *The Age of the World Picture*: "A third, equally essential phenomenon of modernity lies in the process of art's moving into the purview of aesthetics" (Ibid, 57). Further, this phenomenon has two consequences: "the artwork becomes an object of experience [*Erlebens*]", and "consequently is considered to be an expression of human life" (Ibid.).

According to Heidegger's understanding, presented in the essay *The Age of the World Picture*, modern aesthetics is a product of modernity. The modern age is characterized by two intertwined and interdependent processes: the process of subjectivization and the process in which the world becomes a picture. Hence, in order to understand the nature of aesthetic research referred to by Heidegger, and to understand in what sense aesthetics is a decisive factor in the demise of art, it is first necessary to look back at Heidegger's understanding of the Modern Age.

In the essay *The Age of the World Picture*, Heidegger writes: "The essence of modernity can be seen in humanity's freeing itself from the bonds of the Middle Ages in that it frees itself to itself" (Ibid, 58). Heidegger recognizes that this observation is not an original insight. Namely, when analyzing the transition from the Middle Ages to the New Age, most authors glorify the event of the human mind's liberation. By relying on his strength, the man finally freed himself from divine authority and theological censorship, and managed to posit himself as an independent investigator devoted to the eternal quest for truth. Nevertheless, Heidegger warns that in this ode to modern man, something persistently remains forgotten: "What is decisive is not that humanity frees itself from previous bonds but, rather, that the essence of humanity altogether transforms itself in that man becomes the subject" (Ibid, 66). At the same time, Heidegger notes that the determination of *subjectum* must be grasped through the meaning of the Greek word *hypokaimenon*: "that-which-lies-before, that which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself" (Ibid, 60). By rejecting the definition of *ens creatum* and renouncing his foundation in the divine presence, the modern man himself becomes the foundation. In other words, he becomes the central, privileged being (*Seiendes*) around whom everything gathers. Hence, it is not difficult to grasp the modern understanding of inner-world beings, whose way of being differs from the being of man. Subjectivization produces a complementary process of objectification. In accordance with the transformation of man into a subject, an entity becomes an object, that which is standing over-and-against and presented-at-hand before a subject. According to this metaphysical picture, which stands in the background of modernity, man is a present-er and a re-present-er of the totality of beings. Man is the one who gives a measure to that which is existing, while the entity becomes "a product of representational production" (Ibid, 66).

Modern aesthetics is based on this metaphysical framework. When the beings became a representation and were disintegrated in the experience, the same process happened to the work of art. Through aesthetic research, guided by the strategy of the ruling metaphysics, the work of art becomes that which is doubly represented. From the observer's point of view, the work of art is an object of experience, produced for the enjoyment and satiation of the aesthete's taste. From the creator's point of view, the work of art is an expression of his rich

inner life. A work of art is created according to the creator's inclinations and to the audience's satisfaction. Hence the work of art disappears – it is left to resonate between two types of experience, to levitate between impression and expression.

This phenomenon, which involves the processes of subjectivization and objectification, is defined by Thomson as the aestheticization of the artwork. On the one hand, aestheticization is a strategy of modern aesthetics that rests upon a dubious claim that "art objects express and intensify subjects' experiences of life" (Thomson 2011, 51). Hence, modern metaphysical aesthetics is and remains a theory of *aisthesis*: the philosophical observation of *aisthesis*, or aesthetic of experience. On the other hand, aestheticization also represents the everyday way in which modern man encounters art. Galleries, theaters, and concert halls are not temples of art, but temples of experience that people visit to satisfy their aesthetic hunger and enrich their lives.

From everything said so far, a thesis about the end of art can be derived. In this sense, Heidegger writes in the *Afterword to The Origin of the Work of Art* that "perhaps experience is the element in which art dies" (Heidegger 2002, 50). Nevertheless, this Heideggerian "perhaps" opens up space for refuting metaphysical aesthetics. The state of affairs, which justifies the introduction of Hegel's famous thesis about the end of art, simultaneously calls for its reconsideration. In the concluding part of the essay *The Age of the World Picture*, Heidegger warns that "the invisible shadow cast over all things when man has become the *subiectum* and world has become picture" (Ibid, 72). It is precisely this invisible shadow that represents the incalculable, that which resists placing-before and representation (*Vor-stellen*), and eludes Western reason. However, in order to understand this resistance to modern Western thinking that Heidegger foreshadows, it is necessary to conduct an analysis of *The Origin of the Work of Art*.

At the beginning of his essay, Heidegger directly invokes the question of the origin of the work of art. Therefore, Heidegger writes the following: "The origin of something is the source of its nature" (Ibid, 2). This means that the examination should reveal the origin of the nature of the work of art. Since the reasons for rejecting modern aesthetics have already been presented, the philosophical stance on which the artist is the origin can be immediately excluded from the analysis. Although the artist represents the work's causal origin, he is not the source of its nature. That's why Heidegger writes: "Artist and work *are* each, in themselves and in their reciprocal relation, on account of a third thing, which is prior to both; on account, that is, of that from which both artist and artwork take their names, on account of art" (Ibid, 2). The essence of the work of art can be understood only through the opening up of the essence of art. However, art is not a concept that can be grasped *a priori* and applied to our understanding of the artist and the artwork. Art has yet to emerge from the understanding of the work of art. This coalescence between the nature of art and the essence of the artwork generates a *circulus vitiosus* at the level of the analysis. Nevertheless, this is still only the first of the circles of Heidegger's investigation.

The research must first address the problem of the work of art. In that regard, Heidegger decides to start with what is closest to us: what everyday experience comes across first. Hence, Heidegger writes: "Every work has this thingly character" which "even this much-vaunted 'aesthetic experience' cannot evade the thingliness of the artwork" (Ibid, 3). An artwork first opens up as a thing. Therefore, the first requirement of this analysis is to examine that thingly element of the work of art.

Heidegger first notes that the term thing has a wide meaning. According to the testimony of everyday experience, the word *thing* can denote a stone, a jug, and even a "leaf in the

autumn wind" (Ibid, 4). Hence, Heidegger arrives at the first, broadest definition, which identifies a thing as a type of entity. However, this definition of thing, being too broad, is also uninformative. In addition, Heidegger notes that it is also inappropriate. For example, we would never accept to classify a man or God as a thing. Therefore, in the next step, Heidegger will narrow the scope of the term thing and apply it only to equipment and natural things. However, this narrower definition will also need to be revised. According to Heidegger, a thing, in the strict sense of the word, should denote an entity "which is simply a thing and nothing more" (Ibid, 5). Hence, useful objects are removed from the scope of the term thing, thus narrowing the concept to the plain of "mere" things, which are "simply found by man" (Ibid, 5).

The narrowing down of the concept of thing still doesn't answer the question about its meaning. The examination still has to discover what and how this "mere" thing is. The philosophical tradition posits three possible interpretations. On the one hand, the thing shows itself as the bearer of properties. According to Heidegger, this definition is inadequate because it does not refer only to a mere thing, but also to other types of beings. On the other hand, this understanding of things is too rational. It over-intellectualizes the thing, and eludes its materiality. Another traditional understanding of the thing, which Heidegger introduces into research, equates the thing with *aistheton* – that which is perceived by the senses. This definition also seems to be inadequate. We can never directly encounter sensations, as we always encounter concrete things. Hence Heidegger warns that "much closer to us than any sensation are the things themselves" (Ibid, 8). The third and final understanding of the thing reveals that the thing is formed matter. According to this view, the thing has two aspects: *hyle* or substance, which refers to the materiality of the thing, and *morphe* or form, which represents the organization of matter. Heidegger decides to investigate this conception in more detail because it is the most common background understanding of aesthetic research. However, in order to be able to expose this traditional doctrine to critical analysis, the examination has to return to its very source and ask: "Where does the origin of the matter-form schema have its origin; in the thingness of the thing or in the work-character of the artwork?" (Ibid, 9).

To answer this question, Heidegger introduces a difference between a natural, mere thing (a block of granite) and a piece of equipment (a jug, an axe). The analysis of a natural thing indicates a non-differentiation, the fusion of form and matter in this type of being. Thus, the examination shows that the theoretical conception of *hyle-morphe* relation cannot be used to explain the meaning of a natural thing. On the other hand, the analysis of the equipment shows that there is a clear difference between form and matter: form is what determines the choice of a design and type of material of which the equipment is to be made; matter refers to the very material that is used in the production of a piece of equipment. Finally, the very process of creation, which results in the unity of form and matter, is guided by the principle of serviceability. Hence, Heidegger concludes that "matter and form are determinations of beings which find their true home in the essential nature of equipment" (Ibid, 10). But why did this conception transgress its limitations and was transferred to the understanding of other types of beings?

The reason for this transmission is the specific position that the equipment occupies in relation to the thing and the work of art. A piece of equipment (tool or useful object) stands halfway between a thing and a work of art. On the one hand, the equipment is similar to the work of art because it represents a creation, that is, an entity that is made. At the same time, through its serviceability, the equipment also diverges from the work of art. On the

other hand, equipment parallels the thing because, just like the thing, it is subjected to the imperative of consumption. But still, as a created being, it cannot be equated with the thing.

The central position that equipment occupies in relation to the thing and the work of art is not the only explanation for the expansionism of this metaphysical conception. Heidegger states that the understanding of the thing through the conceptual pair matter-form is based on the understanding of Being from the horizon of production, which is typical for ancient philosophy. Moreover, this conception is reinforced within the framework of medieval theology. According to medieval understanding, man is defined as an *ens creatum*, a created being, shaped according to the idea of the perfect craftsman – God. In addition, the understanding of Being from the perspective of productive behavior also stands in the background of modern thinking. As a result of representational production, which became a dominant way of understanding of Being, a modern man became the present-er of the object. Finally, Heidegger asserts that the indeterminacy of the thing through the matter-form unity is another indicator that this metaphysical conception derives from the original experience of the equipmental character of equipment: "The situation reveals itself as soon as we call actual things 'mere things'. The 'mere', after all, means the removal of the character of serviceability and of being made. The mere thing is a kind of equipment that has been denuded of its equipmental being. Its thing-being consists in what is then left over, and this is what needs to be determined. It remains questionable whether the process of stripping away everything equipmental will ever disclose the thingness of the thing" (Ibid, 11).

Given that the metaphysical conception was derived from the understanding of Being from the horizon of production, Heidegger notes that the first requirement is questioning the equipmental character of equipment. However, before that, it is necessary to refer back to the previous analysis and relay its results. Has the philosophical tradition found a satisfactory understanding of the thingness of things? Apparently, it has not. It has been shown that all three metaphysical conceptions have specific weaknesses and shortcomings. Nevertheless, the questioning of traditional metaphysical conceptions has at least indicated the right way to proceed – in order to be able to grasp the work-character of the work of art, it is necessary to expose the understanding of the equipment. Here begins another Heideggerian circle in research: understanding the work of art will bring about an understanding of the Being of the equipment. At the same time, the examination of the Being of the equipment will also lead to the understanding of the essence of the artwork.

At this moment, Heidegger places us in front of Van Gogh's painting of shoes. At the very beginning, it is evident that the painting simply represents a pair of peasant shoes. "But is there a lot to be seen here?" (Ibid, 13), Heidegger asks. We already know what peasant shoes are, as our understanding is determined in advance according to rooted philosophical assumptions. The material and form of the peasant shoes, their relationship, and the formation process are based on utility. The intertwining of form and material is guided by the service they need to complete. Does this mean that we have found out the way of Being of the equipment? Or have we already decided on it and imposed it on the painting? Heidegger writes: "As long as we only imagine a pair of shoes in general, or merely look at the shoes as they stand there in the picture, empty and unused, we will never learn what the equipmental Being of equipment in truth is" (Ibid, 14). As long as the subject-object relation and philosophical assumptions pre-reflexively determine our thinking, the analysis will remain pre-completed. Hence, it is necessary to transform our way of encountering the equipment and the work of art. In what way?

Before making a crucial breakthrough in the analysis, Heidegger will remind us that his research posits a paradoxical demand. The first assumption of the investigation was that the Being of the equipment is seen and recognized only within its use. Peasant shoes are what they are only when the peasant woman wears them and while she works the land: "The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field. Only then do they become what they are" (Ibid, 13). On the other hand, Van Gogh's painting shows an unused pair of shoes removed from the woman's presence and her affairs. Is it possible to learn something about the Being of the equipment despite the absence of the peasant woman, and from within the undefined space where the shoes are located?

Thomson draws attention to a common Heideggerian rhetorical strategy that always brings a turnover in the analysis (See: Thomson 2011). At a crucial moment, Heidegger notes the following: "A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more. And yet" (Heidegger 2002, 14). "And nothing more" is a well-known phrase from the lecture *What Is Metaphysics*, through which Heidegger introduces the inquiry of repelling, repulsive nihilation of the nothing that opens up the totality of beings. Something similar will happen among the lines of *The Origin of the Work of Art*. Only "from out of the dark opening" (Ibid, 14) will the shoes speak about their own Being. Through the nihilation of the silent background and the repulsive fact of the peasant woman's absence, a space is opened that allows the encounter of the Being of the equipment. The repulsion of the nothing repels from itself in order to redirect us to the Being of the equipment and uncover it as reliability. Since Heidegger never undertakes a detailed analysis of reliability, one can only assume that this is a more original way of Being of equipment in which utility is only founded. In addition, Heidegger notes that it is only through the reliability of the equipment that the peasant woman is "admitted into the silent call of the earth" and "certain of her world", and that reliability "keeps all things gathered within itself" (Ibid, 14). The reliability of the equipment places the peasant woman in the world and puts her on the earth. Hence, by observing Van Gogh's painting, Heidegger introduces the dialectics between the earth and the world. But what are the world and its relationship with the earth? This question can only be answered at a later stage through the analysis of the Greek temple. For now, it is enough to present the results of the analysis of Van Gogh's painting.

The most obvious thing should be stated first. Undoubtedly, the analysis of the painting of peasant shoes led to an understanding of the Being of the equipment. Van Gogh's painting revealed the Being of the equipment as reliability. But did the Being of the work of art open up through the openness of the Being of the equipment? Heidegger answers unequivocally: "Van Gogh's painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, in truth *is*. (...) In the work, when there is a disclosure of the being as what and how it is, there is a happening of truth at work" (Ibid, 16). It is here that Heidegger defines art for the first time as the truth's setting-itself-into-work or the setting-itself-to-work of truth of Being. In addition, Heidegger will define art as the setting-of-truth-into-the-work. Hence, Heidegger sets several tasks for this analysis. In order to understand what an artwork is and how art is, the following definitions must be unraveled:

1. In the work of art, there is a happening of truth at work;
2. The art is the truth's setting-itself-into-work;
3. The art is the setting-of-truth-into-the-work

This research will open the following questions: how are we to understand the stance that in artwork, the truth is at work?, What is the truth?, What is the difference between the truth's setting-itself-into-work and the setting-of-truth-into-the-work? However, before proceeding with a detailed interpretation of these determinations, it is necessary to note something else.

Heidegger's analysis of Van Gogh's painting also functions as the first step in overcoming modern aesthetics and the aestheticization of the work of art. First of all, Heidegger reminds us that we did not come to an understanding of the Being of the equipment either through a theoretical understanding of shoes or through an understanding of the production process, and not even through "the observation of the actual use of shoes as it occurs here and there" (Ibid, 15) but through an encounter with Van Gogh's painting of shoes. However, the openness of the Being of the equipment became possible only after the transformation of the *way of encountering* the work of art. At the very beginning, it was necessary to abandon the position of the subject who tends to give measure to the object, to pre-impose a philosophical understanding upon the work of art, or to translate the work into an aesthetic experience. The artwork was not transformed into experience. It was given a chance to speak up. In a way, we put ourselves in the peasant's shoes and became reapers of meaning.

But why doesn't Heidegger stop here? In what sense does the analysis of Van Gogh's painting lead to further research and require an encounter with the Greek temple? As we have already pointed out, Heidegger successfully deconstructed and rejected the metaphysical conceptions that predetermine thinking. Nevertheless, the analysis of Van Gogh's painting did not remain immune to one metaphysical residue. That is why Heidegger writes the following: "But perhaps the stance that art is the truth's setting-itself-into-work should revive the happily overcome opinion that art is the imitation and description of reality?" (Ibid, 16). Here, Heidegger warns that it is necessary to reconsider one more philosophical doctrine that constantly imposes itself on the visual arts. Namely, Heidegger's understanding of art could be interpreted according to the theory of the mimetic nature of art. Hence, the definition of art as the setting-(itself)-to-work of the truth of the being can easily be translated into the setting-to-work of the truth of a concrete entity. This interpretation then suggests that a work of art has one task: to portray a being credibly, and, in this case, its peasant shoes. However, before rejecting this philosophical understanding, one must ask about its origin. The philosophical conception, according to which the purpose of art is to imitate and present the beings, originates in the understanding of truth as correspondence. In order to liberate art from this aesthetic theory, it is necessary to rebuff an inadequate theory of truth. Hence, Heidegger's research falls into another circle: the understanding of truth will develop with regard to the understanding of the work of art, and *vice versa*, the understanding of the work of art will also reveal the essence of truth.

As part of his quest to understand the truth and the Being of the work of art, Heidegger turns to the Greek temple. Why? First, the Greek temple is an authentic example of great artworks and a part of an epoch that was not affected by aestheticization. The Greek temple is suitable for research because it does not represent anything and therefore resists the theory of reproduction that is readily applicable to the visual arts. Therefore, the description of the Greek temple will first liberate the way of Being of the work of art from the theoretical concepts that predetermine it. In the next stage, it will bring to light the authentic understanding of the way of Being of the work. Thanks to this, the definition of art that was previously only indicated will be fully explained. This examination will reveal Heidegger's position on truth, and bring his dispute with modern aesthetics to completion.

Heidegger's observation of the Greek temple first finds out that this work "gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire for the human being the shape of its destiny" (Ibid, 21). In this way, the Greek temple opens up the world of the Greek people. Furthermore, the Greek temple reveals that "on which and in which man

bases his dwelling" (Ibid, 21) i.e., leads to the manifestation of the earth, which is, in its disclosure, always "present as the withdrawal" (Ibid, 20). In the end, Heidegger highlights the primordial character of the Greek temple, and writes: "Standing there, the temple first gives to things their look, and to men their outlook on themselves" (Ibid, 21). So, the first part of the research imposes the following tasks: to discover what the world is, what the earth is, and what kind of relationship they form. Finally, we need to understand the meaning of the primacy that Heidegger attributes to the temple.

Although Heidegger's understanding of the world was already exposed in *Being and Time*, the examination should start with this concept. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Heidegger's doctrine about the world underwent significant modifications. In *Being and Time*, it was shown that the world is a structural moment of the being of Desein – the being of Desein is always being-in-the-world (See: Heidegger 1962). By highlighting this ontological structure, Heidegger carries out the destruction of the traditional philosophical frame of reference based on the separation and opposition of subject and object. Man is not a closed consciousness that has yet to overcome its seclusion and thus establish and place the world in front of him. This theoretical construction overlooks the fact that man has already been thrown into the world and that he always finds himself in the world. But what is the world, and why does it inevitably cling to man? To answer this question, Heidegger first employs the apophatic method. The world is neither the totality of beings nor a philosophical construct through which beings should be grasped. The world is a pre-reflexive background, a general horizon through which beings are already opened up, and which enables the encounter of beings. Heidegger's understanding of the world can be clarified through Young's analogy of the world and the map: "We could, then, think of understanding one's world as possession of a kind of metaphysical map (world, remember, is a kind of space), a map detailing both the regions of beings and the kinds of beings that dwell there, a map that is internalized by all fully-fledged members of the culture" (Young 2001, 24). In *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger adds an ethical aspect and ascribes historicity to this metaphysical map.

The thesis of the historicity of the world implies the changeability and perishability of the general horizons that open up beings. Heidegger notes that, in the course of world history, three great cultures arose and replaced each other: Greek, Medieval, and Modern. But how does this answer the question about the meaning of the ethical aspect of the world? It has already been said that the world is an internalized metaphysical map that outlines in advance what the entities are. However, this metaphysical map also implies a structure and hierarchy of beings. The position that a being occupies further determines the role and behavior that befits them. Therefore, an implicit understanding of what a being is, at the same time implies an understanding of appropriate social practices, determinations, and values (See: Young 2001). If the Greek world recognizes the existence of rulers, slaves, citizens, and gods, then understanding of what a ruler is, also brings an understanding that one should show him reverence. From the understanding of what the gods are, directly follows that we should obey them: *what-is a citizen* means that he should be respected, and *what-is a slave* means that he should be looked down with contempt. The world, therefore, implies the openness of the beings, but also the co-opening of that "what is brave and what cowardly, what is noble and what fugitive, what is master and what slave" (Heidegger 2002, 22).

In the next part of the research, Heidegger states that the positing of the world belongs to the work of art. We have already grasped the meaning of the world, but how are we to

understand this event of positing? In the first part of the analysis, Heidegger indicates its ontic meaning: "When a work is brought into a collection or placed in an exhibition, we also say that it is 'set up'" (Ibid, 22). Ontic positing includes a celebration and consecration – by placing the work of art in a particular place in the gallery, by choosing adequate light we praise and honor the artwork. Yet, by placing the work of art into a gallery, we also displace it from the world and present it to art admirers. On the contrary, the erection of the temple involves a different kind of positing. It shows that the work of art thematizes the world in a non-thematic (non-theoretical) way, moves it from the background and brings it to light. Hence, the work of art also brings a kind of breakdown of everyday life. While in everyday affairs, the world operates as a pre-reflexive background of experience, in the encounter with an artwork, the world is revealed to us for the first time. This analysis also reveals the meaning of the primordiality that Heidegger ascribes to the artwork. A work of art, in this case – a Greek temple, succeeds in pulling a man out of his immersion into everyday life, placing him in front of the world and opening up to him the place he owns in the world. The temple does not create the world in which the Greek dwells, but allows him to encounter it for the first time. This is why Heidegger notes that "to be a work means: to set up a world" (Ibid, 22). However, aside from setting up a world, an artwork also means setting forth the earth. What does this mean?

In order to establish his thought about earth, Heidegger argues that one should remember that a work of art is always made of a certain type of material. The question, therefore, arises: What is that material, and what is its way of Being? To answer this question, Heidegger juxtaposes the creation of artwork with the production of the equipment.

When making a piece of equipment, the craftsman expends the material. The equipment is all the better if the material from which it is made disappears and is overcome by serviceability. On the other hand, the artist, in the process of creation, does not use up the material but brings it to light. In a work of art, the material does not disappear, but emerges from it: "The rock comes to bear and to rest and so first becomes rock; the metal comes to glitter and shimmer, the colors to shine, the sounds to ring, the word to speak" (Ibid, 24). However, Heidegger warns that, along with making the material apparent, the work of art also falls back to materiality. The work allows the material to be seen, but at the same time, retreats into it. It is precisely "that into which the work sets itself back, and thereby allows to come forth" (Ibid, 24) what Heidegger calls earth. Thus, the earth springs from the work of art, but also allows the work to sink into it. Will the earth be the element in the work of art that resists rationalization and protects the work from aestheticization? Is the earth a crucial moment in solving the puzzle of art? First, it should be unraveled why the earth has this double character of appearing and hiding. To achieve this, the analysis will follow Heidegger's steps and begin with the question: what is a stone, and how can it be understood?

The project of understanding the stone can be carried out in different ways. One can try to understand its structure in order to learn about its essence. Alternatively, one can try to weigh the stone to discover its weight. However, every time one tries to approach the stone through scientific research, the stone disappears, leaving only a scientific theory. When a stone is measured, it is translated into units of measurement so that "only the number remains" (Ibid, 24). Hence Heidegger concludes that "earth shatters every attempt to penetrate it" (Ibid, 25). Earth resists understanding and mathematical behavior – it withdraws and closes in on itself. However, in a work of art, the earth appears, but always as something hidden, something impenetrable to reason. The stone emerges from the work of art, not through numbers, but in its incalculable massiveness. The color shines through the

artwork, not as a wavelength, but through its mysterious glow. Therefore, Heidegger concludes that "to set forth the earth means: to bring it into the open as the self-secluding" (Ibid, 25).

There is an interesting correlation between Heidegger's teaching on the nihilation of the nothing and the understanding of the appearing-hiding character of the earth. In the lecture *What is metaphysics* (Ibid.), nothing is shown as the condition of the openness of Being, and as the origin of metaphysical, philosophical questioning. Nothing nihilates, repels from itself, thus opening up the totality of beings. The nihilation of nothing represents the original establishment of a difference between nothing and the totality of beings and delivers the opening of a clearing where all the beings can manifest themselves. Can there be something similar in Heidegger's presentation of the relationship between the earth and the world?

Heidegger first emphasizes the contrast between the earth and the world: "The world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical people" (Ibid, 26), while the earth is "the unforced coming forth of the continually self-closing, and in that way, self-sheltering" (Ibid, 26). So, there is always a conflict between these two opposing sides – the world brings out the openness of beings, while the earth allows them to fall back into concealment.

The analysis of the relationship between the earth and the world brings a crucial moment in Heidegger's research. In the conflict between the earth and the world, the truth happens. As the analysis of Van Gogh's painting already revealed, in a work of art the truth is at work, that is, the truth of the being enters into unconcealment. However, the traditional understanding of truth, which was transferred to aesthetics, obscured the meaning of art. In order to avoid this traditional conception, Heidegger turned to the Greek temple. Yet, this doctrine should be investigated more thoroughly.

Philosophical tradition generally understood truth as the truth of statements. The criterion for determining the truth or falsity of the judgment was most often determined from the direction of the theory of truth as correspondence. A statement is true if it is consistent with the state of affairs it expresses. Hence the formula of truth, found even in scholasticism, reads: *Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*. Although Heidegger does not reject this theory of truth, he finds that it is founded on a more original understanding. The condition of the possibility of the truth of a statement is truth as *a-letheia* - non-concealment. The truth of the statement requires the truth of the Being. What does this mean?

In order to grasp the meaning of a being through statements, we need to already encounter it in some way. Hence, the statement about the being and the possibility of its truth presupposes that the being has already opened up to us, that it has entered into unconcealment. However, the openness of the being is only possible on the illuminated clearing which allows the being to show itself. Therefore, the truth of the being presupposes the understanding of the Being which "allows the freeplay of openness to happen, and introduces it as a place of the sort in which, in its own manner, each being arises" (Ibid, 36). In this sense, the original, primordial concept of truth should be grasped. Truth is *aletheia* – a cleared, open space that enables the manifestation, the unconcealment of beings. Still truth is also regarded as *a-letheia* – non-concealment, i.e., openness that also implies closure, disclosure which is possible on the basis of concealment. This is why Heidegger notes that "truth, in its essence, is un-truth" (Ibid, 31). At the same time, it must be borne in mind that Heidegger does not refer here to the opposition between *truth* and *untruth* that operates at the level of statements. Untruth implies concealment that occurs in the midst of a cleared field of openness. No being will ever be completely open and transparent to understanding. When the research of the being begins, one must be aware that it will resist science, and that it will partly remain hidden. Therefore the truth, as a clearing "is never a fixed

stage with a permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings enacts itself" (Ibid, 30). In the clearing, concealment occurs, while clearing is realized only on the basis of closure and concealment.

Heidegger's definition of art can now be grasped more clearly. Heidegger has already disclosed that in the work the truth is at work, i.e. the truth has placed itself in the work. Heidegger's emphasis on the thesis that truth is at work in a work of art should operate as a constant reminder that truth is not a static and reliable representation of some being, but that it is always an event, a happening. In addition, Heidegger's exposition on the essence of truth should show that truth, which is at work in a work, is never the truth of a concrete being, but the truth understood as *aletheia*, the non-concealment that occurs through the conflict of earth and world. Now that the theory of truth as correspondence has been rejected, the research can refer to the previous analysis of Van Gogh's painting. It can be fully established that Van Gogh's work was not a representation of either shoes or the peasant woman's personal struggle with the earth on which she builds her world. Van Gogh's work was, in fact, the occurrence of the original conflict between the earth and the world – an event of truth: "Truth happens in Van Gogh's painting. That does not mean that something present is correctly portrayed; it means, rather, that in the manifestation of the equipment being of the shoe-equipment, that which is as a whole – world and earth in their counterplay – achieves unconcealment" (Ibid, 32).

One aspect of Heidegger's definition of art is now explained. However, it is necessary to answer the two remaining questions that arose in the first part of the analysis of Heidegger's definition of art: what does it mean that art is truth's setting-itself-into-work? and, how to understand the stance according to which art is also setting-of-truth-into-the-work?

Introducing the double definition of art is Heidegger's way of indicating a kind of balance. On the one hand, the formulation *the setting-itself-to-work of truth* should emphasize the self-sustainability and autonomy of the work of art, and establish an objective understanding of art. But we should also emphasize the moment of thrownness and historicity in contrast to the act of projection and the future. On the other hand, the formulation *setting-of-truth-into-the-work* brings to light the importance of the subject-creator and the subject-receiver. Therefore, Thomson concludes that, although "truth establishing itself in some work should not be thought of as the achievement of some subject", still "there is no truth without human beings producing particular works" (Thomson 2011, 144). It is important to note here that Heidegger's ambiguity also opens up the possibility of reconciliation between the reflexive and the revolutionary understanding of art. Art, as the truth's setting-itself-into-work, should indicate the power of a work of art to pull a man out of his immersion in everyday life and place him for the first time in front of the world in which he has always found himself. On the other hand, art as the setting-of-truth-into-the-work, opens up the revolutionary potential of the work of art, the power of the creator to overcome the already given and create the world anew. Hence, Heidegger's oscillation between these two formulations should not be understood as a kind of vacillation, but as an essential moment of the entire research.

This is why Heidegger writes the following: "Art is the setting-itself-to-work of truth. An essential ambiguity is concealed in this sentence, present because 'truth' functions as both subject and object. Yet 'subject' and 'object' are inappropriate terms, here. (...) Art allows truth to arise [*entspringen*]. Art arises as the founding preservation of the truth of beings in the work. To allow something to arise, to bring something into being from out of the essential source in the founding leap [*Sprung*] is what is meant by the word 'origin [*Ursprung*]" (Heidegger 2002, 49). At the very end, the question from which the research started offered

itself as an answer. Contemplation on the origin of the work of art showed that art itself is a kind of origin – drawing from the earth as the area of inherited possibilities in order to redefine the already-given and create the *novum*.

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HAJDEGEROVO SHVATANJE UMETNOSTI U ESEJU

IZVOR UMETNIČKOG DELA

Cilj ovog rada biće rasvetljavanje Hajdegerovog shvatanja umetnosti koje je izloženo u eseju Izvor umetničkog dela. Istraživanje će biti podeljeno na dva ključna dela: destruktivni, u kome će se izložiti Hajdegerovo razumevanje procesa estetizacije i kritike moderne estetike, i konstruktivni, u kome će se sprovesti detaljna analiza Hajdegerovog razumevanja umetnosti, odnosno, umetničkog dela. Dok se u prvom delu utvrđuje zasnovanost teze o kraju umetnosti, jer je estetizacija proces u kome se umetničko delo pretapa u iskustvo i kao takvo nestaje, u drugom delu se otvara prostor za uvođenje teze o otporu koji umetnost pruža predstavljanju i metafizičkoj estetici. Zbog toga Hajdeger otpočinje kompleksnu analizu načina bivstvovanja umetničkog dela, koje se najpre otvara u kontrastu sa bivstvom stvari i bivstvom tvorevine. Istraživanje otkriva da se umetničko delo mora shvatiti s obzirom na dijalektiku sveta i zemlje, istine kao aletheia-a, te da je umetnost istovremeno sebe-u-delo-stavljanje istine i u-delo-stavljanje istine. Hajdegerovo dvostruko određenje umetnosti sugerise uvođenje ravnoteže između refleksivnog i revolucionarnog shvatanja umetnosti, autonomije dela i neophodnosti umetnika i publike, te egzistencijala bačemošći i projekovanja. Ispitivanje izvora umetničkog dela pokazuje da je i sama umetnost vrsta izvora - iz koga istina proističe.

Ključne reči: *umetničko delo, istina, aletheia, svet, zemlja, izvor*