COMPETITION LAW AND CARTELS OF LARGE RETAIL CHAINS: IMPACT ON CONSUMER WELFARE

Stefan Stefanović

DOI Number
https://doi.org/10.22190/FULP250227008S
First page
095
Last page
105

Abstract


Market economies function efficiently only in the presence of a well-defined and consistently enforced legal framework against anti-competitive practices. The cartelization of large retail chains significantly threatens consumer welfare, which is particularly evident through price increases and reduced service quality and options available to consumers. Cartels pose a huge threat to the economy by undermining fair competition, restricting free competition and violating market fairness. This paper analyzes the regulatory framework for combating cartel behaviour in Serbia, with special reference to practical cases illustrating the disruption of competition caused by cartels formed among major retail entities. It also sheds some light on how such forms of anti-competitive practices directly affect the citizens' quality of life and obstruct small market players. The author discusses some of the best practices in combating retail chain cartels in Germany and France, and the potential incorporation of such practices in Serbia to combat large retail chain cartels. These countries are known for having developed stern antitrust laws that do suppress cartels as well as institutional mechanisms. This paper primarily aims to underscore the necessity of advancing regulatory mechanisms and fostering greater public awareness about the detrimental impact of retail cartels on market fairness and consumer welfare.

Keywords

competition, cartels, retail chains, consumer welfare.

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22190/FULP250227008S

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